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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
While jurisprudence is not usually something which tends to arouse the interest
of policy-makers, in the debate regarding the revision of Regulation No
1049/2001 on Public Access to Documents it is nonetheless of great importance.
Indeed, since the entry into force of Regulation No 1049/2001 ten years ago, the
Court has had to rule on a multitude of issues raised by requests for access to
documents. In thus interpreting the Regulation, the Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean union has produced a sizeable – not uncontroversial – body of case law
which shapes to an important extent the right of public access to documents
within the EU. Hence, when decision-makers eventually manage to move
beyond the current political deadlock, they will simply be obliged to take into
account and respond to these jurisprudential interpretations.
With this in mind, this paper provides an overview and critical analysis of the
case law on Regulation No 1049/2001. In addition, by clarifying the important
considerations underlying the debate on public access to documents, the author
hopes to raise policy-makers’ awareness of the crucial interests at stake in this
seemingly “marginal” political dossier. Far from questioning the necessity and
value of transparency of legislative and administrative processes in a democracy,
this paper pleads in favour of “optimal” as opposed to “maximum” openness.
Probably the most controversial issue within the access to documents debate
concerns the need and justifiability of a so-called “space to think” for policy-
makers. Whereas the Regulation contains a specific exception aimed at protect-
ing decision-making processes from being “seriously undermined” by the disclo-
sure of documents, the Court has become less and less inclined to accept its
applicability. From its recent case law1, it can be inferred that the Court requires,
on principle, complete openness of legislative processes, even if these are still
ongoing. Likewise, the Court has made it considerably tougher to prove that
disclosure of internal documents that were part of a finalized administrative
decision-making process might harm the institution’s decision-making capacity.2
Yet, it is argued in this paper that excessive transparency demands could very
well harm the specific deliberation and negotiation process within the Council,
lead to the use of more informal working methods detrimental to the function-
ing of any institution, deprive the Commission of “frank expert advice” in
domains with large financial interests at stake, limit administrations’ capacity to
organize a free exchange of ideas and opinions that are given the time to mature
without the constraints of self-censure, etc.
1. Case T-233/09, Access Info Europe/Council [nyr] (on appeal: pending Case C-280/11 P, Council/Access Info
Europe); Joined cases C-39/05 P and C-52/05 P, Sweden and Turco/Council [2008] ECR I-4723.
2. Case C-506/08 P Sweden/MyTravel and Commission, paras 89, 97-98, 100.PUBLIC ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS: JURISPRUDENCE BETWEEN PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE
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A related contentious matter is the degree of public access to be granted to legal
advice provided by the institutions’ internal legal services. Since Turco it is clear
that legal opinions in legislative procedures are to be made public even if the
procedure is still ongoing, unless it is proven that a specific legal opinion is of a
“particularly sensitive nature” or “particularly wide scope [going] beyond the
context of the legislative process in question”.3 Whereas in MyTravel the Gen-
eral Court (EGC) had given more leeway to the institutions to refuse the disclo-
sure of legal advice provided in the context of administrative procedures, the
Court of Justice (ECJ) (partially) reversed this judgment4 and concluded in
essence that also legal opinions delivered in the context of administrative proce-
dures need to be made public once that administrative process has ended.5 How-
ever, contrary to the ECJ’s findings in respect of both legislative and administra-
tive procedures, it does not seem “purely hypothetical”6 that such publicity
could prejudice the institutions’ legal services’ frankness and independence
when asked for their opinion, or even cause them to resort to expressing these
opinions orally. For the Council in particular, such a loss of frank, written legal
opinions, aside from reducing rather than increasing transparency, would be
detrimental to the quality of decision-making, given the Council context of seek-
ing agreement between 27 Member State delegates, with differing backgrounds,
who have to communicate back and forth with their capitals.
As regards Member State documents in the possession of the EU institutions, the
Court has limited the Member State’s discretion in refusing their disclosure.
Whereas a prior (dis)agreement of the Member State is still, in principle, binding
on the EU institution confronted with the demand for disclosure this does not
confer an unconditional and general veto right on those Member States.7
Indeed, the Member State is required to state reasons for its refusal, and, more
importantly, these reasons should be able to fall under the exceptions set out in
Art. 4(1)-(3) of the Regulation or relate to the specific protection accorded to
sensitive documents (Art. 9). The Court further clarified that, regardless of
whether this refusal followed the assessment and application of these exceptions
by the institution itself or by a Member State, the Community judicature should
conduct a complete judicial review (as opposed to a mere prima facie review) to
review whether the refusal was validly based on those exceptions.8 Yet, up to
now, the Court has not yet clarified the nature of the institutions’ oversight over
3. Sweden and Turco, para. 69.
4. Since some of the Commission’s arguments, in particular as regards the exception on the protection of the pur-
pose of inspections, investigations and audits, had not been examined by the General Court, the matter was
referred back for a new judgment
5. Case C-506/08 P, Sweden/MyTravel and Commission [nyr].
6. Sweden and Turco, para. 63. Mytravel
7. Sweden/Commission (IFAW I)
8. IFAW II,PUBLIC ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS: JURISPRUDENCE BETWEEN PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE 
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the Member State’s arguments. Hence, the ECJ left the question as to whom, the
institution or the Member State, has the final word unresolved.
An important recent trend in the ECJ’s case law is its willingness to accept that
specialized legislation or rules organizing access to documents in a specific
domain, for example the rules on state aid review procedures, should be pre-
sumed to prevail over the more general rules on access.9 Hence, if these special-
ized rules do not grant access to the documents at hand, there will be a rebutta-
ble general presumption against disclosure. This jurisprudence breaks with the
Court’s traditionally strict stance on the requirement of a concrete case-by-case
analysis, and its rejection of arguments based on categories of rather than indi-
vidual documents. Yet, the fact that Regulation No 1049/2001 affects such a
wide variety of domains and situations, characterized by a multitude of conflict-
ing interests, does indeed seem to plead in favour of relying on the legislator’s
specific balancing act conducted in a specific policy context. Whereas a general
exemption of situations governed by specific access rules from the scope of
application of Regulation No 1049/2001 would in theory be a better solution,
this would arguably require a revision of those sectorial regimes to ensure that
they adequately take into account the public interest in transparency. Since this
is unlikely to happen soon, the application of general presumptions that remain
rebuttable on the basis of an overriding public interest in transparency is prob-
ably the best option. Indeed, it has the potential to relieve the institutions from
the burden of having to establish in respect of every single document (from files
which often contain thousands of pages) the risk of harm from disclosure, in
domains where specific rules of access exist and the applicants are mainly moti-
vated by other reasons than increased accountability or democracy.
More generally, an argument is made for reorienting Regulation No 1049/2001
towards its core business of increasing the accountability and democratic legiti-
macy of the EU. Indeed, given that a non-negligible (and increasing) amount of
requests for access come from lawyers seeking access to large quantities of doc-
uments to support their clients’ case in e.g. infringement or competition law
cases, it seems that a lot of people and resources are being invested for reasons
that do not correspond to the ones which inspired the adoption of the Regula-
tion. Hence, in a world of limited resources it makes sense to rely on the specific
rules on access for these situations and redirect the Regulation to its original
purpose. Moreover, some of these transparency efforts could be usefully redi-
rected towards the remaining obscurity of phenomena such as lobbying and, to
some extent, trialogues. Furthermore, while transparency should be consciously
defended against “old boys”-club reflexes, institutionalised bureaucratic atti-
tudes, etc., it should also be defended against a self-defeating dogmatic pro-
9. Case C-139/07P, Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau; API, Bavarian Lager…PUBLIC ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS: JURISPRUDENCE BETWEEN PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE
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transparency attitude. Though “fear” of evasion practices should not dictate
transparency policy, these far from “purely hypothetical” practices should none-
theless be taken into account when striving for an “optimal” rather than “max-
imum” level of transparency. Hence, the Court should avoid imposing a de facto
“prohibitive” standard of proof on the parties who argue for the need for some
degree of ‘space to think and negotiate’ and who point out the risk of evasion
practices. Indeed, if not, it risks to harm the specific deliberation and negotiation
process within the Council, to deprive the Commission of ‘frank expert advice’
as well as of a free exchange of ideas and opinions that are given the time to
mature without the constraints of self-censure, etc.7
INTRODUCTION
An important ongoing debate regarding the recast of Regulation No
1049/200110 on Public Access to Documents has managed to somewhat « sail
under the radar » of European public and political debate. Although lingering for
the last three years in the stage of first reading at the European Parliament,11 it is
clear that this is a dossier which concerns all actors on the European scene and
should be followed closely. Indeed, for European citizens this debate impacts
upon their fundamental right of public access to documents, their capacity to
hold government accountable as well as their democratic participation rights. As
regards the European institutions, public access to documents influences their
democratic legitimacy, public perception, internal functioning, administrative
and legislative decision-making processes and capacity, etc. Lastly, EU access to
documents-policies affect the Member States when participating in Council meet-
ings or transferring “national” documents to the institutions.
Irrespective of the difficult legislative reform process, the Court of Justice of the
European Union (hereafter ‘the Court’)12 has over the last couple of years been
increasingly called upon to interpret the provisions of Regulation No 1049/2001.
The result of which is a fast-growing, not uncontested, body of case law. More-
over, owing to this legislative “state of limbo”, the Court is at present the main
“evolutionary force” in the EU’s access to documents’ policy. Considering that
any future legislative breakthrough will need to take into account this jurispru-
dence, this paper aims to provide a critical overview of the main cases and the
reasoning adopted by the Court. More specifically, it seeks to evaluate the extent
to which the case law is likely to de facto contribute to the objectives pursued by
the right of public access to documents and what might be the practical impact
on the Union’s overall functioning that needs to be taken into account.13
10. Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding
public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents [2001] O.J. L 145/43; European
Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council regarding public access to
European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, 30 April 2008, COM(2008)229 final.
11. Because the recast process is taking such an exceptionally long time, the Commission has in the meantime
adopted a proposal extending the rules on public access to documents to all EU institutions, bodies, offices and
agencies so as to bring the bring current rules into line with the Lisbon Treaty. European Commission, Proposal
for a Regulation of the European parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001
regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, 21 March 2011,
COM(2011) 137 final.
12. The Court of Justice of the European Union is the overarching name for the institution which consists of the:
Court of Justice (ECJ), the General Court (EGC) and Civil Service Tribunal.
13. Note that this contribution only deals with the general right of access to documents as implemented by Regu-
lation No 1049/2001, and not with the privileged rights of access granted by certain specific regulations as well
as interinstitutional agreements. For example Arts 27, 28 & 30 of regulation (EC) No 1/2003 concerning compe-
tition; Articles 6(7) and 14(2) of Regulation (EC) No 384/96 (antidumping); Articles 11(7) and 24(2) of Regula-
tion (EC) No 2026/97 (anti-subsidy); Article 6(2) of Regulation (EC) No 3285/94 (safeguards); Article 5(2) of
Regulation (EC) No 519/94 (safeguards against non-WTO members); Interinstitutional agreement of 20 Novem-
ber 2002 between the European Parliament and the Council concerning access by the European Parliament to
sensitive information of the Council in the field of security and defence policy [2002] O.J. C298/1.PUBLIC ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS: JURISPRUDENCE BETWEEN PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE
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While an in-depth study of the existing empirical research about the impact of
transparency on political and administrative processes was beyond the scope of
this paper, a modest attempt is nonetheless made to transcend a pure consist-
ency-based or “dogmatic” pro-transparency scrutiny of the case law and include
more pragmatic considerations into the cost-benefit analysis.14
Dr. Tinne Heremans
Senior Research Fellow, Egmont
14. For a laudable effort to lift the analysis beyond the somewhat dogmatic “maximum transparency”-standard
found in much of the legal literature: see KRANENBORG, H.R., “Tien jaar Eurowob: reden voor een
feestje?”(2011) SEW, Issue 5, 217-230, who screens the recent case law using the objective benchmark of “the
effectiveness of the right of access to documents” from the citizen’s perspective.9
1. SITUATING THE PUBLIC ACCESS TO 
DOCUMENTS DEBATE
Before diving into this sizeable body of case law, the objectives, development
and potential pitfalls of the principle of transparency and public access to doc-
uments are briefly set out. These are then discussed more in-depth throughout
the case law analysis.
1.1. Objectives and development of the right of public 
access to documents
Transparency serving regulatory accountability and democracy – Traditionally,
transparency of government action is primarily advocated as a means to ensure
the regulatory accountability of that government, i.e. to facilitate the control of
as well as the quality of government action.15 Yet, in the sui generis European
legal order, transparency has been accorded a much more prominent role in
strengthening democracy at large.16 Indeed, as the substantial expansion of EU
competences and domains of action by the Single European Act and, in partic-
ular, the Maastricht Treaty, intensified the criticism on the democratic deficit of
the EU institutions, the call for more transparency became “incontournable”.
Hence, the principle of transparency was embraced as a key instrument in the
quest for more democratic legitimacy. Moreover, with the idea of deliberative
democracy gaining ground in the context of the EU, transparency was deemed
crucial in ensuring citizens’ capacity to participate in the political process or, in
other words, their democratic participation rights.17
In response, a Declaration of Transparency was attached to the Maastricht
Treaty18 which was then followed by the adoption of a Code of Conduct19 con-
15. See, among others, VERHOEVEN, A., “The Right to Information: A Fundamental Right?”, presentation at the
EIPA Seminar on “ An Efficient, Transparent Government and the Right of Citizens to Information”, 29-30 May
2000, Maastricht, The Netherlands, 2, available at: http://publications.eipa.eu/en/details/&tid=1722
16. FROST, A., “Restoring Faith in Government: Transparency Reform in the United States and the European
Union” (2003) EPL, Volume 9, Issue 1, 87-104. For a discussion of the evolution of the role of transparency in
the EU, see Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro of 18 July 2007 in Case C-64/05 P, Sweden/Council
[2007] ECR I-11389, paras 37-47.
17. VERHOEVEN, A., “The Right to Information: A Fundamental Right”, 5; Opinion of Advocate General Poiares
Maduro in Sweden/Council, para. 41.
18. Declaration No. 17 on the right of access to information, where it was stated that “The Conference considers
that transparency of the decision-making process strengthens the democratic nature of the institutions and the
public’s confidence in the administration”.
19. Code of Conduct of December 6, 1993 concerning public access to Council and Commission documents,
[1993] O.J. L340/41 (corrigendum in [1993] O.J. L23/34); Council Decision 93/731/EC of December 20, 1993
([1993] O.J. L340/43), Council Decision 2001/320/EC of April 9, 2001 ([2001] O.J. L111/29) and Commission
Decision 94/90/ECSC, EC, Euratom of February 8, 1994 ([1994] O.J. L46/58)PUBLIC ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS: JURISPRUDENCE BETWEEN PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE
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cretizing the rules on public access to Council and Commission documents. In
2001 this Code was replaced by the current Regulation No 1049/2001.
Hence, beyond its traditional role as a means to ensure regulatory accountabil-
ity20, the principle of transparency has been accorded the additional function of
conveying democratic legitimacy on the Union’s actions.21 Although the princi-
ple of transparency is multifaceted, within the EU the principle of public access
to documents (Art. 15(3) TFEU) functions as an important proxy.22 Given the
special role accorded to transparency in the EU democratic process, public
access to documents is being interpreted as a “participation right” for citizens.
It should however be noted that from its inception, EU transparency policy has
struggled to reconcile the significant differences in viewpoints among the Mem-
ber States.
Status of the access to documents right – While never formally recognized as
such by the Court23, it seems that public access to documents should nonetheless
be regarded as a general principle of EU law24, in particular in view of its codi-
fication in Art. 42 of the Charter of fundamental rights. In addition, while the
legal implications remain to be clarified, it is notable that the Lisbon Treaty has
inserted the provisions on the right of access to documents at the beginning of
the TFEU among those provisions having general application.25Furthermore,
with the Charter of fundamental rights having “officially” been granted binding
legal effect, the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty has firmly established the
fundamental right status of the right of access to documents.26 This recognition
20. See for an account of the more « limited role » played by the principle of transparency in the USA, i.e. greater
accountability, increased efficiency, and other improvements in government output, FROST, A., “Restoring Faith
in Government: Transparency Reform in the United States and the European Union” (2003) EPL, Volume 9,
Issue 1, 87-104.
21. See Art. 1, para. 2 TEU: “This Treaty marks a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union
among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as openly as possible and as closely as possible to the
citizen”; Art. 10(3) TEU: “Every citizen shall have the right to participate in the democratic life of the Union.
Decisions shall be taken as openly and as closely as possible to the citizen”; Art. 15 TFEU: “1. In order to pro-
mote good governance and ensure the participation of civil society, the Union’s institutions, bodies, offices and
agencies shall conduct their work as openly as possible. 2. The European Parliament shall meet in public, as shall
the Council when considering and voting on a draft legislative act. 3. Any citizen of the Union, and any natural or
legal person residing or having its registered office in a Member State, shall have a right of access to documents of
the Union’s institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, whatever their medium, subject to the principles and the
conditions to be defined in accordance with this paragraph. […] The European Parliament and the Council shall
ensure publication of the documents relating to the legislative procedures under the terms laid down by the regu-
lations referred to in the second subparagraph.”
22. Alongside the obligation of publicity of legislative debates set out in Art. 15(2) TFEU.
23. Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro in Sweden/Council, para. 38
24. BROBERG, M., “Access to Documents: A General Principle of Community Law” (2002) E.L.Rev. 194-205.;
LENAERTS, K., “In the Union We Trust”: Trust-Enhancing Principles of Community Law” (2004) C.M.L.Rev.
317, 324; See also the Advocate General Opinions pleading in favor of such recognition: Opinion of Advocate
General Tesauro of 28 November 1995 in Case C-58/94 Netherlands/Council [1996] ECR I-2169, para. 19;
Opinion of Advocate General Légér of 10 July 2001 in Case C-353/99 P Council/Hautala [2001] ECR I-9565.
25. GODIN, G., “Recent Judgments Regarding Transparency and Access to Documents in the Field of Competi-
tion Law: Where Does the Court of Justice of the EU Strike the Balance?” (2011) Journal of European Competi-
tion Law & Practice, Vol. 2, No. 1, 11.
26. For a sketch of the evolution of the status of the access to documents right, see Opinion of Advocate General
Poiares Maduro in Sweden/Council, paras 37-40.PUBLIC ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS: JURISPRUDENCE BETWEEN PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE 
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is very likely to influence the interpretation of the scope, limitations, etc., of the
access to documents right.27
Recast-attempt – As mentioned in the introduction, over the last 3-4 years an
attempt to recast the Regulation has found itself in a political deadlock. Indeed,
whereas in a 2006 Resolution28 the European Parliament had called upon the
Commission to present a proposal for a revision of the Regulation and had itself
formulated recommendations to that end, the Commission opted for the more
restrained “recast-technique”. According to the relevant interinstitutional
agreement, the legislative recast-technique is designed to avoid the proliferation
of isolated amending acts around frequently amended legal acts, and therefore
allows for a repeal and replacement of the whole act.29 Its use in respect of
Regulation No 1049/2001, which has never been amended since its inception,
is however questionable and likely more inspired by strategy than good practice.
Indeed, the procedural rules of the European Parliament stipulate that, as
regards a recast-proposal, the scope of the debate and the potential amendments
introduced should be confined to those parts of the legal act for which the Com-
mission has proposed changes.30 Hence, by using the recast-technique, the Com-
mission effectively curtailed the Parliament’s aspiration to drive through much
more ambitious revision-plans. In response to the Commission’s “manoeuvre”
the European Parliament ignored these limitations and adopted a total of 92
amendments concerning all aspects of the Regulation and beyond. The Council,
however, refused to consider those EP amendments which transgressed the
“recast-mandate”.31 The European Parliament reacted by refusing to adopt its
1st reading position and sought to induce the Commission to bring forward a
revised proposal to bring the political stalemate to an end. However, the Com-
mission did not “take the bait” and confined itself to proposing, in March 2011,
a very limited revision to adapt the Regulation to the Lisbon Treaty.32
27. See already Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro in Sweden/Council, paras 38-42.
28. European Parliament resolution with recommendations to the Commission (P6_TA(2006)0122), 4 April
2006.
29. Interinstitutional agreement of 28 Nov 2001 on a more structured use of the recasting technique for legal
acts. ([2002]O.J. C 77/1); It can rightfully be questioned whether it was the appropriate technique to use given
that the Regulation had remained unchanged since its adoption and the Commission’s proposal diverged strongly
from the Parliament’s recommendations. (see also HARDEN, I., “The Revision of Regulation No 1049/2001 on
Public Access to Documents” (2009) European Public Law 15(2), 245).
30. Art. 80 of the European Parliament’s Rules of procedures.
31. See for the opinion of the Council’s Legal Service: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2009/may/eu-access-reg-
council-table-7791-09.pdf
32. European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European parliament and of the Council amending
Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission docu-
ments, 21 March 2011, COM(2011) 137 final.PUBLIC ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS: JURISPRUDENCE BETWEEN PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE
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1.2. Framework for a critical review of the case law
Tension between principle and practice – It seems that the main difficulty in this
debate stems from the fact that whereas the “theoretical case” for maximum
transparency with the widest possible public access to documents is clear, the
“practical case” based on the true impact and effects of such wide access rights
is more blurry. Indeed, it is difficult nót to be in favour of the principle of gov-
ernment transparency allowing citizens to hold their governors accountable as
well as to have the opportunity to participate in their democracy as informed
actors. Hence, at the “level of principles”, which is arguably the most natural
habitat of courts, the case for maximum openness and access to documents is a
very strong one. Yet, at the level of the actual practical implications of full trans-
parency of government, in particular in terms of public access to its documents,
the picture becomes mistier.33
Several factors render such an evaluation of the practical effect extremely com-
plicated. For one, there does not seem to exist much empirical research capable
of underpinning any sort of general conclusion as regards the impact of
increased transparency.34 Secondly, when relying on the practical experiences of
the different actors (“anecdotal evidence”), it is clear that these experiences will
be different for each actor and institution, and that each of them, including the
Court, is susceptible to its own type of “institutional bias”. Thirdly, the partic-
ular cost-benefit analysis of the public access to documents-obligation differs
greatly as between institutions and across policy domains.
Transparency as a means or a goal – Especially in view of its evolution into a
fundamental right it might seem that public access to documents has outgrown
its instrumental role as serving democracy and accountability. Yet, if transpar-
ency becomes a goal in itself, there is a risk that it could in the end trump its own
“raison d’être”. Indeed, “too much transparency can kill transparency” by trig-
gering a variety of evasive practices. Moreover, an excessive focus on the oper-
ational proxies like public access to documents can also distract attention from
those real “elephants in the room” such as the pervasiveness and secrecy of
33. See already VERHOEVEN, “The Right to Information: A Fundamental Right?”, 2-5, who, though strongly in
favour of transparency, admits that (1) excessive transparency could lead to “legalism” and “risk aversion”,
thereby undermining effective decision-making; and that (2) the result of an effective participation of citizens in
EU governance on the basis of increased access to information remains contested given the experience in the US
where the freedom of information act has “more often than not been used by commercial interests seeking to gain
competitive advantages which is hardly related to participation of citizens in government”. See also the fragment
in Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro in Sweden/Council, para. 41: “If one wished to be provocative,
one could doubtless question the alleged relationship between transparency and democracy. […] There is, more-
over, a risk that transparency will not be used in the same manner by all citizens and that it will serve to promote
privileged access to the political system for certain interest groups.”
34. See for example MEADE, E. and STASAVAGE, D., “Two Effects of Transparency on the Quality of Delibera-
tion” (2006) Swiss Political Science Review 12(3), 123-124, who note the lack of systematic empirical research
on the behavior of public officials in transparent versus secretive environments as well as, more generally, the
scarce research on the costs as opposed to the benefits of public deliberation between government officials.PUBLIC ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS: JURISPRUDENCE BETWEEN PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE 
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lobbying in the EU decision-making process. Likewise, it could divert attention
and resources away from more effective means to achieve the ultimate goals of
greater accountability, legitimacy35 and democratic participation. For example,
despite the enthusiasm in EU doctrine, it should be clear that transparency is a
necessary yet insufficient condition for strengthening the so-called participatory
democracy36, and other routes such as reinforcing the formalised consultation
processes of citizens and civil society deserve equal if not more attention.
In conclusion, though the right of public access to documents is a necessary
instrument to correct the natural tendency of administrators and political lead-
ers towards secrecy, it should be exercised in a balanced manner taking into
account opposing interests.
35. For a critical appraisal of the naive assumptions underlying the “great expectations” in relation to transpar-
ency in the EU, see CURTIN, D. and MEIJER, E.J., “Does transparency strengthen legitimacy?” (2006) Information
Polity 11, 109-122.
36. See in that sense CURTIN and MEIJER, “Does transparency strengthen legitimacy?”, 120.15
2. JURISPRUDENCE INTERPRETING 
THE EXCEPTIONS
Since most cases on access to documents turn on the interpretation of one of the
grounds of exceptions to access provided for in the Regulation, this will be the
focal point of this case law overview.
2.1. General principles
Substantive scope: documents – Regulation No. 1049/2001 applies to “all doc-
uments held by an institution, that is to say, documents drawn up or received by
it and in its possession, in all areas of activity of the European Union”. A docu-
ment is defined broadly as “any content whatever its medium (written on paper
or stored in electronic form or as a sound, visual or audiovisual recording) con-
cerning a matter relating to the policies, activities and decisions falling within
the institution’s sphere of responsibility” (Art. 3(a)). Probably the most contro-
versial amendment in the Commission’s recast proposal is precisely the reformu-
lation of what constitutes “a document” for the purposes of the Regulation,
suggesting that a document “means any content whatever its medium (written
on paper or stored in electronic form or as a sound, visual or audiovisual record-
ing) drawn-up by an institution and formally transmitted to one or more recip-
ients or otherwise registered, or received by an institution; data contained in
electronic storage, processing and retrieval systems are documents if they can be
extracted in the form of a printout or electronic-format copy using the available
tools for the exploitation of the system”.37 This is clearly a renewed attempt by
the Commission to limit the publicity of its internal decision-making process,
seeking to safeguard some type of “space to think”.38 Arguably, rather than
introducing such a vague and unclear criterion of “formal transmission”39, the
37. Proposed Art. 3 (emphasis added); As regards electronic databases HARDEN notes that there is no simple solu-
tion to the conceptual and practical difficulties in defining a public access right with regard to the content of data-
bases. Though the Commission’s proposal is based on its long experience and current practice, its reliance on the
“available tools for the exploitation of the system” without any requirement to adapt the design and operation of
these electronic databases which were developed in the context of internal information management to the new
reality of increased public access is unsatisfactory. (HARDEN, I., “The Revision of Regulation No 1049/2001 on
Public Access to Documents” (2009) European Public Law 15(2), 246)
38. See already the Commission’s initial Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents ([2000] OJ C177E/70)
““document” shall mean any content whatever its medium (written on paper or stored in electronic form or as a
sound, visual or audiovisual recording); only administrative documents shall be covered, namely documents con-
cerning a matter relating to the policies, activities and decisions falling within the institution’s sphere of responsi-
bility, excluding texts for internal use such as discussion documents, opinions of departments, and excluding
informal messages”, Art. 3(a).
39. The House of Lords European Union Committee considers the unclear criterion of “formal transmission” not
to be a suitable way to balance the competing interests in protection and disclosure. (House of Lords, European
Union Committee, 15th Report of Session 2008-2009, “Access to EU Documents”, 18 June 2009, 31-32, availa-
ble at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200809/ldselect/ldeucom/108/108.pdf)PUBLIC ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS: JURISPRUDENCE BETWEEN PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE
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Commission would be better advised to maintain the current broad definition
and pursue its objective of “effective administration and policy-formulation”
via the route of exceptions. It should nonetheless be noted that the Commission
is not alone in seeking to limit access via exemptions from the substantive scope
of the Regulation. Indeed, notably Sweden restricts the public’s right of access
to “official documents” thereby excluding certain internal documents and pre-
paratory documents.40
Personal scope – Although in line with the wording of ex Art. 255 EC the Reg-
ulation only explicitly applies to access to documents of the Commission, Coun-
cil and European Parliament, the institutions adopted a Joint Declaration
demanding that also agencies and similar bodies adopt analogous rules on
access to documents.41 Though the Lisbon Treaty explicitly expands this right
of access to documents held by “the Union’s institutions, bodies, offices and
agencies” – thereby requiring a revision of the Regulation – it nonetheless pro-
vides that the Court of Justice, the ECB and the EIB are subject to this right of
public access to documents only to the extent that they are exercising adminis-
trative tasks (Art.15(3), para. 4, TFEU).42
Beneficiaries: public with no need to show interest – “Subject to the principles,
conditions and limits defined in this Regulation” a right of access is guaranteed
to “any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having
its registered office in a Member State”43. (Art. 2(1) & (3)) In line with the
Regulation’s philosophy that transparency per se serves the public interest since
“openness enables citizens to participate more closely in the decision-making
process and guarantees that the administration enjoys greater legitimacy and is
more effective and more accountable to the citizen”, a person seeking access to
a document will not need to state any reasons justifying his request (Art.6(1))
and will thus not need to demonstrate any particular interest in having access to
documents beyond the public interest in transparency.
Applying the exceptions – The basic principle underlying the application and
interpretation of Regulation No 1049/2001 is that of the widest possible access
to documents.44 Hence, the exceptions to public access provided for in the Reg-
40. For more information: see Articles 7 & 9 of the Swedish Freedom of Press Act; MENDEL, T., Freedom of
Information: A Comparative Legal Survey, (Unesco, Paris 2008), 101-103, available at www.unesco.org/ web-
world/en/foi; see also DRIESSEN, B., Transparency in EU institutional law: a practitioner’s handbook (Cameron
May, London, 2008), 13.
41. Joint Declaration relating to Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and the Council of
30 May 2001 [2001] OJ L173/5.
42. It would seem useful to adopt a clear-cut definition of what is understood by such “administrative tasks”.
43. Although de facto no limitation was ever used.
44. Art. 1 of the Regulation dealing with its ‘purpose’. Case T-174/95, Svenska Journalistförbundet /Council
[1998] ECR II-2289, para. 66; Case T-211/00, Kuijer/Council (Kuijer II) [2002] ECR II-485, para. 55; Case C-
266/05 P, Sison/Council [2007] ECR I-1233.
para 61.PUBLIC ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS: JURISPRUDENCE BETWEEN PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE 
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ulation are to be interpreted and applied as restrictively as possible.45 More
precisely, the Court requires any request for access to documents to be subjected
to a concrete and individual examination.46
This requirement of a concrete or specific examination means that the institu-
tions need to examine “in a concrete manner” for each document whether its
disclosure is likely to “specifically and actually” undermine one of the interests
protected via the exceptions.47 This risk of harm to the protected interest should
be reasonable foreseeable and not purely hypothetical48. Such a concrete exam-
ination will thus necessarily need to go beyond the mere constatation that a
document “concerns” a particular interest based on49, for example, the
“nature”50 and “title” of the document, and examine whether there is a reason-
ably foreseeable risk that the interest would be “specifically and actually”
undermined when the document were to be disclosed. Moreover, in line with the
proportionality principle, wherever possible, partial access should be granted to
those parts of the requested document(s) which do not endanger the protected
interest (Art. 4(6)). Nonetheless, certain circumstances, like an excessive admin-
istrative burden of having to blank out a multitude of confidential paragraphs,
can discharge the institution from this duty of partial disclosure.51
The obligation to conduct an “individual assessment” requires the institution
to separately assess for each document the possibility to grant the requested
access.52 Hence, in principle, it cannot refuse access to a “group”, “class” or
“category” of documents. However, as we will see, in a couple of very recent
cases the Court accepted that the institution can base its decision on certain
general presumptions regarding a category of documents.53 Moreover, where
the size of the request54 would be such that a concrete and individual examina-
tion of the documents would entail an unreasonable amount of administrative
work risking paralyzing the proper working of the institution, the institution is
45. Case C-353/99 P, Council/ Hautala [2001] ECR I-9565, para. 25; Kuijer II, para. 55.
46. Kuijer II para. 36; Case T-2/03, Verein fur Konsumenteninformation/ Commission [2005] ECR II-1121, para.
69.
47. Verein fur Konsumenteninformation, para. 69.
48. Kuijer II, para. 56; Case T-403/05, MyTravel Group plc./Commission [2008] ECR II-2027, para. 73
49. Joined cases T-391/03 and T-70/04, Franchet and Byk/Commission [2006] ECR II-2023, paras 105&115.
50. Franchet and Byk, para. 130.
51. Case T-14/98, Hautala/Council [1999] ECR II-2489, para. 86; Case C-353/99 P, Council v. Hautala [2001]
ECR I-9565, para. 30; Case T-211/00, Kuijer/Council (Kuijer II) [2002] ECR II-485, para. 57. It is however
uncertain whether this still applies under the regime of Regulation No 1049/2001.
52. Verein fur Konsumenteninformation, para. 70; Franchet and Byk, para. 116; Case T-237/05, Éditions
Jacob/Commission [nyr], para. 42.
53. Joined cases C-514/07 P, C-528/07 P and C-532/07 P Sweden/API and Commission [nyr], para. 73; Tech-
nische Glaswerke Ilmenau in respect of documents regarding an ongoing state aid investigation (Case C-139/07P,
Commission/Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau (TGI) [nyr], para. 61). Although in these cases reference is made to
the Turco-judgment, the ECJ had added an important qualification to its theoretical acceptation of the reliance
on general considerations by requiring the institution to “establishes that these considerations are also applicable
to the particular document at hand”, Joined cases C-39/05 P and C-52/05 P, Sweden and Turco/Council [2008]
ECR I-4723, para. 50.
54. With 30.000 to 40.000 pages not being an exception in requests for access to competition law files.PUBLIC ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS: JURISPRUDENCE BETWEEN PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE
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in principle allowed to balance the interest in public access against the need to
safeguard the interests of good administration.55 Although in line with the spirit
of Art. 6(3) of the Regulation allowing the institution to seek “a fair solution”
with the applicant in the event of a “very long document” or a “very large
number of documents”56, the Court has emphasized that such foregoing of an
individual and concrete examination on the basis of the size of a request should
only happen in very exceptional cases and after the institution has investigated
all other conceivable options.57
Furthermore, the institutions are under the obligation to state the reasons for
their decision in a manner which allows the applicant, as well as potentially the
Court, to ascertain the concrete and individual nature of the assessment of their
request.58 The line is nonetheless drawn at the point where further explanation
would in fact undermine the protection of the interests in Article 4.59
In the next titles the differences in the application of these principles in the
framework of the various types of exceptions will be looked at more closely.
2.2. Mandatory exceptions (Art. 4(1)60)
A first category of exceptions set out in Art. 4(1) of Regulation No 1049/2001
are the so-called “mandatory exceptions”. The interests protected by these
exceptions are deemed to be of such importance that once a likely risk of harm
is established, the institutions are under the obligation to refuse access, without
them having any remaining discretion to weigh up these interests against the
interest in public access.61 In other words, the assessment is limited to a so-called
harm-test excluding any balancing-test.62
These mandatory exceptions are further divided into public and private inter-
ests.
55. Verein fur Konsumenteninformation, paras 101-102; Case T-42/05, Williams/Commission [2008] ECR II-
156*, Summ.pub., para. 85.
56. The Regulation also allows an institution to extend the term for deciding on a request in case of, eg. a very
long document or a very large number of documents (Arts. 7(3) and 8(2)).
57. Verein fur Konsumenteninformation, paras 103 115; Williams, para. 86. Hence, this argument has never
been accepted in concreto.
58. The EGC ruled that the presence of a concrete and individual examination is not proven merely be providing
a detailed list of documents, nor by the “categorization” of documents along the lines of the different exceptions,
nor by disclosing some of the documents. Éditions Jacob para. 84.
59. Case T-105/95, WWF UK/Commission [1997] ECR II-313, para.65; Case C-266/05 P Sisón, paras 81-82.
60. These are sometimes also referred to as «absolute exceptions ».
61. Case T-264/04, WWF European Policy Programme/Council (“WWF EPP”) [2007] ECR II-911, para 44.
62. ADAMSKI, D., “How Wide Is “The Widest Possible”? Judicial Interpretation of the Exceptions to the Right of
Access to Official Documents Revisited” (2009) C.M.L.Rev. 46, 521-549.PUBLIC ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS: JURISPRUDENCE BETWEEN PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE 
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2.2.1. Public Interests
Art. 4(1)(a) protects four types of public interests: (1) public security, (2) defense
and military matters, (3) international relations, (4) the financial, monetary or
economic policy of the Community or a Member State.63
a. Essence of case-law
The case law has made it clear that the institutions enjoy a wide discretion when
establishing the presence of a public interest ground which mandates the refusal
of public access.64 The exercise of this discretion is deemed to be part of the
institutions’ “political responsibilities” conferred by the Treaty provisions.65
Hence, the Court only conducts a limited or marginal review of those deci-
sions.66 Such marginal review consists in ascertaining whether (1) the proce-
dural rules have been complied with, (2) the duty to state reasons has been sat-
isfied; (3) the facts have been accurately stated and (4) the institution has not
made a manifest error of assessment or misused its powers.67
However, notwithstanding this wide discretion, the institutions still need to
establish in respect of each document to which access is refused, that there is a
reasonably foreseeable and not purely hypothetical risk that disclosure would
undermine the protected public interest.68 Moreover, given that exceptions to
the general principle of public access should be interpreted as restrictively as
possible, the possibility of granting partial access in line with Art. 4(6) should
always be examined.69
Public security – Untill now, the Court has been called upon only once to eval-
uate the application of the public security exception under the Regulation
regime.70 In Sison the applicant was refused access to Council documents, which
had been qualified as ‘sensitive documents’ (see below), on the basis of which
the applicant had been included on a list of persons whose funds and financial
assets were to be frozen as part of the fight against terrorism.71 The Court con-
63. Note that the Recast proposal would add environmental protection to this list: “(e) the environment, such as
breeding sites of rare species.”
64. Case T-14/98, Hautala/Council, para. 72; Joined cases T-110/03, T-150/03 and T-405/03, Sison/Council
[2005] ECR II-1429, para. 46; C-266/05 P, Sison/Council, paras 34 & 64.
65. Case T-14/98, Hautala/Council, par. 71; Kuijer II, para. 53.
66. Kuijer II, para. 53;.
67. Case T-14/98, Hautala/Council para. 72; Joined cases T-110/03, T-150/03 and T-405/03, Sison/Council, para.
47; C-266/05 P, Sison/Council, para. 34; WWF EPP, para. 40.
68. Kuijer II, para. 56; WWF EPP, para. 39
69. Case T-14/98, Hautala/Council, paras 83-86; Kuijer II, par. 57.
70. In its proposal for a recast, the Commission extended the wording of this exception to “public security
including the safety of natural or legal persons “ It is unclear whether this will affect the current state of the case
law, see PEERS, S., “Statewatch Analysis June 2008: Proposal on access to documents: Article-by-Article commen-
tary“, 6, available at: http://www.statewatch.org/foi/sw-analysis-docs-june-2008.pdf.
71. More precisely, the applicant sought access to Decision 2002/848 EC implementing Art. 2(3) of Regulation
(EC) No 2580/2001.PUBLIC ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS: JURISPRUDENCE BETWEEN PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE
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firmed the Council’s refusal considering that “the effectiveness of the fight
against terrorism presupposes that information held by the public authorities on
persons or entities suspected of terrorism is kept secret so that that information
remains relevant and enables effective action to be taken” and disclosure would
thus “necessarily have undermined the public interest in relation to public secu-
rity.”72 As regards the brevity of the statement of reasons given by the Council,
the EGC deemed that this was acceptable in light of the fact that providing more
information, in particular concerning the content of the documents, would
negate the purpose of the exception.73 Moreover, the applicant’s particular inter-
est in disclosure based on his need to prepare his defence against being included
on that list could not be taken into account by the institutions when under the
obligation to apply a mandatory exception.74
Military and defence matters and protection of international relations –
Whereas the protection of the public interests as regards military and defence
matters have never formed the object of litigation before the European Court,
the interpretation of the protection of international relations has generated
somewhat more case law. In essence, the exception can be invoked if it is clear
that disclosure would harm the EU’s international relations with third coun-
tries75 and international organizations, complicate international negotiations76,
undermine its position in international negotiations77, endanger international
cooperation in matters like the fight on terrorism78, etc. In Kuijer II – still
decided under the Code of Conduct regime – the General Court found that the
Council had made a manifest error of assessment when deciding to refuse access
to “a group” of reports on the basis of their common features without having
conducted a specific analysis of each individual report.79 The fact that some of
these reports drafted by Heads of Mission on the situation of asylum seekers
returning to their country possibly contained sensitive information on the local
political, economic and social situation of a country, and could harm the Com-
munity’s relations with these third countries, did not free the Council from its
duty to screen them individually. Indeed, before refusing access, it had to estab-
72. Joined cases T-110/03, T-150/03 and T-405/03, Sison/Council, para. 77; confirmed in case C-266/05 P,
Sison/Council [2007] ECR I-1233.
para. 66
73. Joined cases T-110/03, T-150/03 and T-405/03, Sison/Council, para. 62, 84. C-266/05 P, Sison/Council, paras
82-83.
74. Joined cases T-110/03, T-150/03 and T-405/03, Sison/Council, paras 51-52; C-266/05 P, Sison/Council, paras
43 & 46. Yet, whereas such an individual interest cannot be taken into account under Regulation No 1049/2001
which concerns the public right of access to documents, it can obviously be of importance in respect of other pos-
sible privileged rights of access. Hence, in a subsequent case before the General Court the applicant in Sison man-
aged to obtain access on the basis of his individual right of defence. Case T-47/03, Sison/Council, (2007) E.C.R.
II-73.
75. Kuijer II
76. WWF EPP, para. 41
77. WWF EPP, para. 41
78. Joined cases T-110/03, T-150/03 and T-405/03, Sison/Council, paras 79-81.
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lish whether, in view of its content and context, each report at hand indeed
contained sensitive information which was not yet dated or publicly known.80
After having ordered production of those reports and having analyzed them
itself, the General Court concluded that much of their content was unlikely to
cause tensions with the third countries and the Council should thus have granted
partial access.81 In WWF EPP the General Court accepted that disclosure of a
note, which concerned the follow-up to the Cancun Summit on Sustainable
Development and analysed the positions of third countries as well as the nego-
tiating options for the Community, could harm the EU’s international relations.
Indeed, it could reasonably be thought to risk undermining the difficult ongoing
negotiations by straining the Community’s relations with third countries as well
as by jeopardizing its negotiating position.82 Likewise, in Sison, the General
Court confirmed that international cooperation in the fight against terrorism
falls under this exception, allowing even the identity of the third states involved
to be kept secret.83
Financial, monetary or economic policy of the Community or a Member State
– As regards the protection of the public interest in the financial, monetary or
economic policy of the Community or a Member State the scarce case law indi-
cates that once again the same principles apply, thus providing only for a mar-
ginal judicial review.84 However, one case which concerned a document in the
possession of the ECB and which was thus governed by that institution’s specific
rules on access to documents rather than those of Regulation No 1049/2001,
introduced some confusion into the debate. Indeed, when assessing the ECB’s
duty to state reasons by analogy with the case law on the general duty under Art.
253 EC85, the Court asserted that “it is not clear from [the ECB’s] decision that
the applicant’s interests had been weighed against the public interest constituted
by monetary stability”.86 Such weighing of interests would however seem to be
against the general stance taken by the Court in respect of mandatory excep-
tions.87 It is also interesting to note that in a recent case the General Court
confirmed that although the refusal to disclose Member States documents is in
80. Ibid, Paras 60-70.
81. Kuijer II, paras 69-71.
82. WWF EPP, para. 41.
83. Joined cases T-110/03, T-150/03 and T-405/03, Sison/Council, paras 79-81. It should be noted however that
on appeal the ECJ established that the EGC had misinterpreted the facts and that the documents emanated from
other Member States rather than third states thereby excluding the application of the international relations
exception. The judgment was nonetheless upheld since the EGC had also based its decision on the public security
exception. C-266/05 P, Sison/Council, paras 67-76.
84. WWF EPP, paras 40-41. Case T-362/08, IFAW Internationaler Tierschutz-Fonds/Commission ( IFAW II)
[nyr], paras 87 & 107.
85. Joined cases T-3/00 and T-337/04, Pitsiorlas/Council and ECB [2007] ECR 2007, II-4779, 263.
86. Pitsiorlas, paras 271-272. However, the actual annulment decision of the ECB’s decision was based on the
fact that it had neglected to state any ground for rejection, i.e. monetary stability, in its refusal of access addressed
to the applicant.
87. See ADAMSKI, D., “How Wide Is “The Widest Possible”? Judicial Interpretation of the Exceptions to the
Right of Access to Official Documents Revisited” (2009) C.M.L.Rev. 46, 527.PUBLIC ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS: JURISPRUDENCE BETWEEN PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE
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principle subject to complete judicial review, the Member State’s reliance on the
protection of its economic policy falls within Art. 4(1)(a) and is thus only subject
to marginal judicial review.88
Sensitive documents – Unlike the earlier Code of Conduct89, Regulation No
1049/2001 contains a specific provision regarding the treatment of requests for
access to ‘sensitive classified documents’. These are documents which have
received a confidentiality classification90 to ensure the protection of the essential
interests of the European Union or one of its Member States in the domains
covered by Art. 4(1)(a), especially public security, defence and military matters.
According to Art. 9(3) these documents can only be recorded in the register or
released if consent is obtained from the originator. Moreover, when giving rea-
sons for a refusal of access, the institution needs to ensure that its statement of
reasons does not affect the interests protected in Art. 4. (Art. 9(4))
Up to now only one case has required the Court to interpret Art. 9 and clarify
how sensitive documents are to be treated in the context of Regulation No
1049/2001. In Sison, both the General Court (EGC) and the Court of Justice
(ECJ) affirmed that the originator of a sensitive document could refuse not only
the disclosure of the document’s content but also its very existence. 91 In addi-
tion, the identity of the Member States from which the documents originated,
could be kept secret.92
As regards the obligation to state reasons for refusing access, both courts
accepted that the Council had satisfactorily fulfilled this duty by communicating
to the applicant that its refusal was based on the fact that (1) its request con-
cerned sensitive documents falling under Art. 9(3), and that (2) the documents’
originators had refused their disclosure.93 The Council did not need to carry out
an assessment of the grounds on which the originating Member States refused
disclosure, nor did it need to explain why disclosure of the Member States’ iden-
tity would undermine the interests protected by Art. 4(1)(a).94
Furthermore, the EGC considered that the Council had sufficiently proven that
a concrete examination to establish whether disclosure was likely to undermine
88. IFAW II, paras 87 & 107.
89. DRIESSEN notes however that such documents where equally protected via the Code’s exception allowing the
institutions to ‘refuse access in order to protect the institution’s interest in the confidentiality of its proceedings’
combined with the authorship rule, see DRIESSEN, Transparency in EU institutional law, 116-117.
90. Three classification categories are used for such sensitive documents: ‘EU Top Secret’, ‘EU Secret’ and ‘EU
confidential’.
91. Joined cases T-110/03, T-150/03 and T-405/03, Sison/Council, para. 95; C-266/05 P, Sison/Council, para.
101.
92. Joined cases T-110/03, T-150/03 and T-405/03, Sison/Council, para. 96; C-266/05 P, Sison/Council, para.
102.
93. Joined cases T-110/03, T-150/03 and T-405/03, Sison/Council, paras. 64-65; C-266/05 P, Sison/Council, para.
86 & 106.
94. Joined cases T-110/03, T-150/03 and T-405/03, Sison/Council, para. 64; C-266/05 P, Sison/Council, para.
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the protected public interests under Art. 4(1)(a) had been carried out. Indeed, as
discussed above, the Council did not make a manifest error of assessment when
considering that the interests in public security and international relations could
be undermined by disclosure of those documents relating to the fight against
terrorism. Moreover, such a concrete assessment was seemingly taken to be
“inherent” in the procedure regarding access to sensitive documents since it
allows both the officials and the Member State delegations to examine the doc-
uments and express their views, and demands, at the end of the process, a unan-
imous approval of the refusal decision by the Council.95
It can thus be concluded that as regards access to sensitive documents the insti-
tutions are awarded a wide discretion on which the Court exercises only mar-
ginal judicial review.
b. Analysis: examination standard and deferent judicial review
The freedom enjoyed by the institutions in relying on one of the public interest
grounds to refuse disclosure of certain documents has been criticized by many.96
Although recognizing that a certain degree of discretion might be justified in
respect of protecting interests like public security and international relations,97
the Community judicature’s choice to conduct only a marginal judicial review,
is considered as being too lenient towards the institutions.98
However, recalling that “the Community legislature must be allowed a broad
discretion in areas which involve political, economic and social choices on its
part” and where it has to “undertake complex assessments”, the ECJ considered
that “the particularly sensitive and essential nature of the interests protected by
Article 4(1)(a) […], combined with the fact that access must be refused […] if
disclosure of a document to the public would undermine those interests, confers
on the decision which must thus be adopted by the institution a complex and
delicate nature which calls for the exercise of particular care [thus requiring] a
95. Joined cases T-110/03, T-150/03 and T-405/03, Sison/Council, para. 83. For strong criticism on this “categor-
ical exclusion” of sensitive documents from the duty to carry out a concrete and individual examination, see;
HELISKOSKI, J. & LEINO, P., “Darkness at the Break of Noon: the Case Law on Regulation No. 1049/2001 on
Access to Documents” (2006) C.M.L.Rev. 43, 735-781. ADAMSKI however, seems more open to the idea that in
respect of sensitive classified documents such a reasonably foreseeable risk that disclosure would undermine a
protected interest is quite probable given the fact that they have gone through the “classification-process”, ADAM-
SKI, “How Wide Is “The Widest Possible”?”, 525.
ADAMSKI, “How Wide Is “The Widest Possible”?”, 525
96. ADAMSKI, “How Wide Is “The Widest Possible”?”, 524; HELISKOSKI, J. & LEINO, P., “Darkness at the Break
of Noon”, 735-781.
97. ADAMSKI, “How Wide Is “The Widest Possible”?”, 525.
98. Indeed, according to ADAMSKI, the practice of a marginal judicial review has been developed in the context of
economic cases where the Court is thought to lack the necessary expertise to substantively evaluate the economic
assessments conducted by the institutions. Yet, he argues, such reticence is inappropriate in respect of judicial
review in cases concerning a fundamental right such as the right of access to documents, and a more “inquisitive
judicial control” is required so as to check the acclaimed special nature of the documents at hand. ADAMSKI,
“How Wide Is “The Widest Possible”?”, 526PUBLIC ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS: JURISPRUDENCE BETWEEN PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE
24
margin of appreciation”99. Put more clearly by Advocate General Geelhoed:
“[the] decision whether or not to grant access to a document which has a bear-
ing on [the interests protected by the exceptions provided for in Article 4(1)(a)]
necessarily depends on policy considerations and must be taken on the basis of
information which is available only to the competent political authorities. As the
efficacy of policy in this area in many cases depends on confidentiality being
observed, the Community institutions involved must have complete discretion
in respect of determining whether one of the interests listed in Article 4(1)(a)
could be undermined by disclosure of documents”.100 Hence, “it would tran-
scend the nature of the judicial function for the Community courts to replace the
assessment of the responsible political institutions by its own judgment” and
judicial review should thus in principle be restricted.101
2.2.2. Private Interests – Privacy and the Integrity of the 
Individual
a. Borax – expert meetings
In Borax, the EGC rejected the Commission’s claim that disclosure of the iden-
tity of experts – or recordings which would allow for indirect deduction of their
identity – who took part in an expert meeting organised by the Commission to
obtain advice regarding the potential qualification of certain substances as dan-
gerous, would expose them to external pressure and harm their privacy, integ-
rity as well as potentially career.102
The Commission argued that disclosure of the identity and opinions of the
experts would clearly undermine their integrity by exposing them to external
pressure.103 The Court deemed however that no specific evidence had been pro-
vided “which would corroborate the existence of pressure or a risk of pressure
on the participants in the meeting at issue, particularly on the part of Borax or
on its initiative” and held that such a general claim would apply to all expert
meetings held by the Commission.104
99. C-266/05 P, Sison/Council, para. 35
100. Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed of 22 June 2006 in case C-266/05 P, Sison/Council, para. 30.
101. Ibid, para. 31
102. Case T-166/05, Borax Europe/Commission [2009] ECR II-28, Summ.pub.
103. As regards a confidentiality promise undertaken by the Commission, the General Court held that it could
not be invoked against third parties like Borax and did in any case not figure in the exhaustive list of exceptions
included in the Regulation. (para. 34) Moreover, in respect of its argument that disclosure would harm the
experts’ privacy and infringe the Data Protection Regulation No 45/2001 (Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2000 on the protection of individuals with regard to the
processing of personal data by the Community institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data,
[2001] O.J. L 8/1), the Commission had failed to give a sufficient statement of reasons in its contested decision.
Indeed, having relied only marginally on the Data Protection Regulation in the refusal decision itself, it was only
in the proceedings before the Court – and thus too late – that the Commission presented the grounds on which it
considered that disclosure of the experts’ identities would infringe their privacy as well as the Data Protection
Regulation. (paras 38-41)
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Conceding that it could not provide precise or case-specific information as to the
risk of pressure in the particular case at hand, the Commission asserted that “it
was [nonetheless] clear from the evidence of persons participating in that type
of meeting that, when significant interests were at stake, as in this case, pressure
was exerted and the experts were approached or criticised”.105 Nonetheless, the
General Court considered that such a general claim did not prove that there was
more than a purely hypothetical risk of the experts’ integrity being under-
mined.106
Yet the Commission did add more concretely that “the personal inquiries car-
ried out by [Borax], in the past, and the criticisms which it made in respect of
the experts’ qualifications could be regarded as evidence of undue external pres-
sure exerted on them” and should thus be accepted by the Court as tangible
evidence.107 In support of this, the Commission also produced a letter sent to it
by Borax on the date of adoption of the contested decision, and in which Borax
explained that, “in view of the fact that the summary record did not reveal the
qualifications of the experts who had participated in the meeting, it made some
inquiries which had clearly shown that certain experts had no qualifications in
respect of reproductive toxicity”.108 However, the EGC noted that the legality
of a contested measure is to be assessed based on the facts and the law as they
stood at the time of its adoption, and considered that the Commission did not
prove that it took into account this letter, which moreover dated from the same
day as the contested decision, when adopting the refusal decision. Hence, the
letter could not be taken into account for the purposes of the examination of the
present action.109 Furthermore, in the EGC’s opinion the letter did not prove
that actual pressure had been exerted on any of the experts nor that there was
any intention to do so.110
Moreover, the Commission’s claim that an expert’s reputation or career could
be affected by the revelation of an opinion contrary to a company’s interests,
was also deemed to be a purely hypothetical risk. 111
Notwithstanding the potentially far-reaching practical consequences of this
judgment in respect of expert consultation, it should be noted that a seemingly
important factor in the EGC’s decision was the Commission’s persistent refusal
to disclose even after “Borax amended its initial request by accepting that the
information sought be limited to transcripts of the recordings, from which the
experts’ names and countries of origin would be omitted”, whereas the EGC
105. Ibid, para. 45.
106. Ibid, para. 45
107. Ibid, para. 46
108. Ibid, para. 47
109. Ibid, paras 47-48.
110. Ibid, para. 49.
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deemed such an amended “application [...] apt to remove any possible risk of
undermining the protection of the experts’ privacy and integrity”.112
b. Bavarian Lager – relationship with Personal Data Regulation 
45/2001 for documents containing personal data
Other than in Borax, the EGC had to pronounce itself in Bavarian Lager on the
long debated issue of the relationship between Regulations 45/2001 (Personal
Data Protection) and 1049/2001 (Public Access to Documents).113
In this case Bavarian Lager sought access to the full minutes of a meeting held
in the context of an infringement procedure against the UK; a procedure which
had followed on from a complaint lodged by Bavarian Lager itself. The meeting
was attended by Commission officials, UK officials and representatives of a
brewers trade organization at EU level; yet despite its request, Bavarian Lager
had not been invited. The Commission agreed to disclose the substance of the
document yet blanked out the names of the five EU trade organization repre-
sentatives whom had not given their consent for disclosure.114 To justify its deci-
sion, the Commission relied on Regulation 45/2001 and stated that the appli-
cant had failed to establish an express and legitimate purpose or need for such
disclosure as Art. 8 of that Regulation prescribed. Hence, based on the excep-
tion for the protection of the private life and integrity of those participants con-
tained in Art. 4(1)(b) of Regulation No 1049/2001, the Commission refused to
grant access.
After pointing out the distinct objectives of Regulations Nos 1049/2001 and
45/2001115, the General Court examined the relationship between them. It
found, firstly, that recital 15 of the Personal Data Regulation explicitly declares
that access to documents containing personal data should be governed by Reg-
ulation No 1049/2001116, and, secondly, that the exception in Art. 4(1)(b) pro-
tecting the privacy and integrity of the individual explicitly asserts that the pro-
visions of the Personal Data Regulation should be taken into consideration117.
Looking into the Personal Data Regulation’s provisions, the EGC found that
names fall under the concept of “personal data” and that the making public of
those names amounts to the “processing of personal data”.118 In order for
processing to be lawful under the Personal Data Regulation, the data subject
must have given its consent unless such processing is necessary for the perform-
112. Ibid, para. 51
113. Case T-194/04, Bavarian Lager/Commission [2007] ECR II-4523.
114. Two of whom had explicitly refused and three which the Commission had failed to reach.
115. Bavarian Lager/Commission, para. 98.
116. Ibid, para. 99-100.
117. Ibid, paras 101 102.
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ance of a task carried out in the public interest or for compliance with a legal
obligation to which the controller is subject (Art. 5). The EGC concluded that
Regulation No 1049/2001 constitutes such a legal obligation to grant access.
Therefore, it considered that the obligation in Art. 8(b) of the Personal Data
Regulation on a recipient - who is not a Community institution or body - to
establish an interest in having access to those data, without there being any
reason to assume that the data subject’s legitimate interests might be prejudiced,
did not apply.119 Likewise, the right of the data subject to object on compelling
legitimate grounds (Art. 18) was deemed inapplicable since Art. 5 makes access
to documents obligatory when there is a legal duty.120
The General Court thus limited the rest of its evaluation to the question whether
disclosure of the names of the participants to that meeting would undermine the
protection of their privacy and integrity within the meaning of Art. 4(1)(b) of
Regulation No 1049/2001.121 When investigating the potential undermining of
this interest, the EGC relied on the ECtHR’s case law in respect of what consti-
tutes an “unjustified interference in the private life” within the meaning of Art.
8 ECHR.122 It concluded, however, that despite the broadness of the concept of
“private life” not all personal data are necessarily covered and that not all per-
sonal data are capable by their nature of undermining the private life of the
person concerned.123 Hence, when assessing whether the sole disclosure of the
names of the participants to a meeting, not including the specific opinions
expressed by them, would actually and effectively undermine the protection of
their privacy and integrity, the EGC concluded that such was not the case since
they had attended that meeting in their professional capacity of representatives
of a collective body.124 It took the view that the mere participation of a repre-
sentative of a collective body in a meeting held with a Community institution
does not fall within the sphere of that person’s private life so that the disclosure
of minutes revealing his presence at that meeting cannot constitute an interfer-
ence with his private life.125 Hence, since there was no undermining of privacy,
Art. 4(b)(1) did not apply and thus the provisions of Regulation 45/2001 includ-
ing the obligation on the applicant to prove a necessity for the data transfer as
well as the right for the data subject to object to disclosure, were also inapplica-
ble.126
On appeal, however, the ECJ found that the General Court had failed to respect
the “equilibrium” which the legislator had sought to establish between both
119. Ibid,para. 107.
120. Ibid,para. 109.
121. Case T-194/04, Bavarian Lager/Commission [2007] ECR II-4523, para. 109-110.
122. Bavarian Lager/Commission, paras 111-119.
123. Ibid, paras 118-119.
124. Ibid, paras 124-126, 128, 132.
125. Ibid, para. 131
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regulations.127 Indeed, while the EGC had rightfully stressed that both Regula-
tions have distinct purposes128 it had erred in limiting the application of the
privacy-exception under Art. 4(1)(b) to situations “in which the privacy or the
integrity of the individual would be infringed for the purposes of Article 8 of the
ECHR and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, without tak-
ing into account the legislation of the Union concerning the protection of per-
sonal data, particularly Regulation No 45/2001”.129 In doing so the General
Court had negated the wording of Art. 4(1)(b) itself which explicitly requires
conformity with the “[Union] legislation regarding the protection of personal
data”.130 Hence, the ECJ held that “Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation No 1049/2001
establishes a specific and reinforced system of protection of a person whose per-
sonal data could, in certain cases, be communicated to the public.”131 Thus,
when, on the basis of Regulation No 1049/2001, public access is sought to doc-
uments which contain personal data, the provisions of the Data Protection Reg-
ulation are applicable in their entirety, including Arts 8 and 18.132
Agreeing with the EGC that the communication of the full minutes of that meet-
ing including the list of participants would amount to a “processing of personal
data” within the meaning of Art. 2 of Regulation 45/2001, the ECJ examined
whether on the basis of both Regulations the Commission could rightfully have
granted access to that document including those five names.133 The Court held
that the Commission was right to seek the consent of the data subjects and to
blank out those names where consent had not been given.134 Given that the
Commission had already disclosed the substance of the document and merely
blanked out those five names, the ECJ concluded that the Commission had com-
plied with its duty of openness and had not infringed Regulation No
1049/2001.135 Furthermore, it was correct in asking Bavarian Lager to estab-
lish, in line with Art. 8(b) of Regulation No 45/2001, the necessity for transfer-
ring those five names.136 Bavarian had failed however to provide any express
and legitimate justification or any convincing argument demonstrating this
necessity and had thereby deprived the Commission from the possibility to
weigh up the different interests at stake.137 Hence, the Commission had been
right in refusing access to the full minutes of that meeting.138
127. Case C-28/08 P, Commission/Bavarian Lager [nyr], para. 65.
128. Case T-194/04, Bavarian Lager/Commission [2007] ECR II-4523, para. 98
129. Case C-28/08 P, Commission/Bavarian Lager [nyr], para. 58
130. Ibid, para. 59.
131. Ibid. para. 60
132. Ibid, para. 63. Art. 8 requires recipients to establish a need for disclosure; Art. 18 confers on a data subject
the right to object to the processing of data concerning him/her at any time on compelling legitimate grounds
relating to his or her particular situation.
133. Commission/Bavarian Lager, paras. 68-71.
134. Ibid, para. 75.
135. Ibid, paras 72 & 76.
136. Ibid, para. 77.
137. Ibid, 78.
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c. Analysis
Standard of proof for a “risk” – Undoubtedly the EGC was right in Borax to
condemn the Commission’s incomprehensible decision to uphold its refusal to
disclose despite the fact that Borax had amended its application and any poten-
tial privacy or integrity risk had thereby effectively been removed. Nonetheless,
the Court’s reasoning as regards the Commission’s failure to meet the required
“standard of proof” seems to have inappropriately raised the bar for proving
the presence of a risk. Indeed, the Commission’s claim that “it was clear from
the evidence of persons participating in that type of meeting that, when signifi-
cant interests were at stake, as in this case, pressure was exerted and the experts
were approached or criticised”139 was deemed by the General Court to be too
general in nature and indicative of the Commission’s lack of “detailed informa-
tion” as regards the risk of the experts’ integrity being undermined. Yet, even
leaving aside the well-documented massive lobbying of the Brussels’ decision-
making process, the Commission’s testimony of past experience with the pres-
surizing of experts by industry is far from “pure hypothesis”. The denial of this
reality, even after having been confronted with a letter sent to the Commission
by Borax in which it explained that “it [had] made some inquiries which had
clearly shown that certain experts [who had participated in the meeting] had no
qualifications in respect of reproductive toxicity”140, would seem to bear wit-
ness to a dangerous naivety as regards industry’s motivation to protect its large
financial interests at stake.
Moreover, given that a risk is de facto an event yet to happen and thus difficult
to substantiate to a great degree of specificity, when reproaching the Commis-
sion for having failed to support its claim of a threat to the experts’ integrity “by
the allegation of any fact, relevant to this case, which would corroborate the
existence of pressure or a risk of pressure on the participants in the meeting at
issue, particularly on the part of Borax or on its initiative”141, the EGC seems to
come close to demanding proof of actual harm.
Relationship between Regulation No 1049/2001 and 45/2001 – Although the
ECJ’s attempt to clarify the relationship between Regulation No 1049/2001 and
the more specific Regulation 45/2001 in Bavarian Lager should be welcomed on
principle, the implications of its analysis do not seem entirely satisfactory.
Although the ECJ’s assessment in the particular case that by disclosing the sub-
stance of the discussion which took place at the meeting as well as the names of
139. Borax, 45, emphasis added.
140. Borax, para. 47; Although the EGC rejected this letter as evidence since the Commission could not prove
that it had actually formed part of the grounds for its refusal, it still evaluated the content of the letter as failing
to prove any exercise of or intention to exercise pressure. (para. 49)
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the organisations present, the Commission had given sufficient transparency to
its decision-making process to guarantee accountability, seems defendable, the
strict application of the burden of proof set out in Art. 8(b) of Regulation
1045/2001 appears disproportionate in effect. Indeed, by requiring the appli-
cant to provide an “express and legitimate justification” or “convincing argu-
ment” to establish the necessity of having these data disclosed (“trans-
ferred”)142, the ECJ seems to ignore the possibility that in several instances “the
public interest in transparency” could in fact benefit from the disclosure of the
identity of those persons who participate in the process of EU policy- and deci-
sion-making.143
Recast – The Commission proposed to replace current Art. 4(1)(b) by the fol-
lowing: “Names, titles and functions of public office holders, civil servants and
interest representatives in relation with their professional activities shall be dis-
closed unless, given the particular circumstances, disclosure would adversely
affect the persons concerned. Other personal data shall be disclosed in accord-
ance with the conditions regarding lawful processing of such data laid down in
EC legislation on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of
personal data”. The European Data Protection Service however criticizes this
proposal for (1) a too narrowly defined category of data which are to be dis-
closed (names, titles and functions), (2) the inclusion of a vague exception to the
disclosure of those data, (3) the conservation of a reference to the data protec-
tion rules without further guidance and (4) the absence of an overriding public
interest test.144
142. Commission/Bavarian Lager, para 78.
143. See in that sense KRANENBORG, H.R., “Tien jaar Eurowob: reden voor een feestje?”(2011) SEW, Issue 5,
227.
144. See EDPS, Comments on the current discussions in Parliament about the revision of Regulation (EC) No
1049/2001 relating to public access, 16 February 2009, at http://www.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/web-
dav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/Consultation/Comments/2009/09-02-16_Comments_public_access_EN.pdf,
expanding on its Opinion of 30 June 2008, OJ 2008 C 2/7. The EDPS proposed the following alternative: “1.
personal data shall not be disclosed, if such disclosure would harm the privacy or the integrity of the person con-
cerned. Such harm does not arise:
(a) if the data solely relate to the professional activities of the person concerned unless, given the particular cir-
cumstances, there is a reason to assume that disclosure would adversely affect that person;
(b) if the data solely relate to a public person unless, given the particular circumstances, there is a reason to
assume that disclosure would adversely affect that person or other persons related to him or her;
(c) if the data have already been published with the consent of the person concerned;
2. personal data shall nevertheless be disclosed, if an overriding public interest requires disclosure. In those cases,
the institution or body shall have to specify the public interest. It shall give reasons why in the specific case the
public interest outweighs the interests of the person concerned;”PUBLIC ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS: JURISPRUDENCE BETWEEN PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE 
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2.3. Discretionary exceptions (Art. 4(2))
Art. 4(2) sets out a second group of exceptions which are of a “discretionary”
nature145 meaning that the institutions invoking them will need to balance the
protected interest against a possible “overriding public interest in disclosure”.
In principle, the institutions themselves will need to ascertain whether such an
overriding public interest exists.146 The question as to what type of interest
could constitute such an “overriding public interest” has formed the object of
much discussion. More precisely, there is considerable disagreement as to
whether the interest of transparency itself could be adduced as overriding the
exceptions included in the Regulation. Indeed, given that the Regulation in fact
“emanates/concretizes” the principle of transparency and the exceptions
included in that Regulation are thus conscious deviations from the basic princi-
ple of transparency, it has been argued that allowing the interest in transparency
to nonetheless override those exceptions amounts to a circular argument.147
Nevertheless, the Court has accepted that the public interests in transparency,
openness and democracy underlying the Regulation are capable of overriding
the Regulation’s exceptions.148
2.3.1. Protection of Commercial Interests Exception
In the first case on the commercial interests exception, i.e. Terezakis149, the
applicant sought access to a contract for the construction of an International
Airport in Athens, for which the Commission had granted financial support
from the Cohesion Fund. Adopting a strict interpretation, the General Court
145. These are sometimes also referred to as “relative exceptions”. The Commission proposes to add a new excep-
tion aimed at protecting the “objectivity and impartiality of selection procedures”. In so far as this refers to the
procedure for the award of contracts, HARDEN notes that the commercial interests of natural and legal persons are
already protected, so this is presumably intended to make it easier for the institutions to refuse access to documents
which might reveal their decision-making procedures (avoiding the more stringent harm test under Art. 4(3)) for
the awarding of contracts. (HARDEN, I., “The Revision of Regulation No 1049/2001 on Public Access to Docu-
ments” (2009) European Public Law 15(2), 247) As regards procedures for the selection of staff, HARDEN notes
that this new exception could in fact enhance transparency by clarifying that, contrary to the CFI’s case law treat-
ing the Staff regulations as a lex specialis, in principle, the work of Selection Boards falls within the scope of the
Regulation. (247) The House of Lords is however critical of this additional exception since other exceptions (e.g.
personal data & commercial interest) already apply to recruitment and public procurement, and considers that fur-
ther justification for such an additional ground should be given. (House of Lords, European Union Committee,
15th Report of Session 2008-2009, “Access to EU Documents”, 18 June 2009, 67-68, available at:
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200809/ldselect/ldeucom/108/108.pdf). Furthermore, the recast pro-
posal includes a new exception aimed at protecting intellectual property rights (Art. 4(2)(b)). PEERS notes that intel-
lectual property is already explicitly protected as an aspect of commercial interests, so the added value of this new
exception is unclear. PEERS, S., “Statewatch Analysis June 2008: Proposal on access to documents: Article-by-Arti-
cle commentary“, 6, available at: http://www.statewatch.org/foi/sw-analysis-docs-june-2008.pdf.
146. Sweden and Turco, para. 44; Verein fur Konsumenteninformation, para. 69; Éditions Jacob, para. 41. Case
T-471/08, Toland/Parliament [nyr], paras. 29 & 83
147. Case T-84/03, Turco/Council [2004] ECR II-4061, paras 82-83. Note however that the General Court some-
what puzzlingly added that “[i]f that is not the case, it is, at the very least, incumbent on the applicant to show
that, having regard to the specific facts of the case, the invocation of those same principles is so pressing that it
overrides the need to protect the document in question. [emphasis added]”.
148. Sweden and Turco, para. 74; see also paras 45, 46 & 67.
149. Case T-380/04, Terezakis/Commission [2008] ECR II-11*, Summ.pub.PUBLIC ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS: JURISPRUDENCE BETWEEN PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE
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concluded that the argumentation relied on by the Commission was too general
and abstract in nature and failed to show that it had conducted a specific and
individual examination that could lead to its conclusion that disclosure would
actually and specifically undermine the contracting parties’ commercial inter-
ests. For one, the Commission’s assertion that “the contract contains detailed
information about the contracting parties, their business relations and specific
cost components related to the project” could not qualify as such specific exam-
ination. The presence of detailed information about the contracting parties and
their business relations would hold for any commercial contract.150 As regards
the “information on the specific cost components related to the project”, the
EGC considered that such information could indeed require confidentiality yet
found after a noticeably detailed analysis that at least partial access should have
been granted to the documents concerned since many passages did not contain
such information.151 Moreover, much of that information had already been dis-
closed by Greece within the scope of its application for financial assistance from
the Cohesion Fund.152
In two recent cases involving documents from merger files, Editions Jacob and
Agrofert, the General Court adopted a strict stance and found that the Commis-
sion failed to prove that it had conducted a concrete and individual examina-
tion. It found that correspondence between the Commission and parties to a
Merger investigation, respectively documents sent to the Commission in the
framework of a Merger case, could not be presumed to be manifestly covered
by the exception protecting commercial interests yet had to be subjected to a
concrete and individual examination.153 Moreover, in Agrofert the Commission
stated in a general and abstract manner that the requested documents contained
commercially sensitive information relating to the commercial strategy of the
notifying parties, their sales figures, market shares or customers. Hence, its
argumentation was based on the nature of the documents requested in a Merger
notification procedure rather than an actual examination of the specific content
of the documents at hand, and could thus apply to all documents supplied in
merger control proceedings.154 Contesting the Commission’s claim that “it
could not have been more precise as to the actual content of the documents in
question, since that would have led it to disclose their content and would have
deprived the exception of its purpose” the General Court considered that “it
was entirely possible to draw up a list of the documents exchanged between the
150. Ibid, paras. 93-94.
151. Terezakis, paras 95-105
152. Terezakis is one of those few cases in which the EGC requested to be transferred the documents at stake so
as to assess itself whether such a risk of undermining the commercial interests could reasonably have been
thought to be present. (paras 96-104.)
153. Case T-237/05, Éditions Jacob/Commission [nyr], paras 122-123; Case T-111/07, Agrofert Holding/Com-
mission [nyr], paras 79-80.
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Commission and the parties in the merger control proceedings in question and
to describe the content of each document without thereby revealing information
which had to remain confidential” and it should thus have conducted a “fuller
and more individual demonstration”.155
As regards the duty of professional secrecy set out in Art. 17(2) of the Merger
Regulation and ex Art. 287 EC, the Court considered that this duty cannot be
assumed to cover all information received during an investigation.156 Hence, no
legitimate expectations on the part of undertakings that none of the documents
provided to the Commission will be disclosed could flow from this.157 Rather,
the degree of confidentiality required by a particular item of information needs
to be based on a balancing of the individual legitimate interest opposing disclo-
sure (as protected by the specific provisions in the Merger Regulation) as against
the public interest in transparency.158 More generally, “the rules on access to the
file laid down by the Merger Regulation in no way release the Commission from
carrying out a concrete examination of each document [...] in the context of a
request for access under Regulation No 1049/2001”.159
Furthermore, the argument that information gathered in the context of an Art.
17(1) Merger investigation could only be used for the purposes of that investi-
gation (‘limited use’-argument) was found to form no obstacle for the public
access to these documents.160
On the contrary, in Agapiou Joséphidès the EGC accepted that the Education,
Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency’s (EACEA) decision to only partially
disclose the requested documents for reasons of protection of commercial inter-
ests was based on an individual and concrete examination and did not surpass
what was appropriate and necessary to protect that interest.161 In that case the
applicant sought access to the demand for and agreement on a subsidy for the
creation of a Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence at the University of Cyprus. As
regards the project related budget, the EACEA could reasonably consider that
elements relative to the cost structure of undertakings constitute business secrets
the disclosure of which could harm the company’s commercial interests.162 Like-
wise, information regarding the university’s specific knowhow for such projects
could be deemed confidential in view of future project applications.163 The
applicant failed to prove an overriding public interest since, on the one hand,
the defence of its interest in using such information in a pending dispute with
155. Agrofert, para. 65-66
156. Éditions Jacob, Para. 124; Agrofert, paras 69 & 83.
157. Agrofert, para. 83.
158. Ibid., para. 69.
159. Ibid., para. 77
160. Éditions Jacob, para. 89; Agrofert, para. 88.
161. Case T-439/08, Agapiou Joséphidès/Commission [nyr], para. 129. Pending appeal case C-626/10.
162. Agapiou Joséphidès, para. 126; The EGC itself had requested the documents and checked their content.
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the University is merely a private interest and, on the other hand, the interest in
transparency, being more limited in an administrative procedure, is already suf-
ficiently guaranteed by the many publicity requirements surrounding subsidy
requests.164
2.3.2. Court proceedings exception
One exception to the widest possible access principle which the Court has inter-
preted noticeably leniently165 is that of the protection of court proceedings.
a. Scope
As regards the types of documents covered by the exception, the Court has
nonetheless adopted a restrictive interpretation. Only “documents drawn up by
an institution solely for the purposes of specific court proceedings”166 will be
covered. These include pleadings and other documents lodged, internal docu-
ments concerning the investigation of the case at hand, correspondence concern-
ing the case between the Directorate-General involved and the Legal Service or
a lawyers’ office.167 Documents drawn up in connection with a purely adminis-
trative matter are, however, not covered, even if their disclosure could harm the
Commission’s position in an action for annulment against the outcome of the
administrative procedure.168
b. Protected interests and duration of protection
Protection until final judgment
Exemption by category until final judgment – In API/Commission the Court had
to assess a refusal by the Commission to grant the Association de la Presse Inter-
nationale (API) access to its written submissions in a number of pending pro-
ceedings.169 The EGC ruled that documents drawn up for the purpose of court
164. Ibid, paras 137-143.
165. Yet still not sufficiently according to some worried that pleadings submitted by an institution in the context
of one particular case would be “pulled out of context” and used against it in other cases to prove the institu-
tion’s “inconsistent approach”.
166. Franchet and Byk, para. 88.
167. Ibid, para. 90.
168. Ibid, para. 91
169. I.e. several merger cases (Case T-209/01 Honeywell v Commission [2005] ECR II-5527; Case T-210/01
General Electric v Commission [2005] ECR II-5575; Case T-342/99 Airtours v Commission [2002] ECR II-2585;
Case T-212/03 MyTravel/Commission [2008] ECR II-1967); an infringement case (Case C-203/03 Commission v
Austria [2005] ECR I-935.) and the EU US ‘Open Skies’-cases: Commission v United Kingdom (C-466/98); Com-
mission v Denmark (C-467/98); Commission v Sweden (C-468/98); Commission v Finland (C-469/98); Commis-
sion v Belgium (C-471/98); Commission v Luxembourg (C-472/98); Commission v Austria (C-475/98); and
Commission v Germany (C-476/98). The Commission did grant access to the state aid case Altmark (Case C-
280/00, Altmark Trans and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg [2003] ECR I-7747) and to the infringement case
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proceedings could be protected en bloc, i.e. without the need for an individual
and specific examination, until the hearing has taken place.170 This was the first
time that the Court accepted such an exception by category of documents.171 On
appeal, the ECJ extended the categorical protection of these documents up to
the time where the final judgment has been rendered.172 Hence, before a final
judgment has been delivered there is a general presumption that the documents
deserve to be kept confidential.173 Conversely, after the judgment has been ren-
dered, a refusal of disclosure will need to be based on an individual and specific
examination, even if a closely related case is pending before the Court.174
Equality of arms – In its reasoning the ECJ relied first on the principle of equality
of arms, as the corollary to the right to a fair hearing, explaining that “if the
content of the Commission’s pleadings were to be open to public debate, there
would be a danger that the criticism levelled against them, whatever its actual
legal significance, might influence the position defended by the Commission
before the EU Courts”175 and that “such a situation could well upset the vital
balance between the parties to a dispute before those Courts – the state of bal-
ance which is at the basis of the principle of equality of arms – since only the
institution concerned by an application for access to its documents, and not all
the parties to the proceedings, would be bound by the obligation of disclo-
sure.”176
Sound administration of justice – Secondly, it considered that the sound admin-
istration of justice justifies “the exclusion of judicial activities from the scope of
the right of access to documents, without any distinction being drawn between
the various procedural stages […] in the light of the need to ensure that, through-
out the court proceedings, the exchange of argument by the parties and the delib-
erations of the Court in the case before it take place in an atmosphere of total
serenity.”177 Indeed, “[d]isclosure of the pleadings in question would have the
effect of exposing judicial activities to external pressure, albeit only in the percep-
tion of the public, and would disturb the serenity of the proceedings.”178
Moreover, if disclosure would be ordained this would frustrate “the effective-
ness of the exclusion of the Court of Justice from the institutions to which the
principle of transparency applies, in accordance with Article 255 EC.”179
170. Case T-36/04, API/Commission [2007] ECR II-3201, paras 74-76, 98.
171. API/Commission, paras 72-74; confirmed in Sweden/API and Commission, para. 74.
172. Sweden/API and Commission, paras 85-95.
173. Sweden/API and Commission, para. 74 & 94.
174. API/Commission, para. 106; Sweden/API and Commission, paras 130-134.
175. Sweden/API and Commission, para. 86
176. Sweden/API and Commission, para. 87; see also API/Commission, paras 63, 78-81.
177. Sweden/API and Commission, para. 92.
178. Ibid, para. 93.
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Lex specialis – In addition, the ECJ considered that when interpreting Art. 4(2)
para. 2 the Statute of the Court of Justice and the Rules of Procedure of the EU
Courts have to be taken into account. Since neither of these two sets of rules
contain a third-party access right to written pleadings submitted to the Court in
court proceedings, such access could not be granted on the basis of the general
Regulation No 1049/2001 without calling this system of procedural rules in
question.180
Infringement procedures: leaving room for negotiation with the Member State
As regards documents relating to the Court proceedings in an infringement pro-
cedure against a Member State for failure to fulfill its obligations under the
Treaty (Art. 258 TFEU; ex Art. 226 EC), the General Court ruled that letters of
formal notice and reasoned opinions drawn up in connection with the investi-
gations and inspections carried out by the Commission are en bloc covered by
this exception up until the judgment has been rendered.181 Given that infringe-
ment procedures strive to reach an amicable settlement of the dispute with the
Member State, the confidentiality of these documents is required so as to pre-
serve this negotiation option.182 Clearly, once the judgment is rendered on the
basis of Art. 258 TFEU (ex Art. 226 EC), there is no more room for negotiation
with the Member State183 and refusal of public access should thus be based on
an individual and specific examination.184 In API the Commission relied on the
protection of the purpose of inspections, investigations and audits, to refuse
public access to pleadings in an infringement procedure. The General Court
accepted that such pleadings could be en bloc exempted from public access if
they contain the same type of information as the procedural documents drawn
up in the context of that infringement procedure, and if the infringement to
which they relate is contested by the Member State concerned.185 In view of the
objective of an amicable settlement, the ECJ confirmed that such documents
could be kept confidential until it has ruled on the existence of an infringe-
ment.186 However, this investigation exception cannot be invoked merely
because other similar proceedings are still underway or because a procedure on
the basis of Art. 260(2) TFEU could potentially follow. Indeed, the ECJ stressed
that Art. 260(2) TFEU concerns a distinct procedure “designed only to induce a
defaulting Member State to comply with a judgment establishing a breach of
180. Ibid, paras 96-101.
181. Case T-191/99, Petrie and others/Commission [2001] ECR II-3677, para. 68
182. Petrie, para. 67; API/Commission, para. 121.
183. The ECJ stated that once a Member State has been condemned on the basis of Art. 258 TFEU, the negotia-
tions between the Member State and the Commission are no longer aimed to establish an infringement, but to
determine whether the conditions for an action under Art. 260 TFEU are met. (para. 120)
184. Joined cases C-514/07 P, C-528/07 P and C-532/07 P Sweden and others/API and Commission [nyr]., paras
120-121
185. API/Commission, para.123.
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obligations” and thus requires a different investigation seeking to establish
whether the infringement has endured after the judgment of the Court.187
c. Overriding Public Interest?
Although in API both the EGC and the ECJ repeat that, as a rule, the overriding
public interest invoked should be distinct from the interests underlying the Reg-
ulation, they add that “[t]he invocation of those same principles may, in the light
of the particular circumstances of the case, be so pressing that it overrides the
need to protect the documents in question.”188 Hence, contrary to the appli-
cant’s claim on appeal, the EGC did not rule out the possibility that the interest
in transparency is taken into account as an overriding public interest.189 More-
over, the General court even balanced the interest in transparency against the
interest in the protection of court proceedings.190 Still, in the case at hand, the
applicant merely advanced vague arguments in support of the acclaimed need
for an overriding interest in transparency, claiming that “the public’s right to be
informed about important issues of Community law, such as those concerning
competition, and about issues which are of great political interest, which is true
of the issues raised by infringement proceedings, prevails over the protection of
the court proceedings”.191
d. Analysis
It is clear that the Court has been comparatively “mild” in respect of the refusal
of public access to documents concerning pending court proceedings when it
allowed for a general presumption against such disclosure. In so far as API
implicitly confirms the trend to find that more specific access rules192, tailored
to the particular context, should in principle supersede the general regime of the
Regulation, and thus create a general presumption in favour of non-disclosure,
it should be welcomed. Yet, where it in substance posits that it should be gener-
ally presumed that disclosure of court pleadings before the final judgment
undermines the court proceedings and that it is up to the applicant to demon-
strate why a particular document would not do so, the Court’s reasoning is less
187. Sweden/API and Commission, para. 118-122: EGC API para. 137.
188. API/Commission, para. 97; Sweden/API and Commission, para. 152 & 156.
189. API/Commission, para. 97; Sweden/API and Commission, paras 152 153.
190. API/Commission, para. 98 99, Sweden/API and Commission, para. 154.
191. Sweden/API and Commission, paras 157-158. ADAMSKI, in contrast, deems it “hard to find more convinc-
ing arguments for disclosure”, wondering whether “balancing retain[s] any effet utile if the most profound rea-
sons for disclosure are not in a position to outweigh the exception?”. (ADAMSKI, “How Wide Is “The Widest
Possible”?”, 533-534).
192. In casu the Statute of the Court of Justice and the Rules of Procedure of the EU Courts.PUBLIC ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS: JURISPRUDENCE BETWEEN PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE
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convincing and the Advocate General’s more careful analysis seems prefera-
ble.193
It should be noted that the Court itself is one of the few institutions who has
been “spared” from the transparency requirements set out in Art. 15 TFEU;
except when exercising its administrative tasks. In API the ECJ explicitly relied
on “the wording of the relevant provisions of the Treaties and […] the broad
logic of Regulation No 1049/2001 and the objectives of the relevant EU rules”
to confirm “that judicial activities are as such excluded from the scope, estab-
lished by those rules, of the right of access to documents”194. According to the
ECJ, “the fact that the Court of Justice is not among the institutions which, in
accordance with Article 255 EC, are subject to those obligations is justified pre-
cisely because of the nature of the judicial responsibilities which it is called upon
to discharge under Article 220 EC (emphasis added)”195.
While the “serenity” of the judicial proceedings – excluding pressure on judges
and parties – and respect for the principle of a fair trial are indeed important
interests worthy of protection196, I agree with Advocate General Poiares
Maduro in API that there should be a case-by-case analysis of the actual risks.
Though considering that “pleadings lodged before the Court of Justice in court
proceedings are [...] inherently more a part of the judicial activities of the Court
than of the administrative activities of the Commission” and that “judicial activ-
ities are as such excluded from the scope, established by [Regulation No
1049/2001 and ex Art. 255 EC] of the right of access to documents”, the Court
does not pursue its reasoning further to find that such requests for access to
pleadings should be evaluated by the Court itself.197 Even without going as far
as to conclude that requests of access to pleadings in ongoing procedures fall
outside the scope of Regulation 1049/2011198, the Court could still have found
that the assessment of a potential undermining of the court proceedings is to be
carried out by the Court itself to which the pleadings have been submitted.199
Such a case-by-case analysis by the Court would have been preferable above the
blunt general exemption of all pleadings in ongoing procedures.200 Indeed, such
a drastic exemption contrasts rather sharply with the more publicity-minded
193. Favoring the EGC’s choice to uphold this general presumption only until after the public hearing see
KRANENBORG, H.R., “Tien jaar Eurowob: reden voor een feestje?”(2011) SEW, Issue 5, 225.
194. Sweden/API and Commission, para. 76
195. Sweden/API and Commission, para. 82.
196. Contrast however with ADAMSKI, who is of the opinion that positive pressure exercised on the Commission
in the form of critical public debate is “in essence a good thing” since it allows to “alter an imperfect position on
the basis of informed public debate”. ADAMSKI, “How Wide Is “The Widest Possible”?”, 534.
197. Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro of 1 October 2009 in joined cases C-514/07 P, C-528/07 P
and C-532/07 P Sweden/API and Commission, paras 77, 79-82.
198. Which was the preferred route by the Advocate General, paras 13-19; considering that the “best conclusion
in the present case would be to find that all documents submitted by parties in pending cases fall outside the
scope of Regulation No 1049/2001.”
199. Opinion of Advocate General in Sweden/API and Commission, para 30.
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approaches adopted in other Courts, like the ECtHR, Supreme Court, Interna-
tional Criminal Court, etc., where openness is the rule yet the courts can restrict
this in a specific case when they consider that disclosure would harm the judicial
process or other important interests.201
Recast – In the Commission’s proposal the exception on court proceedings is
expanded to include “arbitration and dispute settlement proceedings”. Another
proposed amendment would exclude from the Regulation’s scope of application
“documents submitted to Courts by parties other than the institutions” (Art.
2(5)). In practical terms this would mean that to obtain access to such docu-
ments one would have to turn to the Court itself and follow its specific rules on
access. As discussed above, granting the Court the power to decide on the merits
of each individual case whether court submissions can be disclosed without
undue harm, would seem to make sense, although it is unclear why a distinction
should be drawn between the institutions’ and other parties’ submissions.202
Yet, in evaluating such requests for access, the Court will clearly need to move
beyond its current unsatisfactory regulatory framework of its Rules of Proce-
dure and Statute which does not provide for any third party access.
2.3.3. Legal Advice exception
An exception which has formed the object of considerable controversy over the
last couple of years is the protection of legal advice.
A preliminary question whether the scope of the legal advice exception had to
be limited to “legal advice given in the course of or related to court proceedings”
was unanimously answered in the negative.203 However, the main point of con-
tention in these cases lies in establishing the exact meaning of ‘protection’ of
legal advice204, i.e. what is the precise content of the interest deemed to be pro-
tected by refusing public access to legal advice?
Though not explicitly provided for in Art. 4(2)(b)205, the Court gradually put
more and more emphasis on the difference between legal advice given in the
framework of legislative and administrative processes, with the former requiring
201. See Opinion of Advocate General in Sweden/API and Commission, paras 22-30.
202. Also in favour of leaving the question of disclosure to the courts themselves, though unclear as to why there
should be a difference in treatment between pleadings of the institutions and documents submitted to courts by
parties other than the institutions: House of Lords, “Access to EU Documents”, 7-8. Contra: see PEERS, S., “State-
watch Analysis June 2008: Proposal on access to documents: Article-by-Article commentary“, 2.
203. Case T-84/03, Turco/Council [2004] ECR II-4061, para. 58, 65-66.
204. See Joined cases C-39/05 P and C-52/05 P, Sweden and Turco/Council [2008] ECR I-4723, para. 41: “In
that regard, it must be pointed out that neither Regulation No 1049/2001 nor its travaux préparatoires throw
any light on the meaning of ‘protection’ of legal advice(emphasis added)”.
205. See however Recital 6: “Wider access should be granted to documents in cases where the institutions are act-
ing in their legislative capacity, including under delegated powers, while at the same time preserving the effective-
ness of the institutions’ decision-making process. Such documents should be made directly accessible to the
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a greater degree of openness.206 However, in its most recent case law it has
underlined that also administrative processes should on principle be subject to
the widest possible access.
a. Legal advice given in a legislative process
In Turco, the first case interpreting this exception under the Regulation regime,
the applicant207 fought a Council decision to only partially disclose an opinion
of its Legal Service regarding a proposal for a Council Directive. The legal opin-
ion formed thus part of an ongoing legislative process.
Confidentiality of specific legal opinions versus categories of legal opinions
Although the General Court repeated the requirement of a specific and individ-
ual examination of the effect of disclosure of the particular legal opinion at
hand, it did accept the Council’s general justificatory reasoning that disclosure
“could give rise to uncertainty as regards the legality of legislative acts adopted
following such advice”.208 Satisfied that the Council’s disclosure of the legal
opinion’s introductory paragraph showed that it had examined the content of
the particular legal opinion209, the EGC considered the “generality of the Coun-
cil’s reasoning [to be] justified by the fact that giving additional information,
making particular reference to the contents of the legal opinion in question,
would deprive the exception relied upon of its effect.”210
Advocate General Poiares Maduro agreed that a general statement of reasons
covering a category of documents could sometimes be acceptable, as in the case
of all legal opinions (of the institutions’ legal services) regarding the legality of
draft legislation. Indeed, considering that Art. 4(2) establishes “a general pre-
sumption of confidentiality in respect of the legal advice given by the legal serv-
ices of the institutions on draft legislation”, he estimated that a case-by-case
examination for this exception involves solely the identification of what in that
document amounts to genuine legal advice, noting that “[n]othing but the legal
advice, but all the legal advice, is covered by that provision”.211
However, on appeal the ECJ concluded that the General Court had erred in
accepting such a general need for confidentiality in respect of legal advice relat-
206. Sweden and Turco, para. 46.
207. Who, interestingly enough, was in fact a member of the European Parliament (MEP).
208. Turco/Council, paras 73-74.
209. Turco/Council, para. 75.
210. Turco/Council, para. 74. The EGC explicitly recognized that the Council’s reasoning “relating to the need
for protection relied upon, seems to relate to all the Council’s legal advice on legislative acts and not specifically
to the legal opinion in question”.
211. Opinion of Advocate General in Sweden/API and Commission, para. 37 (emphasis added); see also para.38
in which the Advocate General underpins his position with a historical overview of the case law which was
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ing to legislative matters.212 Although accepting that reasons of a general nature
could, in principle, form part of the institution’s justification in refusing access,
the ECJ emphasized that the Council should have been required to apply them
to the particular legal opinion at stake.213 Moreover, stressing the overriding
public interest in transparency of legislative processes, the ECJ concluded that
Regulation No 1049/2001 “imposes, in principle, an obligation to disclose the
opinions of the Council’s legal service relating to a legislative process”214. Thus,
in contrast with the EGC’s (implicit) acceptance of a general presumption
against the disclosure of legal opinions regarding legislative questions, the ECJ
found a general presumption that legal opinions relating to a legislative process
should be disclosed. It did add, however, that a specific legal opinion can be
found to be of a “particularly sensitive nature” or “particularly wide scope
[going] beyond the context of the legislative process in question” thereby justi-
fying the refusal of access on the basis of the protection of legal advice.215
Precise meaning of “protection of legal advice”
As regards the meaning of “protection of legal advice” the General Court had
accepted that documents containing legal advice could, because of their partic-
ular nature, be kept confidential to avoid fueling doubts about the legality of
Community legislation as well as to preserve the independence of the opinions
of the legal service.216 The ECJ for its part limited the rationale for protecting
legal advice to the institution’s interest in receiving frank, objective and compre-
hensive legal advice.217 On the risk that disclosure of legal opinions would fuel
doubts about the legality of legislative acts, the ECJ considered that it is on the
contrary the lack of information and open debate which triggers such doubt,
and that transparency would confer greater legitimacy on the institutions as well
as increase the trust of citizens.218 Moreover, such doubts could be better
addressed by including a convincing statement of reasons in the legislative act
wherein the legislative choice is defended.219 In his opinion Advocate General
Maduro offered a third argument for confidentiality, i.e. the risk that an overly
broad public access to documents could lead the Legal Service to resort to oral
rather than written expressions of its opinion, thereby in fact reducing transpar-
ency.220
212. Sweden and Turco, para. 57. (emphasis added)
213. Sweden and Turco, para. 50, 56-57, 61, 63.
214. Ibid, para. 67-68 (emphasis added)
215. Ibid, para. 69, stressing the need for a detailed statement of reasons as well as a limitation in time of the
potential invocation of the exception to the period during which such protection is justified. (para. 70)
216. Turco/Council, para. 78-79; Opinion of Advocate General in Sweden and Turco/Council, para. 40.
217. Sweden and Turco, para. 42 & 62.
218. Sweden and Turco, para. 59
219. Sweden and Turco, para. 60.
220. Opinion of Advocate General in Sweden and Turco/Council, para. 40PUBLIC ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS: JURISPRUDENCE BETWEEN PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE
42
Although the ECJ agreed in principle that disclosure could entail the risk of
impairing the independence of the opinions of the legal service221 and thus of
undermining the institution’s interest in receiving frank, objective and compre-
hensive legal advice222, it condemned the Council’s lack of detailed argumenta-
tion establishing a reasonably foreseeable and not purely hypothetical risk.223
As regards the risk of improper external pressure trying to influence the Legal
Service, the ECJ asserted that it is that pressure itself rather than the possibility
of the disclosure of legal opinions which would compromise the interest in
receiving frank, independent, etc. advice and which should thus be addressed.224
Furthermore, the Commission’s argument that disclosure would cause problems
for the Council’s Legal Service when called upon to defend an opposing legal
position in potential legal proceedings was deemed to be too general.225 Hence,
the ECJ found no proof of a reasonably foreseeable risk that disclosure of legal
opinions would undermine the interest in the protection of legal advice.226
Transparency as an overriding public interest
Having accepted that there was a reasonably foreseeable risk of the protection
of legal advice being undermined, the General Court examined the overriding
public interest in disclosure raised by the applicant. Contrary to the applicant,
the General Court considered that the principles of transparency, openness and
democracy were precisely those principles being implemented by the Regulation
and to which the protection of legal advice had been consciously introduced as
an exception or limitation. Hence, those same principles of transparency, etc.,
could not be invoked as overriding public interests to be, once again, weighed
against the exceptions and limitations explicitly introduced in the Regulation
and to justify the disclosure of a document undermining that protection of legal
advice.227 The General Court did however add, somewhat puzzlingly, that “[i]f
that is not the case, it is, at the very least, incumbent on the applicant to show
that, having regard to the specific facts of the case, the invocation of those same
principles is so pressing that it overrides the need to protect the document in
question.”228 thereby all the same introducing a balancing of the protected inter-
est against transparency.
221. Turco/Council, para. 79.
222. Sweden and Turco, para.42&62.
223. Sweden and Turco, para. 63.
224. Sweden and Turco, para. 64. Contrast with Turco/Council, para. 79.
225. Sweden and Turco, para. 65. Contrast however with Opinion of Advocate General in Sweden and
Turco/Council, para. 40.
226. Sweden and Turco, para. 63&66.
227. Turco/Council, paras 82-83.
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The ECJ on the contrary accepted that such an overriding public interest could
be formed precisely by the principles underlying the Regulation229, such as the
public interest in increased openness, which “enables citizens to participate
more closely in the decision-making process and guarantees that the administra-
tion enjoys greater legitimacy and is more effective and more accountable to the
citizen in a democratic system”230. Especially in the a legislative process the
Court, relying on recital 6 of the Regulation’s preamble, advocated increased
openness considering that “citizens [should be able] to scrutinize all the infor-
mation [including legal opinions] which has formed the basis of a legislative act”
and that “[t]he possibility for citizens to find out the considerations underpin-
ning legislative action is a precondition for the effective exercise of their demo-
cratic rights.”231
As regards the burden of proof, the ECJ, in contrast with the EGC, considered
that it is for the Council to ascertain whether there is an overriding public inter-
est and balance it against the protected interest.232
b. Legal advice given in an administrative process
In MyTravel, the Commission refused to disclose legal opinions on the draft
texts of a concentration decision which had already been annulled in the Air-
tours judgment.233 The General Court upheld this refusal, accepting that disclo-
sure would risk to make public the internal discussions between DG Competi-
tion and the legal service on the lawfulness of the assessment of the compatibil-
ity of the Airtours/First Choice concentration with the common market, and
could thus affect possible future decisions to be made as regards the same parties
or in the same sector.234 Moreover, such disclosure risked causing the legal serv-
ice to display reticence and caution in the drafting of future notes so as not to
affect the Commission’s administrative decision-making capacity.235 Further-
more, disclosure could impair the Commission’s legal service’s capacity to
defend a position in Court which is different from the one “it had argued for
229. Sweden and Turco, para. 74. See also the Opinion of Advocate General in Sweden and Turco/Council, para.
50. “In actual fact, what is imposed, in my opinion, by the last phrase in Article 4(2) of Regulation No
1049/2001 is the obligation, for the institution concerned, to weigh the public interest protected by the exception
on the ground of confidentiality against the public interest in access to documents, in the light of the content of
the document requested and the specific circumstances of the case. In other words, the ratio legis of that provi-
sion, so far as concerns the exception on the ground of confidentiality in respect of legal advice, is that, although
the public interest which underlies the protection of legal advice prevails as a rule over the public interest in
access to documents, an analysis of the circumstances of the case and of the content of the legal opinion requested
may tip the scales in the opposite direction.”
230. Sweden and Turco, para. 45, see also para. 67.
231. Sweden and Turco, para. 46.
232. Sweden and Turco, paras 44-45; see also Opinion of Advocate General in Sweden and Turco/Council, para.
54. Contrast with Turco/Council, paras 84-85
233. Case T-342/99 Airtours v Commission [2002] ECR II-2585.
234. Case T-403/05, MyTravel Group/Commission [2008] ECR II-2027, para. 124
235. MyTravel, para. 125PUBLIC ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS: JURISPRUDENCE BETWEEN PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE
44
internally in its role as adviser” and thus create an inequality of arms with the
other parties’ legal representatives.236 In addition, it would likely affect the
Commission’s internal decision-making process where it decides in college and
should thus retain the freedom to depart from the legal service’s initial opin-
ion.237
However, on appeal, the ECJ (partially) reversed this judgment238 and found in
essence that also legal opinions delivered in the context of an administrative
procedure need to be made public once that administrative process has ended.239
It dismissed the Commission’s claim that disclosure of such legal advice could
give rise to uncertainty as regards the lawfulness of the final decision, referring
to Turco in which the Court already clarified that openness, by allowing for an
open debate between divergent points of view, in fact contributes to greater
legitimacy of and public confidence in the institutions.240 Moreover, any doubts
in the minds of European citizens on account of an unfavourable legal opinion
could be solved by a reinforced statement of reasons.241 In addition, no concrete
or detailed evidence (only general and abstract considerations) was put forward
to support the claim that the Legal Service would display reticence and cau-
tion.242 Furthermore, the ECJ considered the argument that the Legal Services’
capacity to defend the institutions’ final decision before the Court could be
affected by the disclosure of a prior negative opinion from its side to be of a too
“general nature”.243 More importantly, since the time-limit to challenge the
legality of the decision before the Court had already passed, there was no more
risk for such a situation to arise.244
In Éditions Jacob, rendered before the appeal judgment in Sweden/MyTravel
and Commission, the EGC accepted that an obligation to disclose legal advice,
forming part of an internal discussion as regards the interpretation of a provi-
sion of the old Merger Regulation 4064/89245 in a specific Merger procedure,
could reasonably be thought to risk undermining (1) the interest in receiving
236. MyTravel, para. 126
237. MyTravel, para. 126
238. Since some of the Commission’s arguments, in particular as regards the exception on the protection of the
purpose of inspections, investigations and audits, had not been examined by the General Court, the matter was
referred back for a new judgment.
239. Case C-506/08 P, Sweden/MyTravel and Commission [nyr]; see also the Opinion of Advocate General
Kokott of 3 March 2011 in Case C-506/08 P Sweden/MyTravel and Commission, paras 91-99..
240. Case C-506/08 P, Sweden/MyTravel and Commission [nyr], para. 113.
241. Sweden/MyTravel and Commission, para. 114.
242. Sweden/MyTravel and Commission, para. 115. The Advocate General was likewise not impressed by the
EGC’s argument as to the risk of self-censorship on the side of the Commission’s Legal Service which, she
reminded, operates independently from DG Competition and whose opinions are “specifically intended to high-
light possible problems and weaknesses”, para. 94.
243. Sweden/MyTravel and Commission, para. 116.
244. Ibid, para. 117. As regards the action for damages then pending, Advocate General Kokott considered that
since only a “sufficiently serious breach” can trigger liability, the legal opinions will only work against the Com-
mission if they “reveal serious deficiencies in the administrative procedure” in which case the Commission has no
legitimate interest in withholding such documents, paras 97-98.
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frank legal advice from the Legal Service246, (2) the Service’s capacity to defend
the final position adopted by the institution before the Court and (3) the internal
decision-making process of the Commission who decides in college and should
thus retain the freedom to deviate from its Legal Service’s opinion.247 Although
the particular Merger decision had already been taken, Éditions Jacob had filed
an appeal and was seeking information to strengthen its case. The General
Court further emphasized that the need for transparency does not carry the
same weight in the context of a purely administrative procedure concerning the
application of the competition law rules as opposed to a legislative procedure.248
In Agrofert, the applicant was refused access to documents containing the legal
opinion of the Commission’s Legal Service in respect of a particular Merger
notification procedure. The merger proceedings had been closed by a decision
taken over a year ago and which had become definitive at the time of the request
for access.249 Unlike in MyTravel and Éditions Jacob the General Court rejected
the Commission’s reliance on the legal advice exception because of the vague-
ness and generality of its argumentation. Indeed, although a refusal to disclose
may be based on “general presumptions which apply to certain categories of
documents”, the institution will stíll need to establish that these considerations
apply to that particular document.250 The EGC estimated that the Commission’s
statement of reasons did not explain how, having regard to the facts of the case,
access could, specifically and effectively undermine the interest in having full
and frank legal advice.251 In other words, the EGC emphasized that also a
refusal of access to documents from an administrative procedure will need to be
supported by a statement of reasons setting out the specific and individual rea-
soning in respect of those documents.252
c. Analysis
Although it is hard to argue in abstracto with the value of the principle of trans-
parency and the widest possible public access to documents, also in respect of
legal opinions, context is crucial.
Fair trial & equality of arms – For one, the fact that all three Legal Services of
the Community institutions perform the double function of advising and
246. Éditions Jacob, paras 157-159, where the EGC also referred to the risk that the legal service would refrain
from producing written opinions which nonetheless form an important instrument for the Commission in per-
forming its tasks.
247. Éditions Jacob, para. 160.
248. Éditions Jacob, para. 161.
249. Nor were there any connected pending proceedings or proceedings concerning the same sector mentioned.
250. Agrofert, para. 123.
251. Agrofert, para. 128.
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defending their institution,253 gives rise to the legitimate concern that disclosure
of previous conflicting opinions might compromise their capacity to effectively
defend their institution’s interests “on equal footing with the other legal repre-
sentatives of the various parties” before the Court.254 Although this argument
was rebutted by the ECJ in Turco  on the basis that it is too “general” in
nature255, the General Court continued to rely on it when accepting confidenti-
ality of legal advice in administrative procedures.256 Arguably, rather than deny-
ing the truth in this argument257, it would make more sense if the ECJ were to
base its rejection on the consideration that in legislative matters this “equality
of arms” principle is outweighed by the overriding public interest in transpar-
ency.
Risk of external pressure on Legal Service – In Turco the ECJ dismissed rather
bluntly the argument that disclosure of legal opinions carries the risk of
improper external pressure on the Council Legal Service, asserting that it would
be that pressure itself rather than the possibility of disclosure which would com-
promise the interest in receiving frank, independent, etc. advice and which
should thus be addressed.258 However, in respect of the risk of “improper pres-
sure on the judiciary and the parties to judicial proceedings”259 caused by the
disclosure of written submissions in court proceedings, the ECJ was much more
willing to accept that this “would have the effect of exposing judicial activities
to external pressure, albeit only in the perception of the public, and would dis-
turb the serenity of the proceedings.”260 Yet, in line with Advocate General Poi-
ares Maduro’s Opinion in API, I find it somewhat hard to see why this argument
of external pressure should be treated differently in both settings.261
253. ARNULL notes that the ECJ might have been influenced in Turco by “the practice of Member States where
legal advice on forthcoming legislation is provided to government by autonomous bodies and made available to
the public”; ARNULL, A., “Joined Cases C 39/05 P & C 52/05 P, Sweden and Turco v. Council, judgment of the
Grand Chamber of 1 July 2008, not yet reported” (2009) C.M.L.Rev. 46, 1232.
254. MyTravel, para. 126. See also Opinion of Advocate General in Sweden and Turco/Council, para. 40.
255. See also Sweden/MyTravel and Commission. However, in Sweden/MyTravel and Commission the ECJ based
its rejection largely on the fact that the Commission decision had become final and an appeal, requiring an inter-
vention by the Legal Service, was no longer possible, para. 117.
256. See MyTravel, para. 126 (reversed on appeal in Sweden/MyTravel and Commission); Éditions Jacob, paras
157 & 159.
257. It is worth noting that the ECJ has explicitly held in Sweden/API and Commission in the context of the pro-
tection of court proceedings that the principle of “equality of arms” applies also to the Community institutions
(para. 90), considering that “if the content of the Commission’s pleadings were to be open to public debate, there
would be a danger that the criticism levelled against them, whatever its actual legal significance, might influence
the position defended by the Commission before the EU Courts”(para. 86) thereby risking “to upset the vital bal-
ance between the parties to a dispute before those Courts – the state of balance which is at the basis of the princi-
ple of equality of arms – since only the institution concerned by an application for access to its documents, and
not all the parties to the proceedings, would be bound by the obligation of disclosure”(para. 87). Arguably, the
institutions are likewise disadvantaged when previous opinions of their “in-house legal services” on certain
points of law are to be made public whereas the other parties challenging their decisions, acts, etc., can benefit
from the “legal professional privilege” protecting the legal opinions produced by their “independent lawyers”.
258. Sweden and Turco, para. 64. Contrast with Turco/Council, para. 79.
259. Opinion of Advocate General in Sweden/API and Commission, para. 25
260. Sweden/API and Commission, para. 93.
261. Opinion of Advocate General in Sweden/API and Commission, para. 25.PUBLIC ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS: JURISPRUDENCE BETWEEN PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE 
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Complexity of Council decision-making and the need for frank, independent
and high quality legal opinions – Furthermore, for legal opinions delivered by
the Council Legal Service in the context of legislative procedures, the complex
nature of the decision-making process within the Council cannot be ignored.
For, a system in which delegates from 27 Member States with differing back-
grounds and interests have to come to an agreement, the quality and clarity of
information provided by the Council’s Legal Service is crucial.
The idea that publicity of these opinions and legal debates would “rid the legal
service of unprofessional legal advice and the institutions of questionable legis-
lative initiatives”262 as well as enhance the Union’s legitimacy263, is, at the very
least, debatable. Indeed, any lawyer knows that law is far from “exact science”
and that many legal opinions, especially in controversial cases, are a matter of
interpretation. Hence, within the context of Council debates on controversial
issues, the legal opinions produced are most likely to contain analyses of the
different competing positions, their potential legal problems and how they are
likely to hold up in Court. It is not unimaginable that these arguments offered
in the context of a nuanced and complex legal debate could afterwards be
invoked to discredit the final position adopted by the Council.264 The ECJ’s
suggestion that these doubts as to the legality of the final act could be prevented
by an extended statement of reasons explaining why a negative opinion of the
Legal Service was not followed proceeds from the quite unrealistic assumption
that a detailed and complex legal debate can be set out in the preamble to an
act.265
Moreover the risk that such publicity might prejudice the Legal Service’s frank-
ness and independence when asked for its opinion, or even cause it to resort to
expressing these opinions orally, does not seem “purely hypothetical”266 in
nature.267 Indeed, disclosure would cause the legal service to display reserve and
caution in drafting its opinions, “so as not to affect the institution’s scope for
decisions”.268 The loss of written legal opinions, aside from having the effect of
reducing rather than increasing transparency, would be particularly detrimental
to the quality of decision-making in a context of seeking agreement between 27
Member State delegations that have to communicate back and forth with their
capitals. Hence, bearing in mind Advocate General Maduro’s warning that “the
262. ADAMSKI, “How Wide Is “The Widest Possible”?”, 537
263. Sweden and Turco, para. 59.
264. See in that sense ARNULL, “Sweden and Turco v. Council”, 1234.
265. Sweden and Turco, para. 60; ARNULL, “Sweden and Turco v. Council”, 1234.
266. Sweden and Turco, para. 63.
267. Opinion of Advocate General in Sweden and Turco/Council, para. 19, 38, 40, recalling also the case law
preceding and underlying Art. 4(2) like Order in Case T-610/97 R, Carlsen and Others/Council [1998] ECR II-
485, para. 46; see also in that sense ARNULL, “Sweden and Turco v. Council”, 1236.
268. Opinion of Advocate General in Sweden and Turco/Council, para. 40.PUBLIC ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS: JURISPRUDENCE BETWEEN PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE
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best can sometimes be the enemy of the good”269, the risk that this provision of
free and frank legal advice by the Legal Service, often on its own initiative, dur-
ing the negotiations in the Council would be hampered, could in fact counteract
the objective of a “Union based on the rule of law”.270
Administrative versus legislative, ongoing versus ended – Since Turco it is clear
that legal opinions in legislative procedures are to be made public even if the
procedure is still ongoing, unless it is proven that a specific legal opinion is of a
“particularly sensitive nature” or “particularly wide scope [going] beyond the
context of the legislative process in question”.271 The problems likely to arise
from publicity of legal opinions in an ongoing legislative process in the Council
have been discussed in the previous point. Less clear up to now is the position
of legal opinions in administrative procedures. Whereas the General Court
seemed intent on upholding the legal advice exception in administrative proce-
dures272, the ECJ considered that at least in respect of ended administrative pro-
cedures such legal opinions should be made public.273 It remains to be seen what
the ECJ will decide in the pending appeals in the Éditions Jacob as well as Agro-
fert cases274, and whether it might even go as far as to extend public access to
legal opinions which form part of an ongoing administrative procedure.275 In
her Opinion in Sweden/MyTravel and Commission the Advocate General con-
ceded that disclosure of opinions in the course of ongoing administrative proce-
dures merits greater protection so as to avoid undue influence by interested par-
ties that could disturb the serenity of the procedures as well as affect the quality
of the final decision and the Commission’s capacity to respect the time-limits in
procedures for the control of concentrations.276
General presumption of non-disclosure of legal advice mitigated by accepting
overriding public interest in transparency – It is argued here that rather than
“twisting” the text of the Regulation and finding a general presumption in
favour of disclosure of legal opinions in legislative procedures, a more nuanced
analysis is possible when a general presumption of confidentiality of legal opin-
269. Ibid, para. 40
270. Contrast however with Advocate General Kokott in MyTravel who was not convinced about the likelihood
of a shift to informal and oral working methods in the context of a Commission competition law procedure,
since, “it will often be impossible, because of the complexity of competition procedures, to dispense entirely with
written opinions”, Opinion of Advocate General in Case C-506/08 P Sweden/MyTravel and Commission, para.
96.
271. Sweden and Turco, para. 69.
272. MyTravel (reversed on appeal in Sweden/MyTravel and Commission); Éditions Jacob. However, in Agrof-
ert such protection of a legal opinion rendered in the course of an administrative procedure which had ended
more than a year ago was not accorded since the Commission had failed to provide specific and non-hypothetical
evidence substantiating the risk of harm.
273. Sweden/MyTravel and Commission, paras 109-119; see also the Opinion of Advocate General in Case
C-506/08 P Sweden/MyTravel and Commission, para. 92.
274. Éditions Jacob (C-404/10 P), Agrofert (C-477/10 P)
275. In particular when the Court deems the administrative document to be of a policy nature resorting effects
beyond the individual case.
276. Opinion of Advocate General in Case C-506/08 P Sweden/MyTravel and Commission, paras. 65-69, 92.PUBLIC ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS: JURISPRUDENCE BETWEEN PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE 
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ions is subjected to an overriding public interest in transparency check.277
Indeed, the interest in the protection of legal advice from disclosure is not
(solely) connected to the particular content of the legal advice provided in the
specific document yet to the nature of legal opinions in general, the disclosure
of which carries the risk of compromising the independence and frankness of the
legal services.278
Clearly, such a general presumption should be rebuttable on the basis of an
overriding public interest in transparency in the particular (type of) case. Yet, as
mentioned above, the substance of this “overriding public interest”-prong has
been the object of debate since the adoption of Regulation No 1049/2001. In
Turco the ECJ accepted the possibility to invoke the principles of transparency,
openness, democracy, citizen participation as such an overriding public interest.
The General Court had held on the contrary that, since those principles are
already implemented by the Regulation, the overriding public interest had to be
“as a rule, distinct” from them.279 The ECJ’s decision has been criticized as a
misinterpretation of Art. 4(2) last sentence280 and as turning the exception into
the rule and vice versa281. Although it is a bit confusing that the balancing of
transparency as against the interest protected by the exception would need to
take place under a so-called “overriding public interest”-analysis, I do tend to
agree with the Advocate General’s opinion that the last phrase of Art. 4(2) can
be read as aiming at “the obligation, for the institution concerned, to weigh the
public interest protected by the exception on the ground of confidentiality
against the public interest in access to documents, in the light of the content of
the document requested and the specific circumstances of the case (emphasis
added)”282, or in other words as a “full” proportionality test. Indeed, although
a limited proportionality test is already imposed in the form of a partial disclo-
sure obligation,283 this does not seem to cover the actual weighing up of both
interests in the specific case at hand.284 Its limited nature is moreover illustrated
by the fact that the duty for partial disclosure also exists in respect of the man-
datory exceptions where a genuine balancing of the protected interests as
against transparency is ruled out, since this “balancing of interests was made by
the Community legislator and has been laid down in the regulation itself”. 285
277. See also the Opinion of Advocate General in Sweden and Turco/Council, para. 40.…
278. See in that sense, Opinion of Advocate General in Sweden and Turco/Council, para. 43; KRANENBORG,
H.R., “Is het tijd voor een herziening van de Eurowob?” (2005) SEW, Issue 4, 166-167.
279. Sweden and Turco, paras 82-83
280. ARNULL, “Sweden and Turco v. Council”, 1236-1237.
281. BROUSSY, E., DONNAT, F., LAMBERT, C., « Chroniques – Chronique de jurisprudence communautaire. Droit
institutionnel – Accès aux documents des institutions », (2008) l’AJDA, 1533.
282. Opinion of Advocate General in Sweden and Turco/Council, para. 50
283. ARNULL bases himself on this to conclude that the “overriding pI” should thus be something distinct,
ARNULL, “Sweden and Turco v. Council”, 1236-1237.
284. See also KRANENBORG, H.R., “Is het tijd voor een herziening van de Eurowob?” (2005) SEW, Issue 4, 168.
285. Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed of 22 June 2006 in case C-266/05 P, Sison/Council, para. 27.PUBLIC ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS: JURISPRUDENCE BETWEEN PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE
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Recast – The Commission’s proposal predates the Turco-case law and would
thus best be amended to address the consequences and implications of this judg-
ment in one way or another. 286
2.3.4. Exception protecting the purpose of inspections, 
investigations and audits
a. Basic principles
To rely on this exception, the institutions need to show, not only that the docu-
ment concerns an inspection or investigation,287 but, more importantly, that its
disclosure will endanger the purpose and outcome of the inspections, investiga-
tions or audit.288 In general, the exception can be invoked as long as the inves-
tigations or inspections are ongoing289, even if “the particular investigation or
inspection which gave rise to the report to which access is sought is com-
pleted”.290 Hence, investigations which resulted in a final report yet still await
a decision on the action to be taken (for example by national authorities acting
upon information received from OLAF)291 can be protected as “ongoing” if the
decisions and actions are taken “within a reasonable period”.292
Whereas in principle a non-disclosure decision should be based on a specific and
individual examination of the documents at hand293, in some instances the case
law seems to have moved towards an exemption of documents by category.
b. Infringement procedures
The Court had to assess this exception in several cases involving infringement
proceedings against Member States for failure to fulfil their obligations under
the Treaty (Art. 258 TFEU; ex Art. 226 EC). The reasoning underpinning the
286. PEERS, S., “Statewatch Analysis June 2008: Proposal on access to documents: Article-by-Article commen-
tary“, 6, considers that to reflect the Turco-judgment this exception should be amended in the following manner:
“legal advice and court proceedings, except as regards legal advice in connection with procedures leading to a leg-
islative act or a non-legislative act of general application”.
287. Case T-20/99, Denkavit Nederland/Commission [2000] ECR II-3011, para. 45; Franchet and Byk, para.
105.
288. API/Commission, para. 133 (purpose); Franchet and Byk, para. 109 (completion). Case T-237/05,
Éditions Jacob/Commission [nyr], paras 72-76.
289. See Terezakis in respect of the need to protect the Commission and its auditors from external pressure dur-
ing an ongoing audit; paras 133&135.
290. Denkavit, para. 48; Franchet and Byk, 110.
291. Franchet and Byk, 120-124.
292. Franchet and Byk, 110-113. See also Case T-471/08, Toland/Parliament [nyr], paras 44-46, where the EGC
however did not find reference to “any specific inspection or investigation or of any other administrative checks
which were ongoing” at the time of the non-disclosure decision and which could be considered as implementing
the final audit report. The implementing initiatives mentioned concerned the protection of the institution’s deci-
sion-making process rather than the protection of the purpose of investigations, inspections and audits. Paras 51-
58.
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Court’s analysis is that infringement procedures strive to reach an amicable set-
tlement of the dispute with the Member State, and therefore the confidentiality
of these documents is required to preserve this negotiation option.294
In Bavarian Lager I the General Court was confronted with a request for disclo-
sure of a purely preparatory document in a procedure in which the delivery of a
reasoned opinion had been suspended, and which was thus to be seen as still at
the ongoing inspection and investigation stage. The EGC concluded that such a
document could be shielded from disclosure since the infringement procedure
was “still at the stage of inspection and investigation” and “the Member States
are entitled to expect confidentiality from the Commission during investigations
which may lead to an infringement procedure”.295
In respect of requests for disclosure of documents relating to infringement pro-
cedures at the time that proceedings are brought before the Court of Justice, the
EGC held that letters of formal notice and reasoned opinions drawn up in con-
nection with the investigations and inspections carried out by the Commission
are covered by this exception up until the judgment has been rendered.296 Like-
wise in API the Court stated that, in principle, pleadings in infringement pro-
ceedings which refer to the results of the investigation carried out to establish
the existence of an infringement, and where the infringement is contested by the
Member State concerned, can be as a category exempted from public access
until the time that the Court of Justice has adjudicated on the possible existence
of an infringement.297
Clearly, once the judgment is rendered on the basis of Art. 258 TFEU (ex Art.
226 EC), there is no more room for negotiation with the Member State298 and
refusal of public access should thus be based on an individual and specific exam-
ination.299 Likewise, this investigation exception cannot be invoked merely
because other similar proceedings are still underway300 or because a procedure
on the basis of Art. 260 TFEU could potentially follow. Indeed, the ECJ stressed
that Art. 260 TFEU concerns a distinct procedure “designed only to induce a
defaulting Member State to comply with a judgment establishing a breach of
obligations” and thus requires a separate investigation seeking to establish
whether the infringement has endured after the judgment of the Court.301
294. Case T-309/97, Bavarian Lager (“Bavarian Lager I”) [1999] ECR II-3217, para. 46; Petrie, para. 67-68;
API/Commission, para. 121; Bavarian Lager II, para. 159.
295. (emphasis added) Bavarian Lager I, para 46.
296. Petrie, para. 68.
297. API/Commission, paras 122-123; by analogy yet focused solely on the court proceedings exception: Swe-
den/API and Commission, para. 134,
298. The ECJ stated that once a Member State has been condemned on the basis of Art. 258 TFEU, the negotia-
tions between the Member State and the Commission are no longer aimed to establish an infringement, but to
determine whether the conditions for an action under Art. 260 TFEU are met. (para. 120)
299. Sweden/API and Commission, paras 120-121
300. API/Commission, para. 141.
301. Sweden/API and Commission, para. 118-122: API/Commission, para. 137.PUBLIC ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS: JURISPRUDENCE BETWEEN PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE
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c. State aid investigations
Whereas the General Court had found in Technische Glaswerke that the Com-
mission’s refusal to disclose documents from an administrative file concerning a
state aid investigation302 was invalid for lack of concrete and individual exami-
nation303, the ECJ rendered a landmark ruling accepting the existence of a
rebuttable general presumption that disclosure would undermine the state aid
investigation. More precisely, it held that the EGC should “have taken account
of the fact that interested parties other than the Member State concerned in the
procedures for reviewing State aid do not have the right to consult the docu-
ments in the Commission’s administrative file, and, therefore, [should] have
acknowledged the existence of a general presumption that disclosure of docu-
ments in the administrative file in principle undermines protection of the objec-
tives of investigation activities”.304 In other words, the ECJ implicitly accepted
that Regulation 659/1999 concerning state aid review procedures (“State Aid
Regulation”)305 forms a type of “lex specialis” (yet susceptible to rebuttal)
which derogates the lex generalis Transparency Regulation No 1049/2001.
Indeed, while reaffirming the need to explain why access to that document
would specifically and effectively undermine the protected interest, the ECJ
emphasized that institutions can base their disclosure decisions “on general pre-
sumptions which apply to certain categories of documents”.306 In respect of
ongoing procedures307 for reviewing State aid, “such general presumptions may
arise from Regulation No 659/1999 and from the case law concerning the right
to consult documents on the Commission’s administrative file”.308 Given that
the State Aid Regulation does not grant a right to consult the Commission’s
administrative file to interested parties other than the Member State con-
cerned309, to allow such access on the basis of Regulation No 1049/2001 would
amount to circumvention and thus justifies applying a general presumption that
disclosure would undermine the protection of the purpose of the investigation
within the meaning of Art. 4(2), para. 3.310
302. Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau (TGI) wanted access to all documents from a state aid investigation against
Germany which concrerned TGI and the aid received by it.
303. Case T-198/01, Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau/Commission [2004] ECR II-2717, para. 77-79, 85, 89.
304. Case C-139/07P, Commission/Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau [nyr], para. 61. (emphasis added)
305. Council Regulation No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Arti-
cle 93 (now Art.88) of the EC Treaty ([1999] O.J. L 83/1).
306. Case C-139/07 P, Commission/Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau [nyr], paras 53-54. This case law was con-
firmed in the domain of state aid review procedures by Cases T-494/08 to T-500/08 and T-509/08, Ryanair/Com-
mission [nyr].
307. Though in Technische Glaswerke the ECJ did not explicitly limit its acceptance of a general rebuttable pre-
sumption to ongoing state aid review procedures, in Sweden/MyTravel and Commission (para. 77) it did
expressly stress this fact when distinguishing it from the situation in Technische Glaswerke.
308. Case C-139/07P, Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau, para. 55
309. Art. 20 of that Regulation.
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This general presumption can still be rebutted if the party demonstrates that the
specific document at hand should not be covered by it (thus requiring an indi-
vidual examination), or that there exists an overriding public interest in disclo-
sure.311 In Technische Glaswerke the applicant had however solely relied on its
own interest as a beneficiary of the state aid under scrutiny and thus failed to
rebut the general presumption.312
d. Merger investigations
In Éditions Jacob the applicant sought access to a large number of documents
from a merger investigation file313 on the basis of which the Commission had
issued a positive decision and against which that applicant had already launched
an appeal.314 When the Commission awarded only partial access, the applicant
appealed also this partial disclosure decision. The General Court accepted that
documents submitted in a pré-notification stage of a merger do indeed form part
of the investigation file yet emphasized the need for a restrictive interpretation
of the exception.315 When considering the temporal scope of the exception to
disclosure, the EGC emphasized that once the merger decision has been adopted
by the Commission, the investigative file can no longer be deemed to be pro-
tected.316 To accept that the exception would continue to apply as long as the
merger decision has not yet become “final”, i.e. still open to annulment by the
courts, or as long as the Commission has not adopted another decision to
replace the annulled merger decision, would make disclosure dependent on an
uncertain, future and possibly distant event.317 Therefore, the requested docu-
ments were no longer covered by the exception protecting the purpose of inves-
tigations.318
The EGC further rejected the Commission’s more general argument on the risk
of a “chilling effect”, i.e. the fear that parties and third parties in merger cases
would no longer speak as freely during the investigation out of fear that this
information might be transmitted to third parties for other purposes. In other
words, the Commission argued that disclosure risks to destroy the climate of
311. Ibid, para. 62. Note that this places once again the burden of proof on the applicant. (see general conclu-
sions)
312. Ibid, para. 70
313. Case T-237/05, Éditions Jacob/Commission [nyr](hereafter Éditions Jacob)
314. Case T-279/04, Éditions Odile Jacob/Commission [nyr]; an appeal has been lodged with the ECJ against
this judgment: Pending Case C-551/10 P.
315. Éditions Jacob, para. 67-68.
316. Ibid, para. 77.
317. Ibid, para. 76
318. Ibid, para. 77. However, even if the documents would have been covered, the Court deemed that the Com-
mission’s motivation was too vague and general and failed to reveal an individual and concrete assessment. (paras
78-84) As regards correspondence between the Commission and parties in the context of a merger investigation,
the EGC stressed that this cannot be deemed to be manifestly covered by the exception, yet should be subjected to
an individual and concrete assessment. (para. 86.)PUBLIC ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS: JURISPRUDENCE BETWEEN PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE
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trust and cooperation necessary during such investigations.319 The General
Court deemed the Commission’s argumentation to be too vague and general.320
The Commission’s attempt to underpin its claim by referring to a law firm’s
publication, following the VKI judgment, in which the firm advised companies
who are the object of an investigation to be careful when giving out information
precisely because of the risk of later publicity, did not convince the EGC who
recalled moreover that parties in merger proceeding are in any event under a
legal obligation to provide the information requested by the Commission.321
Likewise, the General Court did not follow the Commission’s “limited use”
argument, i.e. the fact that information gathered on the basis of the Merger
Regulation can be used solely for the purposes of the relevant request, investi-
gation or hearing, flowing from Art. 17(1) of the Merger Regulation. The EGC
considered that this restriction only concerns the manner in which the Commis-
sion can use the information and has nothing to do with the right of access to
documents as implemented by the Transparency Regulation. This restriction
moreover needs to be read in light of Art. 17(2) as only requiring secrecy of
information “of the kind covered by the obligation of professional secrecy”.322
The EGC thus concluded that the documents were no longer within the scope of
the exception and had in any case not been subject to a concrete and individual
assessment.323
In Agrofert, where a third party sought access to all unpublished documents
regarding the pre-notification and notification procedures on the basis of which
the Commission authorised the acquisition of Unipetril by PKN Orlen, the EGC
responded more nuanced to the “chilling effect”-criterion. Though still conclud-
ing that the Commission’s argumentation was too vague and general, the Gen-
eral Court nonetheless showed somewhat more willingness to accept that such
a chilling effect on future investigations could be a ground for refusing disclo-
sure if this risk is proven to the “requisite legal standard”.324
e. Analysis
Lex specialis – The ECJ should be applauded for having clarified that, at least
in respect of state aid review procedures325, specialized legislation organizing
319. Ibid, para. 87
320. Éditions Jacob, para. 88.
321. Ibid, paras 87-88.
322. Ibid, para. 89
323. Ibid, para. 97.
324. Agrofert, paras 102-103.
325. Yet the same can be expected for other specialised procedural rules such as Articles 27, 28 and 30 of Regu-
lation 1/2003. The Ombudsman has already followed up on this in his recent decision in E.ON: Decision of the
European Ombudsman closing his inquiry into complaint 2953/2008/FOR against the European Commission, 27
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access to documents in specific domains should be presumed to prevail over the
more general rules on access.326 Indeed, it could be assumed that when adopting
the specific regulation the legislator has already balanced the value of transpar-
ency against the different opposing interests in the particular context of state aid
procedures. Hence, the transparency needs in that context should be adequately
guaranteed by the legislator’s balancing act.327 The fact that Regulation No
1049/2001 affects so many different domains with a multitude of conflicting
interests would seem to plead in favour of relying on the legislator’s specific
balancing act conducted in a specific policy context.328
Clearly, it should be verified that the special access rules at hand can indeed be
deemed to reflect such a balancing act. As regards e.g. the competition law
domain, it can be expected that the specific rules on access to files will be mainly
inspired by the goal to protect the rights of defence and guarantee the equality
of arms.329 Hence, it should always remain possible to prove the existence of an
“overriding public interest” in transparency in the particular case.
In contrast with the ECJ and, recently also, the ombudsman, the General Court
has shown itself less “amenable” to the specific concerns in the competition law
domain, and has imposed a high standard of proof on the Commission in its
Editions Jacob and Agrofert cases.330 Hence, it will be interesting to see how the
ECJ, in the pending appeals in Editions Jacob and Agrofert, will deal with the
specific risk in competition policy of a “chilling effect” on cooperation to inves-
tigations.331
326. Yet, the ECJ’s reliance on Turco to underpin its acceptance of general presumptions is rather tricky. Indeed,
when citing paragraph 50 in Sweden and Turco which states that “It is, in principle, open to the Council to base
its decisions in that regard on general presumptions which apply to certain categories of documents, as consider-
ations of a generally similar kind are likely to apply to requests for disclosure relating to documents of the same
nature” it conveniently ignores the second sentence where it was said that “it is [however] incumbent on the
Council to establish in each case whether the general considerations normally applicable to a particular type of
document are in fact applicable to a specific document which it has been asked to disclose.” Case C-139/07 P,
Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau, para. 54.
327. Contrast however with KRANENBORG, “Tien jaar Eurowob”, 224, who is precisely of the opinion that this
crucial link in the Court’s reasoning, i.e. the assumption that the legislator took into account the interest in public
access when designing the specialised legislation, is faulty. Indeed, the State Aid Regulation at hand in Technische
Glaswerke predates Regulation No 1049/2001 and KRANENBORG finds that genuine public access to documents
considerations are absent from the State Aid Regulation. He bases this, among others, on the fact that nothing is
said about possible access to documents from the file after the Commission Decision has been taken.
328. See also Advocate General Kokott in MyTravel who suggests that the access rules contained in the Merger
Regulation should serve as an interpretative tool for Regulation No 1049/2001; Opinion of Advocate General in
Case C-506/08 P Sweden/MyTravel and Commission, para. 60 ev.
329. GODIN, G., “Recent Judgments Regarding Transparency and Access to Documents in the Field of Competi-
tion Law: Where Does the Court of Justice of the EU Strike the Balance?” (2011) Journal of European Competi-
tion Law & Practice, Vol. 2, No. 1, 15.
330. Agrofert; Editions Jacob; GODIN, “Recent Judgments Regarding Transparency”, 11.
331. GODIN, “Recent Judgments Regarding Transparency”, 23, stresses that the exception regarding the protec-
tion of investigations is key to competition policy and should indeed “remain valid even after completion of an
investigation, in order to avoid a “chilling effect” that would discourage undertakings, such as potential immu-
nity/leniency applicants, from cooperating.”PUBLIC ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS: JURISPRUDENCE BETWEEN PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE
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Competition law documents not the Regulation’s “core business”? – Competi-
tion law files constitute a specific collection of documents whose disclosure
poses considerable challenges to the Commission, not in the least because of
their often impressive size.332 Without denying the importance of scrutiny of
and accountability for administrative tasks, it does seem that access to competi-
tion law files should not be the core business of the Transparency Regulation.
Yet, in reality there has been a steady and significant increase in public access
applications linked to competition law activities.333
Recast – Another proposed amendment which is strongly contested concerns the
Commission’s attempt to “pre-empt” the application of the Regulation to “doc-
uments forming part of the administrative file of an investigation or of proceed-
ings concerning an act of individual scope […] until the investigation has been
closed or the act has become definitive” and, even after the investigation has
been closed, those “documents containing information gathered or obtained
from natural or legal persons by an institution in the framework of such inves-
tigations” (Art. 2(6)).
Whereas under the current Regulation most of those documents would probably
already fall under the exception of the protection of investigations, exempting
them from the scope of the proposed Regulation clearly goes beyond that.
Indeed, it not only relieves the Commission of having to prove concretely a risk
of harm to the investigation, but also excludes the possibility of an overriding
public interest being invoked. In addition, it rules out the option of taking into
account the factor of passage of time when exempting documents obtained from
natural or legal persons.334
Although the recent TGI case indeed establishes a general presumption in
favour of applying the more specific rules on access developed in the context of
state aid, and this presumption is likely to be applied in the future to other
“specific rights of access for interested parties established by EC law”335 in the
context of competition law; the difference between an outright exemption ver-
sus a rebuttable general presumption is obvious.
332. 30.000 to 40.000 pages are no exception.
333. See in that sense Report from the Commission on the application in 2009 of Regulation (EC) No
1049/2001, 30.6.2010 COM(2010)351 final, 7, where the Commission notes that “As in past years, the overall
picture that emerges from analysis of access applications is that a large proportion of them relate to Commission
monitoring of the application of Community law”; GODIN, “Recent Judgments Regarding Transparency”, 10.
334. HARDEN, “The Revision of Regulation No 1049/2001”, 246.
335. Art. 2(6) – wording. In its Memorandum the Commission notes in this respect: Articles 27, 28 and 30 of
Regulation 1/2003 (competition) Articles 6(7) and 14(2) of Regulation (EC) No 384/96 (antidumping), Articles
11(7) and 24(2) of Regulation (EC) No 2026/97 (anti-subsidy), Article 6(2) of Regulation (EC) No 3285/94
(safeguards) and Article 5(2) of Regulation (EC) No 519/94 (safeguards against non-WTO members).PUBLIC ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS: JURISPRUDENCE BETWEEN PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE 
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2.4. Exception relating to the protection of the 
decision-making process (Art. 4(3))
Art. 4(3) of the regulation contains a specific exception aimed at protecting the
institutions’ decision-making process. Its first paragraph deals with documents
drawn up by an institution for internal use or received by it, which concern
matters in which the decision is still pending. The second paragraph allows for
limitations on access to documents containing opinions for internal use as part
of deliberations and preliminary consultations, even after the decision has been
taken.
Different from Art. 4(1)&(2), this provision explicitly requires there to be a
serious  undermining of the institution’s decision-making process. In other
words, the application of this exception is subjected to a stricter “qualified harm
test”336 and calls for a “substantial impact on the decision-making process”337.
Moreover, this exception is also subject to a balancing test requiring the pro-
tected interest to be weighed off against any potential overriding public interest
in disclosure.
While the Court consistently reaffirms the need, on principle, for wider access
to documents stemming from legislative procedures,338 this has not prevented it
from annulling several decisions refusing access to documents relating to admin-
istrative activities.339 Whereas for legislative decision-making procedures the
Court has clearly confirmed the public accessibility of documents on principle,
even if the procedure is still ongoing340, the situation is less clear in respect of
ongoing administrative procedures.341
2.4.1. Administrative and other non-legislative decision-
making processes
Although in MyTravel342 the General Court seemed open to a more generous
interpretation of this exception in the context of administrative procedures,
the later case law of the same Court indicates a much more stringent
approach, emphasizing in particular the need for the institution to prove that
disclosure would “concretely and effectively” undermine its decision-making
336. ADAMSKI, “How Wide Is “The Widest Possible”?”
337. Case T-144/05, Muñiz v. Commission [2008] ECR II-335*, Summ.pub, para. 75.
338. Borax, para. 69; Sweden/API and Commission, para. 77; Case C-139/07P, Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau,
para. 60.
339. Éditions Jacob, Agrofert, Case C-506/08 P, Sweden/MyTravel and Commission [nyr].
340. Muñiz, Case T-233/09, Access Info Europe/Council [nyr].
341. Contrast Technische Glaswerke, which admittedly was solved on the basis of the protection of investiga-
tions and specialized legislation on access rights in state aid review procedures, and the Opinion of Advocate
General in Case C-506/08 P Sweden/MyTravel and Commission (para. 65-70, 73) with Éditions Jacob where the
decision was arguably not yet final since appeal remained possible.
342. Case T-403/05, MyTravel Group plc./Commission [2008] ECR II-2027, para. 49.PUBLIC ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS: JURISPRUDENCE BETWEEN PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE
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process.343 The ECJ’s recent judgement on appeal in the MyTravel case, which
effectively reverses the General Court’s judgment, confirms this trend.344
a. MyTravel
The General Court’s favourable appraisal in the MyTravel case of the Commis-
sion’s desire to protect a finalized administrative decision-making process from
being seriously undermined by the disclosure of certain documents offered a
glimpse of hope to those supporting some degree of “space to think” within
administrations. However, on appeal the ECJ de facto rejected the General
Court’s reasoning across the board.345
The background to the dispute was the Commission’s rejection of MyTravel’s
concentration plans, a decision which was later annulled in the Airtours judg-
ment.346 Following this judgment, the Commission established a working
group, composed of officials from DG Competition and the Legal Service,
charged with investigating the possibility of bringing an appeal, as well as, more
generally, with reviewing the Commission’s investigation procedures in respect
of concentrations. When instigating an action for damages against the Commis-
sion, MyTravel also filed a request for access to the report drawn up by this
working group, the preparatory documents for that report and the documents
from the file concerning the Airtours/First Choice case on which the report was
based or which were referred to in it. The Commission rejected this request on
the basis of, among others, the risk that disclosure would seriously undermine
its decision-making capacity.
The EGC first emphasized that the interest in public access to documents carries
less weight as regards documents drafted in the context of a purely administra-
tive as opposed to a legislative procedure.347 It the accepted that disclosure
could seriously undermine the Commission’s decision-making process by
depriving it for the future from frank and complete views of its service. Indeed,
the possibility of public access might incite the services to practise self-censor-
ship in their opinions and avoid expressing (even constructive) criticisms.348
Moreover, such disclosure could reveal internal discussions and disagreement
within the Commission, thereby seriously undermining the decision-making
freedom of the Commission “which adopts its decisions on the basis of the prin-
343. Éditions Jacob, Agrofert.
344. Case C-506/08 P, Sweden/MyTravel and Commission [nyr].
345. The ECJ partially reversed the General Court’s judgment and partially annulled the Commission’s Decisions.
Yet, since some of the Commission’s arguments, in particular as regards the exception on the protection of the
purpose of inspections, investigations and audits, had not been examined by the General Court, the matter was
referred back for a new judgment.
346. Case T-342/99 Airtours v Commission [2002] ECR II-2585.
347. Case T-403/05, MyTravel Group plc./Commission [2008] ECR II-2027, para. 49.
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ciple of collegiality and whose Members must, in the general interest of the
Community, be completely independent in the performance of their duties”.349
Likewise, disclosure would restrict the Commission’s freedom to depart from its
services’ recommendations and take into account factors going “beyond the
scope of the rules in force, as interpreted by the Commission services and the
Community judicature”, like political priorities and resources constraints, when
adopting its line of action.350 Lastly, the EGC accepted that there was a reason-
ably foreseeable risk that written procedures would be gradually replaced with
oral less effective procedures thereby seriously undermining the decision-mak-
ing process.351
In her Opinion, Advocate General Kokott firmly rejected these arguments and
considered that the new case law adopted after MyTravel rightly requires spe-
cific evidence that disclosure of the documents at stake would concretely and
effectively undermine the decision-making process in a serious manner, some-
thing which the Commission had failed to do.352
The judgment on appeal, which was surprisingly rendered by the First and not
the Grand Chamber, confirmed the strict stance adopted in the recent case-law as
regards ended versus ongoing procedures, the narrow interpretation of Art. 4(3),
para. 2353, as well as the high standard of proof developed in cases like Borax. In
essence, the ECJ found that the Commission had failed to prove how disclosure
of these documents from a finalized administrative procedure would “specifically
and effectively” undermine the interest protected by Art.(3), para. 2.
Though agreeing that administrative activities do not require the same degree of
public access to documents as legislative activities, the ECJ recalled that admin-
istrative documents do not in any way fall outside the scope of the Regula-
tion.354 Moreover, like the Advocate General, the ECJ placed strong emphasis
on the fact that the documents at hand concerned a procedure which had been
closed. The fact that Art. 4(3), para. 2, limits protection in respect of finalized
procedures to a smaller category of internal documents indicates the legislator’s
opinion that in respect of closed administrative procedures, the need for protec-
tion is less acute.355 Hence, drawing an analogy with the case-law on ongoing
349. MyTravel, para. 51.
350. Ibid, para. 53
351. Ibid, para. 54. As regards the applicants claim that there was an overriding public interest in understanding
what the internal analysis and reform taking place within the Commission following the Airtours judgement
amounted to, the EGC deemed the applicant’s argumentation to be insufficient. (ADAMSKI disagrees, ADAMSKI,
“How Wide Is “The Widest Possible”?”, 543) The EGC further considered that the applicant’s reliance on the
sound administration of justice solely concerned the applicant’s search for information to underpin his case, and
was thus a private as opposed to a public interest. Paras 63 & 65.
352. Opinion of Advocate General in Case C-506/08 P Sweden/MyTravel and Commission, para. 38, 55; Muniz,
para. 75; Borax, para. 66; Editions Jacob, para. 141; Agrofert, para. 142.
353. See case T-250/08, Batchelor [nyr], discussed below.
354. Para. 87-88
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and ended court proceedings, it considered that the Commission had to provide
“specific reasons” to support its claim that, despite the fact that the procedure
was closed, disclosure could still seriously undermine its decision-making proc-
ess.356 Evaluating the Commission’s non-disclosure decisions against this touch-
stone, the ECJ disagreed with the EGC’s finding that the Commission’s argu-
ments were sufficient. Unlike the EGC, it did not consider the risk that the Com-
mission’s services would refrain from expressing frank and critical opinions or
might even resort to oral rather than written working methods to constitute
sufficiently “detailed evidence”, allowing it to be understood why disclosure
was likely to seriously undermine its decision-making process, even if the proce-
dure to which these documents relate had been closed.357
b. Editions Jacob and Agrofert
Also in the recent Éditions Jacob/Commission and Agrofert cases the Commis-
sion failed to concretely substantiate its arguments as to why the disclosure (of
the content) of certain internal documents preparing a decision regarding the
compatibility of a concentration operation358 would, after that decision has
been taken359, have the effect of seriously  undermining its decision-making
process, i.e. expose its services to external pressure, hamper their free exchange
of opinions, affect the collective nature of the decision-making process and
diminish the will to cooperate of parties in a merger notification procedure.
Rather, the Commission’s argumentation was given in such a general and
abstract manner, without any genuine application to the content of each of the
specific documents at hand, that it could pertain to the whole category of doc-
uments of that type/nature.360
356. Para. 82. Yet, a brief observation should be made in respect of the ECJ’s reliance on this analogy with the
protection of pleadings in ongoing versus closed court proceedings. Though the analogy might hold in as far as it
would refer to a potential presumption in favour of non-disclosure in ongoing administrative procedures in com-
petition or infringement investigations to safeguard “the serenity of the procedures”, arguably no such strong
analogy between the jurisprudence on ended court proceedings and closed administrative decision-making proce-
dures can be drawn. Indeed, the interest in the protection of internal documents from an administrative decision-
making process in terms of “non-censured” internal brainstorming and deliberation, frankness of opinions, etc.,
goes beyond a mere safeguarding of the serenity of the proceedings as is at stake in the protection of pleadings
submitted in court proceedings. Whereas internal notes on concrete cases already differ in nature from pleadings
“officially” submitted in a court case, such is even more the case for the Report drawn up to analyse the conse-
quences of a court judgment for the Commission’s handling of merger cases. Hence, the ECJ’s use by analogy of
this touchstone of “specific reasons”, as developed in respect of ended court proceedings, to assess the argumen-
tation for non-disclosure of the documents in the case at hand, does not seem entirely justified.
357. Para. 89, 97-98, 100.
358. In Éditions Jacob the applicant sought access to the following documents to use in its appeal against the
Commission’s positive concentration decision: a note from DG COMP to the legal service asking for advice on
the application of Art. 3, para. 5, sub a Regulation 4064/89 and a note containing a summary of the state of the
dossier drawn up for the Competition Commissioner.
359. Note that in the case of Éditions Jacob, the concentration decision was under appeal.
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c. Batchelor – non-disclosure of a Member State document on the 
basis of Art. 4(3), para.2?
In Batchelor, the UK relied on the protection of the decision-making process in
Art. 4(3) para.2, to refuse disclosure by the Commission of two letters sent by
the UK in the context of an assessment of the compatibility with Community
law of certain measures taken with respect to television broadcasting activities.
The General Court however, deemed such documents “sent to an institution by
an external person or body, in order to be the subject of an exchange of views
with the institution concerned” to fall outside of the category of “opinions for
internal use as part of deliberations and preliminary consultations within the
institution concerned” as protected by Art. 4(3), para. 2.361 Moreover, the UK
failed to adequately prove the risk that the EU’s decision-making process would
be seriously undermined. Indeed, it could evidently not rely on its own unwill-
ingness to loyally cooperate with the Commission once the documents
exchanged during such a cooperation risked being made public. Such reluctance
to respond frankly to the Commission’s queries could not form the basis for a
claim of a serious undermining of the decision-making process.362
d. Toland – internal audit report as part of ongoing decision-making 
process
While accepting that the internal audit report to which access was sought was
indeed a document “drawn up by an institution for internal use” and relating to
an issue, i.e. the reform of the rules on parliamentary assistance, on which the
European Parliament had not yet adopted any decision,363 the General Court
did not deem it proven that disclosure might risk to seriously undermine the
ongoing decision-making process. Indeed, the Parliament’s fear that parts of the
audit report could be abused to hinder the complex decision-making process
concerning such a sensitive and mediatised topic as the reform of the parliamen-
tary allowances’ system, was not supported in its decision by “any tangible ele-
ment”, mention of existing “acts undermining, or attempting to undermine” or
reference to “objective reasons” on the basis of which such a risk could be rea-
sonably foreseen.364 Moreover, the EP had failed to provide any motivation as
regards the absence of an overriding public interest.365
361. Case T-250/08 Batchelor/ Commission [nyr], paras 70-76.
362. Batchelor, paras 77-81.
363. Case T-471/08, Toland/Parliament [nyr], paras 72-74.
364. Toland, paras 78-81.
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2.4.2. Legislative decision-making processes
a. Muñiz
In the Muñiz case decided only two months after MyTravel, the EGC showed
itself much less amenable to “unconditionally” accept the Commission’s argu-
ments that its decision-making process would be seriously undermined by dis-
closing certain internal documents. The preparatory documents to which access
was sought formed part of a still ongoing legislative procedure. Nonetheless, the
EGC rejected the Commission’s arguments across the board.
More precisely, the applicant had sought access to certain internal documents of
a Working Group, which had been set up to support the work of the Nomencla-
ture Committee. The documents at stake contained a preliminary analysis of cer-
tain technical issues. At the time of the request, the Nomenclature committee had
not yet discussed those preparatory documents intended to help the Committee
in formulating its opinion for the Commission, who was then to adopt measures
as regards the classification of goods for the purpose of customs duties.
The core criticism was the Commission’s failure to provide convincing evidence
showing how disclosure would concretely and effectively undermine its deci-
sion-making process, and how the risk of that happening was reasonably fore-
seeable and not purely hypothetical. Indeed, the EGC was not convinced by the
Commission’s “procedural” arguments relating to the preliminary nature of the
analysis and the informal nature of the Working Group.366 Furthermore, the
fear of external pressure on the experts and staff influencing their decisions was
not backed up with concrete evidence lifting this argument beyond mere hypoth-
esis.367 Likewise, the claim that a disclosure obligation would lead the experts
and staff to exercise self-censure and prevent open and frank discussions was
not supported by any concrete evidence.368 Finally, a possible confidentiality
promise made by the Commission could not justify a protection level above and
beyond that laid down in Art. 4(3).369
b. Access Info
In the recent case Access Info, the General Court annulled a Council decision
which had allowed only partial disclosure of a Working Group note regarding
the recast of Regulation No 1049/2001 itself.370 More precisely, while revealing
366. Muñiz, paras 78-82.
367. Muñiz, paras 86-88. A general statement considering that such external pressure is possible in view of the
important commercial interests linked with custom tariff classification, does not qualify as concrete evidence.
368. Ibid, paras 89-91.
369. Ibid, paras 92-93
370. Case T-233/09, Access Info Europe/Council [nyr]. An appeal has been lodged by the Council: Pending Case
C-280/11 P, Council/Access Info Europe.PUBLIC ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS: JURISPRUDENCE BETWEEN PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE 
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all the information in that note as to the substantial arguments and proposals
for amendments advanced by the Member States, the Council refused to reveal
the identity of the delegations behind separate proposals, claiming that it would
seriously undermine its decision-making process in this ongoing legislative pro-
cedure. This practice of keeping the individual positions of the Member State
delegations secret until the legislation has been adopted is in fact common prac-
tice in the Council.371 Interestingly, in the time between the refusal of the appli-
cant’s request for access and the Court proceedings, the document at hand had
already appeared with the names of the different delegations on the website of
the organisation Statewatch.
Recalling that “openness makes it possible for citizens to participate more
closely in the decision-making process and for the administration to enjoy
greater legitimacy and to be more effective and more accountable to the citizen
in a democratic system” the General Court emphasized that these considerations
are of even greater importance in legislative procedures.372 More specifically, it
asserted that “the possibility for citizens to find out the considerations under-
pinning legislative action is a precondition for the effective exercise of their dem-
ocratic rights”.373
In view of these considerations and given that Member State delegations should
be publically accountable for their proposals, the EGC concluded that full dis-
closure of the Council documents, including the name of the delegation making
a particular proposal, has to be the principle to which the exceptions should be
interpreted and applied strictly374 and that no such general practice of blanking
out names could thus be accepted.
Indeed, after examining the Council’s arguments, the Court concluded that the
Council had failed to establish “to the requisite legal and factual standard” that
such full disclosure would have seriously undermined the ongoing legislative
process relating to the proposal for amending Regulation No 1049/2001. 375
Hence, the Council’s argument that such publicity of the different Member
States’ positions would complicate negotiations by reducing the delegations’
capacity to modify their position and to compromise, as well as risk serious
external pressure from the public with regard to any proposal tending towards
restricting openness, was judged insufficiently substantiated.376 Considering
that public accountability and the exercise by citizens of their democratic rights
371. Access Info, para. 43 referring to COREPER guidelines (Note from the General Secretariat of the Council to
Coreper (Part II) – Public access to documents – Issues of principle, doc. 6203/02 of 1 March 2002 approved by
Council doc. 6898/02 of 23 July 2002, at point 22.
372. Access Info, paras 56-57.
373. Ibid, para. 57 citing Sweden and Turco, para. 46.
374. Ibid, para. 69
375. Ibid, para. 66.
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requires them to be “in a position to follow in detail the decision-making proc-
ess within the institutions taking part in the legislative procedures and to have
access to all relevant information”377, the Court did not see such information as
an insurmountable hurdle for the delegations to modify and refine their posi-
tions. On the contrary, it deemed “[p]ublic opinion […] perfectly capable of
understanding that the author of a proposal is likely to amend its content sub-
sequently”.378 Moreover, as regards the risk for public pressure on those delega-
tions in favour of restricting openness, the Court deemed these to be based on
the “undemonstrated premise that public opinion would be hostile to any limi-
tation of the principle of transparency”.379
Furthermore, the Court asserted that the preliminary nature of the ongoing dis-
cussions depicted in the requested document cannot alter the balancing exercise
since Art. 4(3), para. 1, does not make such a distinction.380
As regards the Council’s plea to take into account the “particularly sensitive
nature of the proposals made by the Member State delegations”, the Court
rejected such a categorization finding that “those questions are not ‘particularly
sensitive’ to the point that a fundamental interest of the European Union or of
the Member States would be jeopardised if the identity of those who made the
proposals were to be disclosed.”381 In addition to pointing out the specific pro-
cedure laid down in Art. 9, for documents that are likely to qualify as a “sensi-
tive document”, which the Council had failed to invoke, the General Court con-
sidered that “it is in the nature of democratic debate that a proposal for amend-
ment of a draft regulation […] can be subject to both positive and negative
comments on the part of the public and media”.382 Furthermore, the Council’s
assertion that the length of the ongoing legislative process de facto illustrated the
difficulty in reconciling the different positions was not deemed convincing by
the Court which suggested several possible alternative explanations.383 Hence
the Council failed to provide actual proof of the “risk of compromising the
room for manoeuvre of the Member State representatives”.384
With regard to the risk that Member States would replace written communica-
tion with oral, the Court pointed out that the document drawn up by the Coun-
cil relies on the submissions by the delegations regardless of whether these are
made in writing or orally. Hence, such a potential shift could not be thought to
seriously undermine the decision-making process.385
377. Ibid, para. 69
378. Ibid, para. 69
379. Ibid, paras 70-71.
380. Ibid, paras 75-76
381. Access Info, para. 78.
382. Ibid, para. 78.
383. Ibid, para. 79
384. Ibid, para. 80.
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More generally, the Court did not find the Council’s evidence as regards the
actual harmful impact on the decision-making process of the disclosure of the
document on the Statewatch website convincing, and thus annulled the Coun-
cil’s decision.
c. Other cases
In the earlier case of Borax the EGC came essentially to the same conclusion that
the Commission had failed to provide specific evidence as to how disclosure in
this case would concretely and effectively undermine its decision-making proc-
ess.386 The case concerned a request for access to transcripts and audio record-
ings of an expert meeting on the basis of which the Commission had included
the applicant’s products on a list of dangerous substances annexed to a Direc-
tive. Hence, it concerned documents relating to a legislative decision which had
already been taken.
The Commission argued that disclosure would expose the experts to external
pressure and destroy the space for frank and open discussion, likely deterring
them from expressing their opinions in the future. The EGC, however, consid-
ered that the fact that the public debate following disclosure of such scientific
opinions could deter experts from participating in the decision-making process
is a risk which “is inherent in the rule which recognises the principle of access
to documents containing opinions intended for internal use as part of consulta-
tions and preliminary deliberations”.387 Furthermore, since this risk cannot be
extrapolated to mean that any disclosure of a scientific opinion with significant
economic or financial consequences will deter experts or even make it impossi-
ble for the Commission to consult appropriate experts as part of its decision-
making process, the EGC concluded that “scientific opinions obtained by an
institution for the purpose of the preparation of legislation must, as a rule, be
disclosed”.388 Considering that the Commission only offered abstract and gen-
eral justifications for its refusal and failed to specify how disclosure of the
recordings “would concretely and effectively undermine the process by which it
decides on the classification of the substances in question”, the risks of external
pressure and of deterring frank and free opinions were “based on mere asser-
tions, unsupported by any properly reasoned argument”.389
Interestingly, in this case the EGC briefly compared the level of protection
accorded to scientific as opposed to legal “expert” advice. It pointed out that,
unlike for legal advice, the Regulation does not contain an explicit exception for
386. Borax, paras 70-71.
387. Borax, para. 70.
388. Ibid, para. 70
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the protection of scientific advice. Moreover, since the ECJ has rejected a general
need for confidentiality of legal advice given in the context of a legal proce-
dure390, such a general and abstract protection from disclosure would be even
less justified in respect of scientific advice.391.
2.4.3. Analysis
It is clear that an exception protecting the decision-making process touches
upon the core of the “raison d’être” of the right to transparency and access to
documents, i.e. the transparency of the Union’s decision-making and adminis-
tration as a prerequisite for its democratic legitimacy and accountability. Hence,
the requirement that the harm inflicted upon the decision-making process must
be of a “serious” nature seems reasonable. Yet, at the same time the proper
functioning of the decision-making processes is fundamental to the so-called
output legitimacy of that Union, i.e. its ability to deliver. Therefore, it does not
seem unreasonable to also take into account the specificity and complexity of
the decision-making processes at EU level when evaluating the institutions’ reli-
ance on this exception.
From the case law it emerges that the Court has gradually toughened the burden
of proof on the institutions, emphasizing the need for specific non-hypothetical
evidence showing an actual risk of a serious undermining of the decision-making
process. It can be argued that in some cases, the Courts have, on the one hand,
failed to adequately take into account the complexity of decision-making in the
EU as well as the pragmatic reality of political decision-making processes more
generally, and, on the other hand, arguably overestimated the actual benefits in
terms of democratic participation flowing from increased access to documents.
a. A ‘space to think and negotiate’
Within the European academic debate, it has for a long time been assumed that
transparency is almost unambiguously beneficial for the decision-making proc-
ess in terms of legitimacy, democratic participation, quality of decisions, etc.
Gradually however, some academics started to feel the need to empirically as
well as game-theoretically investigate these assumptions. Hence, without deny-
ing the importance of transparency, their findings could help to develop a more
balanced perspective. Indeed, not every stage of political and administrative
decision-making processes will necessarily benefit from publicity. Hence, the
idea of a so-called ‘space to think’ or ‘space to negotiate’ is not without merit.
These overlapping concepts could be described as the shielding of internal delib-
390. Sweden and Turco, para. 57.
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erations and/or negotiations that serve to prepare a decision or other policy
action to be taken by a public authority from instant or even ex post publicity.
Publicity, denying any such a ‘space to think or negotiate’, can affect the quality
of decision-making roughly in two ways. For one, it can prevent the actual
reaching of agreement and thus adoption of a particular decision. Secondly, it
could even reduce the quality of deliberation. Several factors can contribute to
this.
Given that “a basic finding in social psychology is that public commitment to a
position makes people more resistant to moderating their views in light of sub-
sequent argument”392, there is a clear risk of “entrenchment of positions” once
they are out in the open. This would mean that policy-makers would refuse to
retreat from a position, despite good counterarguments, simply because the pub-
lic could perceive this as a lack of commitment or incapacity more generally. In
other words, “if deliberation is about transforming preferences, and publicity
forces you to know what you want and stand by your position, then ‘public
deliberation’ [...] is something of a contradiction in terms”393 It would also strip
the debate from the benefits of spontaneity where “deliberating parties are able
to try out ideas out of the blue with the risk of having to abandon them straight-
away (trial and error), to show hesitation, to re-consider the issues again and
again with a fresh eye”.394 This might lead “the actual deliberation [to] be [op]
more than the juxtaposition of pre-prepared statements with no actual interac-
tion taking place”.395
Another possible effect of publicity is that it could lead politicians “to posture”,
i.e. adopt excessively tough bargaining positions so as to demonstrate their loy-
alty to their constituents, a behavior which clearly risks causing a breakdown in
the negotiations.396 Relatedly, when voters are uncertain about the merits of a
particular policy, it could create a so-called “political correctness effect” where
politicians adopt the position which is most likely to follow prior beliefs held by
their constituents rather than the position which corresponds to their own pri-
vate beliefs about what is the best policy.397
392. MACCOUNC, R.J., “Psychological Constraints on Transparency in Legal and Government Decision Mak-
ing”, (2006) Swiss Political Science Review 12(3), 116-117, refering to, among others, JELLISON, J.M. and MILLS,
J., “Effect of Public Commitment Upon Opinions”, (1969) Journal of Experimental Psychology 5(3), 340-346;
and GOSSERIES, A., “Publicity”, in ZALTA, E.N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2010 Edi-
tion), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/publicity/, who argues that unless deliberating actors are
able to “try out ideas out of the blue with the risk of having to abandon them straightaway (trial and error), to
show hesitation, to reconsider the issues again and again with a fresh eye the actual deliberation may not be more
than the juxtaposition of pre-prepared statements with no actual interaction taking place”
393. NAURIN, D., “Taking Transparency Seriously” (2002) SEI Working Paper No. 59, 19.
394. GOSSERIES, A., “Publicity”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta
(ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/publicity/,
395. Ibid.
396. Stasavage, D., “Does Transparency Make a Difference? The Example of the European Council of Ministers”
(2005), 6, available at: http://as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/5395/transparency.pdf,
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Finally, in complex dossiers, it might also be beneficial if a representative is able
to shield of the deal under negotiation until all the “pieces of the puzzle” are put
together and the compromise-solution can be appreciated in its entirety.398
b. Council legislative decision-making: what the Council is versus 
ought to be…
From the Turco and Access Info judgments it can be inferred that the Court
requires, as a principle, full openness of the legislative process. The Access Info
case demonstrates some of the concerns raised by such increased transparency
demands for the decision-making process within the Council. Although the Gen-
eral Court is right in requiring a careful case-by-case analysis of disclosure
requests, it did not exhibit a great deal of openness towards the pragmatic argu-
ments advanced by the Council Legal Service and considerably raised the bar for
justifying reliance on that exception.
“Space to negotiate” – Yet, despite the hopes and aspirations of “European fed-
eralists” who perceive the Council as a type of senate in a federal state system,
the reality is still somewhat different. It is fair to say that at present the Council
still resembles more closely a kind of permanent diplomatic conference in which
sovereign Member States negotiate “deals”. Hence it seems rational to take into
account the specific dynamics of such negotiations. Although unsubstantiated
vague claims as to the risks of external pressure are indeed unsatisfactory to defy
transparency demands, it would seem common sense that, as set out above, the
psychology of negotiations will often require a certain degree of confidentiality.
As regards the reports made of the Council working group sessions, the Council
considered that with its “Coreper 2002”-compromise399 it had struck a good
balance between the demands of transparency and the needs of negotiations.
Indeed, by ensuring that the names of the delegations are blanked out in docu-
ments concerning ongoing legislative procedures which are disclosed, the Coun-
cil Secretariat created a “climate of confidence” which persuaded the Member
States to accept that the reports drawn up of the meetings dó display the posi-
tions taken by the different delegations. Hence, when made public after the end
of the process they will constitute a valuable source of information and account-
ability ex post.
The General Court was, however, unconvinced by the Council’s assertions that
disclosure would complicate ongoing negotiations by entrenching the Member
States’ positions as well as inflicting external pressure, and considerably raised
398. Ibid, 7.
399. Note from the General Secretariat of the Council to Coreper (Part II) – Public access to documents – Issues
of principle, doc. 6203/02 of 1 March 2002 approved by Council doc. 6898/02 of 23 July 2002, at point 22.PUBLIC ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS: JURISPRUDENCE BETWEEN PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE 
69
the standard of proof for this exception. As in Turco, the General Court
renounced the Council’s general practice of non-disclosure based on the pre-
sumption that it would undermine the protected interest and imposed as a prin-
ciple the need for disclosure of the delegations’ names in legislative procedures,
while still leaving the Council the possibility to prove on a case-by-case basis
that disclosure of a specific preparatory legislative document would harm its
decision-making. Yet as discussed above, this fear for “entrenchment of posi-
tions” once they are out in the open, does not seem such a “wild idea.
Standard of proof – It could be argued that in Access Info the EGC went beyond
the requirement of a “reasonably foreseeable and not purely hypothetical risk”
of the protected interest being undermined and de facto requested the Council
to provide evidence of “actual harm”. Such a standard of proof would clearly
be excessive and unfeasible. Aside from the fact that practical arguments based
on the “psychology of negotiations” are difficult to prove empirically, it is some-
what paradoxical that no such “standard of proof” seems to apply in respect of
the claims of “enhanced democratic participation rights”, “increased quality of
legislation”, etc., which are axiomatically invoked to underpin the imposition
of more stringent access requirements.400
Though the practical implications of this judgment remain to be seen, some
potentially worrisome consequences can be imagined. For one, increased disclo-
sure requirements could lead to the drawing up of documents containing less
substance.401 Even more drastically, it could cause a switch from written to oral
procedures which would be detrimental to the quality of decision-making in a
context of seeking agreement between 27 Member State delegations who have
to communicate back and forth with their capitals. Furthermore, such potential
disclosure could cause the delegations participating in the Working groups to be
much more careful and reticent in taking “individual initiative or responsibility”
without prior approval of their highest national level. Such would obviously
seriously slow down and handicap decision-making at EU level.
400. Criticising the axiomatic rather than argumentative nature of the claims made in the EU as regards the posi-
tive consequences of transparency in terms of legitimacy, accountability, etc., see: See Naurin, D., Deliberation
Behind Closed Doors (ECPR Press, 2007), 3; see also Stasavage, D., “Does Transparency Make a Difference? The
Example of the European Council of Ministers” (2005), 3, available at: http://as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/5395/transpar-
ency.pdf,
401. Which has according to some sources already happened in Sweden: see Ahlenius, I.,”Rätten att granska
tomma skåp” (2004) Dagens Nyheter 040423, as cited by NAURIN, D., “Public deliberation – a contradiction in
terms? Transparency, deliberation and political decision-making”, – (2006) Översikter och meddelanden Vol.
108(2), 192; ERIKSSON, F. and ÖSTBERG, K., “The problematic freedom of information principle – The Swedisch
experience”, in FLINN, A. and JONES, H. (eds) Freedom of Information – Open Access, Empty Archives?
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c. Commission internal decision-making process
In the MyTravel case, the General court had accepted, on the basis of quite
“general” arguments, the Commission’s need for a “space to think” in adminis-
trative procedures. Heavily criticized by some as favouring an unconstrained
independence of the Commission in administrative processes above the benefi-
cial self-restraint accompanying accountability402, the judgment nonetheless
seems to reflect a certain realism as regards the interests at stake. Yet, on appeal,
the ECJ followed the Advocate General’s call to reverse the MyTravel judgment
and abandon the greater leeway given to confidentiality of administrative proc-
esses, at least once they have been closed.403 In essence, the ECJ concluded that
the Commission had failed to prove how disclosure of these documents from a
finalized administrative procedure would “specifically and effectively” under-
mine the interest protected by Art. 4(3), para. 2. Whereas the ECJ’s reliance on
an analogy with the case-law on the protection of court proceedings to establish
the “principles” in the light of which the Commission’s argumentation is to be
evaluated, i.e. the need for that “institution [to explain] the specific reasons why
it considers that the closure of the procedure does not exclude the possibility
that that refusal of access may remain justified having regard to the risk of a
serious undermining of its decision-making process (emphasis added)”, is
already questionable404, its blunt rejection of the Commission’s arguments
seems somewhat unfair. Indeed, the finding that the Commission’s fear for the
deterrence of frank and written opinions, as well as self-censorship, was “not in
any way supported by detailed evidence, having regard to the actual content of
the report” allowing it to be understood why disclosure would have been likely
to seriously undermine the decision-making process even if the procedure “to
which that document relates” had been closed, seems a rather strong conclu-
sion.405 From the detailed mandate of that working group, which the Commis-
sion disclosed406, it can be deduced that the content of the report will go beyond
that particular case and is likely to contain sensitive divergences in view.
Whereas administrative accountability is indispensable and indeed contributes
to the quality of argumentation of the institutions, there is once again a balance
to be struck between “stimulating” and “paralyzing” openness.407 Indeed, the
402. See ADAMSKI, “How Wide Is “The Widest Possible”?”, 543.
403. Based on the provision’s drafting history, the Advocate General concluded that the protection of the deci-
sion-making process set out in Art. 4(3) purposefully refrained from granting a broad “space to think”-exception,
Opinion of Advocate General in Case C-506/08 P Sweden/MyTravel and Commission, paras 41-75.
404. See footnote 363
405. Case C-506/08 P Sweden/MyTravel and Commission, para. 89.
406. Next to its working plan and calendar. Case T-403/05, MyTravel, para. 34.
407. Contrast with Advocate General Kokott’s Opinion in Sweden/MyTravel and Commission para. 48, where
she emphasized that it is in fact the Regulation’s intention that “Union citizens […] understand how and for what
reasons the administration takes its decisions” and be informed about the “positions which the institution in
question has discussed internally and subsequently rejected”, thereby allowing them to judge the quality of the
administration’s “decision-making processes, participate in the public discussion on the administration’s action
and possibly be given guidance in making their democratic vote”.PUBLIC ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS: JURISPRUDENCE BETWEEN PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE 
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risk that “anything you say may be used against you” will logically lead civil
servants to avoid asserting criticisms, at least on paper, which could discredit a
later Commission action or decision. The Advocate General’s suggestions that
more transparency could equally well lead to the assertion of more “honest or
critical opinions” since publicity means that such well-reasoned arguments will
be harder to disregard, and that a shift to informal forms of deliberation might
not occur since “all participants in the administration have an interest in taking
high-quality decisions”,408 are not entirely convincing.409 Indeed, quite likely
the fear of disclosure has already led to a decrease in the “paper trail”, although
currently probably still limited to a practice of “selective conservation”, i.e. an
ex post screening of the documents which are to be kept as part of a file. How-
ever, if also documents forming part of ongoing procedures would become sub-
ject to disclosure, a shift from written to oral procedures in controversial or
sensitive matters seems plausible. Indeed, some have argued that this is precisely
what has happened under the Swedish system, resulting in so-called “empty
archives”.410 Clearly, this would hamper the efficiency of the Commission’s
decision-making process as well as de facto reduce the degree of transpar-
ency.The Advocate General herself conceded ongoing administrative procedures
merit greater protection so as to avoid undue influence by interested parties
disturbing the serenity of the procedures and affecting the quality of the final
decision as well as the Commission’s capacity to respect the time-limits of the
procedure.411
As regards the different treatment of ongoing versus closed administrative pro-
cedures, it should be noted that the Court in Editions Jacob deemed a merger
procedure to have ended when the decision is adopted, regardless of any remain-
ing appeal opportunity. However, in her opinion in MyTravel, Advocate General
Kokott suggested that the merger procedure is to be considered as finalized
when the final decision can no longer be judicially challenged.412
408. Opinion of Advocate General in Case C-506/08 P Sweden/MyTravel and Commission, paras. 51-54.
409. MEADE and STASAVAGE found that in the setting of the US Federal Reserve’s Federal Open Market Commit-
tee (FOMC) the introduction of ex post publicity in the form of verbatim transcripts of meetings in fact signifi-
cantly lowered the willingness of committee members to share dissenting opinions and thereby arguably reduced
the quality of deliberation, MEADE, E. and STASAVAGE, D., “Two Effects of Transparency on the Quality of Delib-
eration” (2006) Swiss Political Science Review 12(3), 123-133.
410. AHLENIUS, I., “Rätten att granska tomma skåp”(2004) Dagens Nyheter 040423, as cited by NAURIN, D.,
“Public deliberation – a contradiction in terms? Transparency, deliberation and political decision-making”, –
(2006) Översikter och meddelanden Vol. 108(2), 192. ERIKSSON, F. and ÖSTBERG, K., “The problematic freedom
of information principle – The Swedisch experience”, in FLINN, A. and JONES, H. (eds) Freedom of Information –
Open Access, Empty Archives? (Routledge, London, 2009), 113-124.
411. Ibid, paras. 65-69.
412. Opinion of Advocate General in Case C-506/08 P Sweden/MyTravel and Commission, paras 70-73.PUBLIC ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS: JURISPRUDENCE BETWEEN PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE
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d. Consultation of experts by the Commission
Also in certain cases on the consultation of experts by the Commission, i.e.
Borax and Muniz, the Court imposed a stringent standard of proof, almost
amounting to a demand for proof of actual harm suffered rather than the risk
of harm, and rejected on that basis the Commission’s request for confidentiality
to protect its experts.413 It seems that, at least in Borax,414 the Court’s analysis
was of a worrisome naivety in its refusal to recognize the power of industry
lobby groups and their capacity to discredit an expert when his opinion is
known to be adverse to their interests.
e. Recast
Although the Commission considers that its amended Art. 4(3) does not alter
the substance of that exception, it does extend the protection of documents
relating to ongoing decision-making processes beyond those “drawn up for
internal use or received by an institution” as protected under the current Regu-
lation.415
Moreover, both the EP and several other actors in the debate plead in favour of
an outright abolishment of this decision-making process exception. Indeed, they
are of the opinion that, especially since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty,
this exception lacks legitimacy given that there is no more reference in the Treaty
to the need to preserve the effectiveness of the decision-making process.416 Yet,
while it is true that the specific reference in the Treaty to the effectiveness of the
decision-making process has disappeared417, Art. 15(3), para. 2, instructs the
legislator to adopt the “general principles and limits on grounds of public or
413. In Muñiz, the language used by the EGC as regards the standard of proof for such a risk of external pressure
seems overly strict: “Nevertheless, the reality of such external pressure must be established with certainty, and
evidence must be adduced to show that there was a reasonably foreseeable risk that the classification decision to
be taken would be substantially affected owing to that external pressure.”, para. 86 (emphasis added).
414. In the Borax case, the experts had first heard the arguments of the company concerned in a public gathering
and had then given their advice in the context of a closed meeting.
415. 4(3) would become: “Access to the following documents shall be refused if their disclosure would seriously
undermine the decision-making process of the institutions: (a) documents relating to a matter where the decision
has not been taken;(b) documents containing opinions for internal use as part of deliberations and preliminary
consultations within the institutions concerned, even after the decision has been taken.” HARDEN, “The Revision
of Regulation No 1049/2001”, 50, who notes that this would broaden its scope by, for example, allowing the
institutions to rely on this exception even in respect of documents “drawn up for purposes of external consulta-
tion with specific persons or interests.”.
416. European Parliament, Resolution of 11 March 2009 regarding public access to European Parliament, Coun-
cil and Commission documents (recast), to be considered as Parliament’s position at first reading
(COM(2008)0229 – C6-0184/2008 – 2008/0090(COD)), P6_TA(2009)0114; see also the Draft Report of 12
May 2010 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council regarding public
access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (recast) (COM(2008)0229 – C6-0184/2008
– 2008/0090(COD)); Report of 22 June 2011 on public access to documents (Rule 104(7)) for the years 2009-
2010 (2010/2294(INI).
417. The 3d paragraph of ex Art. 207 EC, instructing the Council to elaborate within its Rules of Procedure the
conditions for access to its documents as well as the cases in which it acts in its legislative capacity “with a view
to allowing greater access to documents in those cases, while at the same time preserving the effectiveness of its
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private interest governing this right of access to documents” and thus still leaves
open the option of including efficiency of decision-making as a limit to disclo-
sure. Moreover, while the reference to effectiveness of the legislative decision-
making process contained in ex Art. 207(3) EC has disappeared, the exception
in Art. 4(3) concerns also non-legislative decision-making processes.
2.5. Exception relating to the protection of the 
authority of Member States (Art. 4(5))
No unconditional and general veto right – In Sweden/Commission (IFAW I) the
ECJ limited on appeal the “boundless” discretion which the General Court had
accorded to the Member States to refuse disclosure of documents transmitted by
them to the EU institutions.418 In this case, the applicant sought the annulment
of the Commission’s denial of access to certain documents which had been sent
to it by Germany. These German documents served to allow the Commission to
take its decision in a procedure for declassification of a site protected under the
Directive on conservation of natural habitats, so as to permit the site to be used
for economic purposes. The General Court concluded that the institutions are
bound by a Member State veto, without there being any obligation on that
Member State to provide reasons.419 Whereas the ECJ confirmed the principle
that a prior (dis)agreement of the Member State is binding on the EU institu-
tion420, it nonetheless emphasized that this does not confer an unconditional
and general veto right.421 Hence, in line with the duty of loyal cooperation422,
the Member State is required to state reasons for its refusal423, and, more impor-
tantly, these reasons should be able to fall under the exceptions set out in Art.
4(1)-(3) of the Regulation or relate to the specific protection accorded to sensi-
tive documents.424 The EU institution will need to include those reasons pro-
vided by the Member State in its statement of reasons accompanying a possible
negative decision.425 In the recent Batchelor case the General Court held that the
institution “need not set out its own assessment of the merits of that reason-
418. Art. 4(5) allows the Member States “to request the institution not to disclose a document originating from
that Member State without its prior agreements”.
419. Case T-168/02, IFAW Internationaler Tierschutz-Fonds/Commissie [2004] ECR II-4135, paras 58 59.
420. Ibid, para. 58; Case C-64/05 P, Sweden/Commission (IFAW I) [2007] ECR I-11389, paras 43, 47, & 50.
421. Sweden/Commission (IFAW I), para. 75.
422. Ibid, para. 85.
423. Ibid, paras 87 Contrast with EGC, IFAW/Commission, paras 58, 59&72.
424. Sweden/Commission (IFAW I), paras 76, 83, 84, 86, 88 & 89. Contrast with the Opinion of Advocate Gen-
eral Poiares Maduro of 18 July 2007 in case C-64/05 P, Sweden/Council (IFAW I) where he suggested that Mem-
ber States could also rely on grounds of exception derived from their national law, paras 50-51. LEINO, P., “Case
C-64/05 P, Kingdom of Sweden v. Commission”(2008) C.M.L.Rev. 45(5), 1483-1484.
425. Sweden/Commission (IFAW I), para. 89; see also Joined cases T-109/05 and T-444/05, NLG v. Commission
[nyr], paras 195-197. in which a Commission decision refusing access to a Member State document, and pre-dat-
ing IFAW I, was annulled due to the lack of a statement of reasons setting out the grounds of exception invoked
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ing”.426 The ECJ has furthermore asserted that it falls within the jurisdiction of
the Community judicature to review whether the refusal was validly based on
those exceptions, regardless of whether this refusal followed the assessment of
these exceptions by the institution itself or by a Member State.427
Extent of review – In the follow-up case IFAW Internationaler Tierschutz-
Fonds/Commission (IFAW II)428 the General Court had to assess whether the
German authorities and the Commission had complied with the conditions set
out in IFAW I when substantiating their refusal of access to one of the docu-
ments, i.e. a letter from the Chancellor.429 The applicant challenged the formal
nature of the Commission’s review which was limited to checking whether Ger-
many had provided a statement of reasons based on the exceptions in Arts. 4(1)
to (3) for its refusal.430 However, since the Commission decision confirmed and
based itself on the grounds of objection invoked by Germany, the EGC consid-
ered that, for the appraisal of the present case, it was not necessary to determine
the nature of the review, prima facie or full, to be undertaken by the Commis-
sion under an Art. 4(5) exception.431 Such would only have been necessary if the
Commission had disagreed with the Member States’ objections.432
Rather, in the case at hand, it was the nature of the judicial review of the Com-
mission’s final decision which had to be determined.433 Hence, the General
Court considered that, regardless of whether the refusal stems from an assess-
ment of the exception by an EU institution or by a Member State, the Courts are
obliged to conduct a complete review of the matter as opposed to a mere prima
facie review.434 Nonetheless, if the exception being invoked falls within the cat-
egory of mandatory public interest exceptions, in casu the protection of the eco-
nomic policy of a state, the Member States (like the EU institutions) enjoy a wide
discretion435 and the Courts can only carry out a limited legality review.436 Sat-
isfied that the Commission had provided an adequate statement of reasons and
that the Member State had not committed a manifest error of assessment when
applying the exception regarding the protection of the economic policy of the
426. Case T-250/08 Batchelor/ Commission [nyr], para. 47. It should however be noted that the Dutch transla-
tion of this paragraph is highly confusing since it states that the institution “niet zelf dient te beoordelen of deze
motivering gegrond is” which can be read as implying that the institutions themselves do not need (or are possi-
bly not even allowed) to substantively evaluate the merits of the Member States’ argumentation.
427. Sweden/Commission (IFAW I), para. 94
428. Case T-362/08, IFAW Internationaler Tierschutz-Fonds/Commission (“IFAW II”) [nyr]
429. Following the IFAW I judgment of the ECJ, Germany allowed disclosure of all the documents requested,
with the exception of a letter from the Chancellor to the Commission President. Hence it is this refusal of access
which formed the basis for the IFAW II procedure.
430. Or in the Commission’s own words: “cursory examination”. (IFAW II, paras. 59 & 64)
431. IFAW II, paras 84-86.
432. IFAW II, para. 86. It should be noted that this is precisely what is at stake in the pending case T-59/09, Ger-
many/Commission, where Germany challenges the Commission’s decision to go ahead with the disclosure of a
document originating from the German authorities despite the latter’s objection.
433. Ibid, para. 86.
434. Ibid, para. 87.
435. Ibid, para. 104-105.
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Federal Republic of Germany, the EGC concluded that the Commission cor-
rectly refused disclosure of the Chancellor’s letter.437
2.5.1. Analysis
Whereas the Regulation abandoned the disputed authorship rule438, it intro-
duced the ambiguously worded439 Art. 4(5) which seemed destined to pose
interpretative challenges for the Court. Indeed, the combination of the Member
State’s possibility to “request” the institutions not to disclose “without its prior
agreement” one of its documents held by them seems to reflect a compromise
solution which allowed the Member States to come to an agreement440, yet
which ultimately deferred the cutting of the knot to the Court. However, since
not much teleological guidance could be derived from the intentions of the
divided legislative actors441, the General Court and the ECJ arrived at opposite
conclusions.
The General Court thus sided with those who rely on the subsidiarity principle
to assert that the Regulation with its explicit statement that “it is neither the
object nor the effect of this Regulation to amend national legislation on access
to documents”442 does not affect the applicability of national access to docu-
ments regimes to Member State documents.443 Hence, rather than a genuine
exception to the principle of the widest possible access laid down in the Regula-
tion, Art. 4(5) would constitute a conflict of laws rule.444 Member State docu-
ments, even if held by the institutions, should thus remain solely a matter of
national law. However, as is also reflected in the ECJ’s reasoning, it seems quite
untenable in a decision-making structure which is so intertwined as today’s EU,
to deny that those Member State documents which genuinely form part of the
core information on the basis of which the EU institutions decide, do not take
on a Community nature which could require their disclosure as part of the trans-
437. Ibid, paras 118, 127, 138. An appeal has however been lodged: Pending Case C-135/11 P, IFAW Interna-
tionaler Tierschutz-Fonds/Commission.
438. This rule formed part of the regime under the Code of Conduct of December 6, 1993 concerning public
access to Council and Commission documents, and established that European institutions could not disclose doc-
uments, even if in their possession, which originated from third parties.
439. Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro of 18 July 2007 in case C-64/05 P, Sweden/Council (IFAW I),
para. 29.
440. Ibid, para. 32.
441. See also DRIESSEN, B., Transparency in EU institutional law: a practitioner’s handbook (Cameron May, Lon-
don, 2008), 107, who considers that the intentions of the different institutions and Member States were to diver-
gent to distillate any coherent legislative intent.
442. Recital 15 of the Regulation.
443. Defending this position, DRIESSEN, Transparency in EU institutional law, 104-107, emphasizing that the
applicant should then use the national route of access to documents.
444. See in that sense IFAW/Commission, paras 57, 58 & 61; DRIESSEN, Transparency in EU institutional law,
104-105 who stresses that Art. 4(5) is not a genuine exception because it relates to the status rather than the con-
tent of the document. Hence, the principle that exceptions should be interpreted restrictively should not apply.
Moreover, Driessen considers that neither ex Art. 255 EC nor any other provision provides a legal basis for the
Community to interfere with the Member States domestic policies on access beyond the laying down of a jurisdic-
tional rule.PUBLIC ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS: JURISPRUDENCE BETWEEN PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE
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parency required from Community decision-making.445 Yet, the ECJ’s claim
that since “in their capacity as members of the Council and as participants in
many committees set up by the Council […], the Member States constitute an
important source of information and documentation intended to contribute to
the Community decision-making process” and a veto right for Member States
would thus exclude an important class of documents is, at the very least, puz-
zling.446 Indeed documents transmitted by Member States as part of their work
in the Council are automatically considered as Council documents and thus do
not even come within the scope of Art. 4(5).447
In reality, it will primarily be the Commission dealing with such requests for
Member State documents, either as part of its decision-making processes or as
part of infringement proceedings, state aid investigations,…448
As for the claim that, were the EU regime to prevail in respect of Member State
documents held by the institutions, this would amount to an indirect harmoni-
sation of national access to documents rules, this would seem to somewhat over-
stretch reality. Indeed, it should be kept in mind that the EU regime would only
apply to those Member State documents which are in the possession of the EU
institutions.449
Although the Advocate General had attempted to convince the ECJ to rely on
the fundamental right status of the right of access to documents to limit the
applicability of this ground for exception and thus abandon an unconditional
veto right450, the ECJ did not follow. Rather, it adopted a somewhat ambiguous
approach. Indeed, on the one hand it confirmed the existence of a veto right, yet
on the other hand, it limited the exercise of this veto right to those situations
where the Member State gave a clear statement of reasons based on the excep-
tions in Art. 4(1) to (3) without however clarifying the nature of the institutions’
oversight over the Member State’s arguments. Hence, the ECJ left the question
as to whom, the institution or the Member State, has the final word unre-
445. See also Opinion of Advocate General in Sweden/Council (IFAW I), para. 42-43; Sweden/Council (IFAW I),
paras 63, 72 & 73 asserting that those Member State documents could be essential in understanding the rationale
for the Commission’s decision. Furthermore, it should be noted that if documents of several Member States are
involved, requiring the individual to make applications for access under the different national regimes could con-
stitute a prohibitive barrier.
446. Sweden/Council (IFAW I), paras 62-64.
447. Note from the General Secretariat of the Council to Coreper (Part II) – Public access to documents – Issues
of principle, Council doc 6203/02 of 1 March 2002 approved by Council doc 6898/02 of 23 July 2002 at point
22.
448. See for example: Joined cases T-109/05 and T-444/05, NLG v. Commission [nyr]; pending case T-59/09,
Germany/Commission.
449. KRANENBORG seems to consider that disclosure at EU level of a Member State document which would not
be disclosed under the national regime does not oblige that Member State to adapt its national rules. (KRANEN-
BORG, H.R., “Is het tijd voor een herziening van de Eurowob?” (2005) SEW, Issue 4, 170. Yet, it is obvious that
if those national rules can be circumvented via a request for access at EU level, that would de facto amount to an
abolition of the national rule at hand.
450. Opinion of Advocate General in Sweden/Council (IFAW I), paras 38-42.PUBLIC ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS: JURISPRUDENCE BETWEEN PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE 
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solved.451 It did emphasize that, regardless of whether the exception on which
the refusal was based had been interpreted by an EU institution or a Member
State, given that the disclosure decision was still in the end a Community deci-
sion, it remained subject to its judicial review.452 In IFAW II the General Court
then added that this amounts, in principle, to a complete review, unless the
Member State relies on an exception falling in the category of mandatory public
interest exceptions, then only a limited legality review will be carried out.
Recast – In its recast proposal the Commission replaced Art. 4(5) with a new
Art. 5(2) which reads: “Where an application concerns a document originating
from a Member State, other than documents transmitted in the framework of
procedures leading to a legislative act or a non-legislative act of general applica-
tion, the authorities of that Member State shall be consulted. The institution
holding the document shall disclose it unless the Member State gives reasons for
withholding it, based on the exceptions referred to in Article 4 or on specific
provisions in its own legislation preventing disclosure of the document con-
cerned. The institution shall appreciate the adequacy of reasons given by the
Member State insofar as they are based on exceptions laid down in this Regula-
tion.”
While enhancing transparency by excluding “documents transmitted in the
framework of procedures leading to a legislative act or a non-legislative act of
general application” from prior Member State consultation, the Commission’s
proposal diverges from the ECJ’s finding in IFAW. Indeed, in IFAW the Court set
out the obligation for Member States to justify their refusal on the basis of the
exceptions laid down in Art. 4 (1)-(3) (or as a sensitive document in the sense of
Art. 9), and thus seems to have excluded the reliance on justificatory grounds
drawn from national legislation – which do not fall within Art. 4(1)-(3) or Art.
9 of the Regulation – as is provided for in the recast proposal.453 Moreover, the
current proposal would seem to deny the institutions the power to judge the
adequacy of those reasons which are based on specific national legislation,
whereas this question is still open under the current regime. Clearly, this would
give the Member States an incentive to justify their refusal on the basis of
national rules rather than the Regulation.454
451. The pending Case T-59/09, Germany/Commission, in which Germany challenges the Commission’s decision
to go ahead with the disclosure of a document originating from the German authorities despite the latter’s objec-
tion, will hopefully clarify this matter; LEINO, “Case C-64/05 P, Kingdom of Sweden v. Commission”, 1481-1482.
Unlike Advocate General Maduro who was of the opinion that the institution should definitely be able to refuse
the Member States’ reliance on a particular exception derived from the Regulation. As for exceptions based on
national law, though in principle not subject to scrutiny from the institution, they could still be ignored by that
institution if it considers that such is necessary for the transparency of the Community decision-making process.
Opinion of Advocate General in Sweden/Council (IFAW I), paras 52-53.
452. Sweden/Council (IFAW I), para. 94; ADAMSKI considers that such review of what is in essence a national
decision is in fact inconsistent with Art. 230 EC, ADAMSKI, “How Wide Is “The Widest Possible”?”, 546.
453. See also HARDEN, “The Revision of Regulation No 1049/2001”, 251; House of Lords, “Access to EU Doc-
uments”, para. 55.
454. LEINO, “Case C-64/05 P, Kingdom of Sweden v. Commission”, 1485.79
3. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
3.1. General tendencies in the case law
3.1.1. Transparency for general policy measures unless 
conflicting fundamental values
General policy measures – Irrespective of whether one agrees with the result,
there is a relatively consistent line of reasoning that has emerged over the last
two years in the ECJ’s case law on public access to documents. More specifically,
the ECJ can be seen to promote maximum transparency in cases involving polit-
ical decisions containing general and abstract policy choices, as well as imple-
menting decisions with a clear policy content. In a democracy, decision-making
processes resulting in general policy choices affecting all are deemed to mandate
the utmost openness. Yet, the Court has accepted a restriction of transparency
when other fundamental values such as the right to a fair trial, privacy, etc.,
risked being undermined and when the interests in democracy as well as
accountability were sufficiently guaranteed.
The “big five” – Five Grand Chamber judgments handed down over the last
two years, i.e. Sweden/Commission (IFAW I), Turco, Bavarian Lager, Tech-
nische Glaswerke and API, all fit in this framework. In Sweden/Commission
(IFAW I) and Turco the ECJ considered that the interest in democracy man-
dated access to a legal opinion in a legislative procedure, respectively a Member
State document forming part of an administrative decision-making process
resulting in measures of general application. However, in Bavarian Lager and
API, the Court found the interest in transparency to be outweighed by the right
to privacy, respectively the right to a fair trial and the need for a sound admin-
istration of justice. In Technische Glaswerke the Court de facto applied the lex
specialis derogat legi generali principle considering that the State Aid Regula-
tion already embodied the legislator’s balancing act of transparency against a
myriad of other interests worthy of protection in the context of a state aid
investigation.
Legislative versus administrative procedures – The Court’s demand for complete
openness of the legislative process on principle,455 as is clear from the Turco and
Access Info judgments, is fully in line with its increased transparency require-
ment as regards “general policy choices”. Likewise, the greater leeway given to
the institutions in Technische Glaswerke and the first instance judgment in
455. Sweden/API and Commission, para. 77; Case C-139/07P, Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau, para. 60. (Opin-
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MyTravel456 reflects the lesser public interest in full transparency of such admin-
istrative procedures leading to decisions with an individual scope457 as well as,
in the case of Technische Glaswerke, the greater deference accorded to the leg-
islator’s balancing act of the specific interests which is deemed to be incorpo-
rated in such “sector-specific” Regulations.
Yet, the Court has recently recalled in Agrofert and Sweden/MyTravel and Com-
mission that, even if legislative processes mandate greater openness, also for
administrative processes “openness remains the principle”.458 Indeed, in her
opinion in the MyTravel-case, Advocate General Kokott points out that the Reg-
ulation explicitly provides that “openness guarantees that the administration
enjoys greater legitimacy and is more effective and more accountable to the cit-
izen in a democratic system”.459
3.1.2. Special versus general access to documents regimes
Interpreting Regulation No 1049/2001 in light of other specific EU rules – In
the three judgments mentioned above where the ECJ deemed the interest in
transparency to be outweighed by other fundamental values, it also, somewhat
implicitly, clarified that Regulation No 1049/2001 should be interpreted in light
of other more specific EU rules on access.460 Hence, in Bavarian Lager, Tech-
nische Glaswerke and API the Court interpreted the exceptions invoked in light
of the more specific rules contained in the Personal Data Protection Regulation,
the State Aid Regulation, the Statute of the Court of Justice and the Rules of
Procedure of the EU Courts. Although the Court never explicitly relied on the
lex specials derogat generalis principle, it clearly emerges from this case law that
the Regulation cannot deprive these specific access rules of their “effective-
ness”.461 Although it remains to be seen whether the Court will extend this rea-
soning to other specific access regimes in, for example, merger proceedings, it
456. Yet on appeal this reasoning seems to have been rejected in respect of ended administrative procedures: Case
C-506/08 P Sweden/MyTravel and Commission. In line with the EGC’s MyTravel judgment, see also Éditions
Jacob/Commission, para. 161, in respect of legal opinions provided in an administrative process. Contrast how-
ever with Agrofert where a different chamber of the General Court rejected the Commission’s refusal to disclose a
legal opinion relating to a Merger decision arguing that the Commission’s statement of reasons failed to offer any
explanation why disclosure would compromise its capacity to benefit from having full and frank legal advice.
(paras 128-129)
457. Note however that in her opinion on the appeal in the MyTravel case Advocate General Kokott considered
that the Report on the consequences of the Airtours judgement is “not a typical administrative activity, but the
development of policy or strategy”, and that therefore, “[u]nder Article 12(3) of Regulation No 1049/2001, such
documents, like legislative documents, should where possible be made directly accessible” (emphasis added,
Opinion of Advocate General in Case C-506/08 P Sweden/MyTravel and Commission para. 87)
458. Agrofert, para. 129. (emphasis added)
459. Recital 2.
460. See also GODIN, “Recent Judgments Regarding Transparency”, 22.
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does seem likely.462 The recent E.ON decision of the Ombudsman seems to con-
firm this in respect of antitrust cases governed by Regulation 1/2003.463
Rebuttable general presumptions – In view of the very diverse interests at stake
in requests for access to documents addressed to the different institutions in
different domains, it seems sensible to rely on specialized access rules drawn up
for a particular sector or domain. Yet, since it would be naive to assume that the
legislator consciously took into account the public interest in transparency when
adopting these “sector instruments”464, as long as these special regimes are not
adapted in this respect, the existence of such a lex specialis should probably do
no more than create a “general presumption” which remains rebuttable also on
the basis of an overriding public interest in transparency. This was the approach
taken in Technische Glaswerke as well as, though less clear, in API.465 However,
whereas these cases shifted the burden of proving an overriding public interest
once again upon the applicant466, the institutions themselves should be required
to ex officio consider whether there can be expected to be an overriding public
interest in disclosure.467
In Bavarian Lager, the Court went beyond this “general presumption” approach
and effectively applied the lex specialis Regulation 1045/2001-regime, requiring
the applicant to provide an “express and legitimate justification or any convinc-
ing argument in order to demonstrate the necessity for those personal data to be
transferred” and thus his “specific interest” in disclosure (Art. 8) beyond the
general public’s interest in transparency. 468
3.1.3. Ongoing versus ended procedures
Legislative procedures – It seems that the Court has seriously limited the possi-
bility to restrict access to documents which form part of an ongoing legislative
process. Indeed, both in Turco and Access Info the Court stressed the need for
citizens to be fully informed about the ongoing debate so as to allow them to
462. More clarity should be brought by the appeals pending in Éditions Jacob (C-404/10 P), Agrofert (C-477/10
P), MyTravel (C-506/08 P). See also Advocate General Kokott in MyTravel who asserted that the interpretation
of the exception in Art. 4(3) of Regulation No 1049/2001 needs to take into account the restrictions of access to
the file laid down in “the Merger Regulation” (i.e. Art. 17(3) of Regulation No 802/2004) governing the merger
control procedures. (Opinion of Advocate General in pending Case C-506/08 P Sweden/MyTravel and Commis-
sion, paras 68-69)
463. Decision of the European Ombudsman closing his inquiry into complaint 2953/2008/FOR against the Euro-
pean Commission, 27 July 2010.
464. See the criticisms on this point expressed by KRANENBORG, “Tien jaar Eurowob”, 223-224.
465. In contrast with TGI (Case C-139/07P, Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau, para. 62), in API the possibility to
rebut the general presumption on the basis of an overriding public interest is only discussed much later in the
judgment (Sweden/API and Commission, para. 152)
466. For a critical analysis in this respect, see KRANENBORG, “Tien jaar Eurowob”.
467. Some clarity could be brought by the pending appeal cases Éditions Jacob (C-404/10 P), Agrofert (C-477/10
P).
468. Commission/Bavarian Lager, paras 77-78; see in that sense, KRANENBORG, “Tien jaar Eurowob, 227.PUBLIC ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS: JURISPRUDENCE BETWEEN PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE
82
“exercise their democratic rights” and “participate more closely in the decision-
making process” (“democratic participatory right”)469, rather than merely hav-
ing the option of holding decision-makers accountable ex post. It is beyond
doubt that in a democracy legislative processes should be as transparent as pos-
sible. Yet, aside from the fact that it would seem somewhat naïve to believe that
mere public access to documents will genuinely empower and encourage citizens
to actively participate in the ongoing legislatives debates, certain arguments also
plead in favour of allowing some “space to think and deliberate”.470 Indeed, as
already discussed in the context of the exception protecting the decision-making
processes, excessive transparency demands could very well harm the specific
deliberation and negotiation process within the Council, lead to the use of more
informal working methods detrimental to the functioning of any institution,
deprive the Commission of “frank expert advice” in domains with large finan-
cial interests at stake, etc.
Administrative procedures – Although in MyTravel the General Court accepted
the need for protection of the Commission’s administrative decision-making
process even after the relevant decision has been taken, in two subsequent cases
Editions Jacob and Agrofert the Commission failed to produce evidence sub-
stantiating a similar need for protecting documents from a merger file where the
decision had been taken.471 Moreover, on appeal, the ECJ (partially) reversed
the MyTravel judgment and restricted the greater leeway given to confidentiality
of administrative processes, at least as regards closed procedures.472 In her
Opinion, the Advocate General explicitly recognized that ongoing administra-
tive procedures merit greater protection so as to avoid undue influence by inter-
ested parties disturbing the serenity of the procedures and affecting the quality
of the final decision and the Commission’s capacity to respect the time-limits of
the procedure.473
3.1.4. Standard and burden of proof
Standard for proving “risk of harm” – Whereas the general presumptions
accepted in the recent line of cases clearly alleviate the institutions’ task of estab-
lishing a risk of harm to a protected interest, on several other occasions the
469. Sweden and Turco, para. 45 & 67; Access Info, paras. 56-57, 69, 78.
470. As regards the empowerment of citizens, it is clear that sufficient transparency is a necessary yet insufficient
condition to strengthen democratic participation, and some of the efforts might thus be better invested in devel-
oping other means of participation. Apropos the encouragement of citizens to participate more actively in the
democratic process, the striking lack of individual citizens among the applicants seeking access to documents con-
trasts with the preponderance of academics, lawyers, lobbyists and NGOs, and indicates that the ideal of a “par-
ticipatory democracy” is unlikely to be (solely) realized via an ever greater public access to documents.
471. Note however that in Editions Jacob an appeal was pending against the Commission’s merger decision.
472. Case C-506/08 P Sweden/MyTravel and Commission.
473. Opinion of Advocate General in Case C-506/08 P Sweden/MyTravel and Commission, paras. 65-69.PUBLIC ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS: JURISPRUDENCE BETWEEN PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE 
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Court has on the contrary toughened the standard of proof as regards the risk
that disclosure “would actually and effectively undermine the protected inter-
est”. Indeed, it has repeatedly concluded that the institutions’ arguments were
“mere assertions”, “merely hypothetical”,…,474 and thus failed to establish “to
the requisite legal and factual standard that disclosure […] would seriously
undermine” the protected interest.475 Yet, the nature of such a “requisite legal
and factual standard of proof” for a risk, i.e. an event which is yet to occur, is
far from obvious. It could even be argued that in some cases the Court’s “stand-
ard” almost amounts to demanding evidence of “actual harm”.476
Burden of proof of overriding public interest – Since Turco it seemed clear that
the institutions themselves are, at least as regards documents from a legislative
procedure, under the obligation to ex officio investigate whether there exists an
overriding public interest in disclosure, including the general interest in trans-
parency itself.477 Hence, the institutions would have to balance the interests pro-
tected by the exceptions against the interest in transparency in that particular
case. Also in respect of documents from a non-legislative procedure, the General
Court recently reaffirmed in Toland the institutions’ duty to include in their non-
disclosure decision an explicit motivation as regards the absence of an overrid-
ing public interest.478
Yet, in the Technische Glaswerke case concerning an administrative state aid
procedure, the ECJ shifted the burden of proving the existence of an overriding
public interest, capable of rebutting the general presumption, once again upon
the applicant.479 A similar story is found in the API-case.480 Obviously this sig-
nificantly weakens the applicant’s position and ignores that such general pre-
sumptions should remain sufficiently open to rebuttal as long as it cannot be
assumed that the specific rules adequately incorporate the public interest in
transparency.
474. Sweden and Turco, para. 63 & 66; Borax, paras 44-50.
475. Access Info, para. 66 (emphasis added)
476. See in that sense Borax (a.o. para. 44) and Muñiz.
477. Sweden and Turco, para. 74.
478. Toland, paras 83-84.
479. Case C-139/07P, Commission/Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau [nyr], para. 62; KRANENBORG, “Tien jaar
Eurowob”, 224.
480. Sweden/API and Commission, paras 57-59.PUBLIC ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS: JURISPRUDENCE BETWEEN PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE
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3.1.5. General assumptions/categories of documents versus 
specific examination
Although the Court has always been very strict on the requirement of a concrete
case-by-case analysis and rejected arguments based on categories of rather than
individual documents, the recent line of cases discussed above (TGI, Bavarian
Lager, API) has visibly broken with this tradition.481
Though the technique of general presumptions in favour of non-disclosure con-
flicts with the core “case-by-case” approach of the Regulation, it seems cur-
rently the best manner to deal with the unintended consequences of the very
broad scope of the Regulation. Indeed, whereas a general exemption of situa-
tions which are governed by specific access rules from the scope of application
of Regulation No 1049/2001 would in theory be a better solution, this would
arguably require a revision of those sectorial regimes to ensure that they ade-
quately take into account the public interest in transparency. Since this is
unlikely to happen soon, the application of general presumptions which remain
rebuttable on the basis of an overriding public interest in transparency is prob-
ably the best option.
Indeed, it has the potential to relieve the institutions from the burden of having
to establish in respect of every single document – from files which often contain
thousands of pages – the risk of harm from disclosure, in domains where specific
rules of access exist and the applicants are mainly motivated by other reasons
than increased accountability or democracy. This would particularly help the
Commission to contain the increasing workload from requests for access to
competition law files.
3.2. The Regulation: some more general reflections
3.2.1. Regulation is very often not used for its original goal
Irrespective of the more fundamental question whether a right of public access
to documents is überhaupt capable of living up to the important role accorded
to it within the EU in terms of increasing democratic legitimacy and participa-
tion, it can be empirically observed that Regulation No 1049/2001 is very
often used for purposes other than it was designed for. Indeed, though differ-
ing across the institutions and policy domains, the majority of requests for
access stem from academics, lawyers, lobbyists, officials and NGOs, as
opposed to individual citizens seeking to exercise their democratic participa-
481. Contrast however with the recent Agrofert case where although it was reiterated that a refusal to disclose
may be based on “general presumptions which apply to certain categories of documents”, the institution will stíll
need to establish that these considerations apply to that particular document, para. 123.PUBLIC ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS: JURISPRUDENCE BETWEEN PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE 
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tion rights.482 Admittedly, the active involvement of NGO’s indirectly repre-
senting particular concerns and interests in society would, overall, seem a pos-
itive development in terms of democratic participation.483
Yet, if it emerges that a significant proportion of the applications come from
lawyers seeking access to large quantities of documents in the hope of finding
evidence in support of their clients’ case in eg. infringement or competition law
cases,484 it can be argued that a lot of people and resources are being invested
for reasons that do not correspond to the ones which inspired the adoption of
the Regulation. Moreover, in view of the efforts to facilitate private actions for
damages brought before national courts by victims from breach of EU antitrust
rules, these types of expansive requests from competition lawyers looking for
evidence to support their clients’ claims are likely to increase even further.485
Even if these applications could have some marginal democracy or legitimacy
knock-on-effects, in a world of limited resources it makes sense to rely on spe-
cific rules and redirect the Regulation to its original purpose.
3.2.2. Are we dancing around the “elephants in the room”?
Lobbying the European Parliament – While the European Parliament is without
doubt the most transparent of the EU institutions in several respects, some
important “black holes” remain. It is well-known that MEPs depend heavily on
the input provided by external stakeholders or so-called lobbyists to manage the
technicality and diversity of dossiers entrusted to them.486 Yet, while it would
seem crucial for such external input, which will often take the shape of fully
482. For 2009, the profile of the applicants seeking access to documents of the different institutions was the fol-
lowing:
1. the Commission: 21.29% academics, 9.85% civil society (down from 18.26% in 2008), 45.5% applicants
with unknown “socioprofessional profile”(up from 6.75% in 2008), 7.33% public authorities (down from
14.19% in 2008), 10.24% lawyers, 3.77% other EU institutions, 2.02% journalists; (Report from the
Commission on the application in 2009 of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001, COM(2010)351 final),
30.6.2010.
2. the Council: Initial applications came mainly from students and researchers (33,6%). Lawyers (11,4%),
industry and commerce and pressure groups (17,2%) were also high on the list of social and professional
categories represented. Since applicants are not required to give their identity or provide reasons for their
applications, which are usually sent by e-mail, the occupations of a significant proportion (12,7%) of them
is unknown. Most confirmatory applications also originated from students and researchers (46,9%). How-
ever, numbers from lawyers increased remarkably in 2009 (18,8% against 10,5% in 2008). (Council
Annual report on access to documents – 2009)
483. CURTIN & MEIJER note however that the democratic nature of many NGO’s is increasingly being ques-
tioned, casting doubts on their contribution in terms of representation and increased legitimacy, CURTIN and
MEIJER, “Does transparency strengthen legitimacy?”, 117.
484. Report from the Commission on the application in 2009 of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001, 7.
485. Already in its Green Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules {SEC(2005) 1732},
COM(2005) 672, 19.12.2005, 5-6, the Commission implied that disclosure by the competition authorities
under Regulation No 1049/2001 is not the proper route to obtain this sort of information. A system of “dis-
covery rules”, allowing a party to request the defendant to hand over evidence to the Court without these doc-
uments having to be made public, would be a better option, yet many Member States do not know such rules,
5-6.
486. RASMUSSEN, M.J., “Lobbying the European Parliament: A necessary evil”, CEPS Policy Brief No. 242, May
2011, at: http://www.ceps.eu/book/lobbying-european-parliament-necessary-evil, 2.PUBLIC ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS: JURISPRUDENCE BETWEEN PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE
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elaborated lists of amendments and voting lists487, to be made visible to the
public in some form, it is not. Despite the efforts being undertaken to remedy
these shortcomings, in the form of the recently set up Transparency register488
and the working group on codes of conduct for MEPs and lobbyists set up by
President Jerzy Buzek,489 there is still a long way to go. Introducing a so-called
legislative footprint, which obliges the rapporteurs to list in their report the
interest groups that they have consulted, is a valuable yet insufficient step.
Rather, what seems really needed is the installation of more formalised consul-
tations of external stakeholders, with their position papers being put online and
with an obligation on the MEPs to invite the major stakeholders representing
the main diverging viewpoints and interests.490 Relatedly, the position papers
and lists of amendments drafted by interest groups and received by the MEPs
via email, etc., and which are currently covered under the so-called “free man-
date” principle until they are tabled in accordance with the Rules of Procedure,
should be made available to the public.491 Indeed, given the reality that about
80% of amendments tabled in the committees are estimated to come directly
from interest representatives492, it seems that the MEP’s “freedom to receive
information” should in this instance be outweighed by the public’s interest in
knowing where that information comes from.
Trialogues – Another “black hole” in the transparency of the EU’s legislative
decision-making process are undoubtedly the (in particular first reading) tria-
logue meetings which take place in complete secrecy and do not produce docu-
ments. Yet the European Parliament is undertaking efforts to enhance the tria-
logues’ transparency and ensure a more active involvement of the MEPs (in par-
ticular committee members) who are not part of the negotiating team.493
487. Ibid.
488. European Parliament decision of 11 May 2011 on conclusion of an interinstitutional agreement between the
European Parliament and the Commission on a common Transparency Register (2010/2291(ACI)), P7_TA-
PROV(2011)0222; for the Transparency Register itself, see: http://europa.eu/transparency-register/index_en.htm.
489. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/nl/pressroom/content/20110523BKG20013/html/Parliament’s-working-
group-on-codes-of-conduct-for-MEPs-and-lobbyists
490. RASMUSSEN, “Lobbying”, 6.
491. Currently, such “correspondence” is not qualified as “a document” and thus not subject to Regulation No
1049/2001: Art. 4 of the Statute for Members of the European Parliament reads “Documents and electronic
records which a Member has received, drafted or sent shall not be treated as Parliament documents unless they
have been tabled in accordance with the Rules of Procedure.” (emphasis addedd)
492. RASMUSSEN, “Lobbying”, 2.
493. See already: European Parliament. Code of Conduct for Negotiating Codecision Files. Brussels, 2008; and
calls for further reforms: Minutes of the Conference of Presidents meeting on 10 March 2011 discussing among
others first-reading agreements, PV CPG 10.03.2011, 15-17; Own Initiative Report by Heidi Hautala of 22 June
2011 on public access to documents (Rule 104(7)) for the years 2009-2010 (2010/2294(INI), A7-0245/2011,
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3.2.3. “Best can be the enemy of the good” – optimal instead of 
maximal transparency
As stated before, it is overly clear that transparency of government is a must in
any democratic society. Hence, transparency should be consciously and vigor-
ously defended against “old boys”-club reflexes, institutionalised bureaucratic
attitudes, etc. Yet, it should also be protected from a self-defeating dogmatic
pro-transparency attitude.494 Therefore, both the costs as well as the benefits of
transparency need to be taken into account in the EU debate.495
Evasion – Indeed, if the reality is that complex compromises are rarely reached
in public, neither at the national nor at the EU level, there is no good reason to
try to impose on the EU formalised processes a degree of publicity which will
ultimately relocate the real decision-making to other informal settings. In addi-
tion, a shift from written to oral procedures is far from “merely hypothetical”496
and clearly risks to affect the quality of decision-making as well as ex post trans-
parency. Indeed, some have argued that such a shift from written to informal
oral practices is precisely what has happened under the Swedish system, result-
ing in so-called “empty archives”.497 Though “fear” for evasion practices can-
not dictate transparency policy498, these practices should nonetheless be taken
into account when the costs and benefits of imposing further openness are
weighed of. As asserted before, increased transparency should not be seen as a
goal in itself, rather the benefits to be included in the balance should be the gains
in accountability and democracy that can flow from greater transparency.
Benefits of “a space to think and negotiate” – Likewise, as discussed extensively
above499, denying the need of any so-called “space to think” both within legis-
lative deliberation processes, as in administrations where ideas and opinions can
494. See already VERHOEVEN, “The Right to Information: A Fundamental Right?”, 2-5, who, though strongly in
favour of transparency, admits that (1) excessive transparency could lead to “legalism” and “risk aversion”,
thereby undermining effective decision-making; and that (2) the result of an effective participation of citizens in
EU governance on the basis of increased access to information remains contested given the experience in the US
where the freedom of information act has “more often than not been used by commercial interests seeking to gain
competitive advantages which is hardly related to participation of citizens in government”.
495. Criticising the axiomatic way in which the claims regarding the positive consequences of transparency in
terms of legitimacy, accountability, etc., are made in the EU, see: See Naurin, D., Deliberation Behind Closed
Doors (ECPR Press, 2007), 3&6; see also Stasavage, D., “Does Transparency Make a Difference? The Example
of the European Council of Ministers” (2005), 3, available at: http://as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/5395/transparency.pdf,
496. See among others, Opinion of Advocate General in Case C-506/08 P Sweden/MyTravel and Commission,
para. 55.
497. AHLENIUS, I., “Rätten att granska tomma skåp”(2004) Dagens Nyheter 040423, as cited by NAURIN, D.,
“Public deliberation – a contradiction in terms? Transparency, deliberation and political decision-making”, –
(2006) Översikter och meddelanden Vol. 108(2), 192. ERIKSSON, F. and ÖSTBERG, K., “The problematic freedom
of information principle – The Swedisch experience”, in FLINN, A. and JONES, H. (eds) Freedom of Information –
Open Access, Empty Archives? (Routledge, London, 2009), 113-124.
498. Opinion of Advocate General in Case C-506/08 P Sweden/MyTravel and Commission, para. 50.
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be freely exchanged and left to mature without the constraints of self-censure,
would seem highly counter-productive for any decision-making process.
It should be noted that, in its opposition to any such “space to think”, the Euro-
pean Parliament is not fully consistent since it has its own share of closed or even
informal meetings. For instance, Coordinators’ meetings500 are not held in pub-
lic and know no formal practice of publishing minutes, although some experi-
menting in this respect seems ongoing.501 Still, these meetings do deal with
important matters such as whether or not the Parliament should object to Com-
mission draft Comitology measures.502 At times the Coordinators’ meeting even
decides on (adaptations to) the negotiating team and mandate for trialogues.503
Another example is the practice of (unofficial) pre-meetings between the rappor-
teur and shadow-rapporteurs dealing with a particular dossier, so as to find
compromises between the different positions which emerged during the Com-
mittee meetings.
In conclusion, Advocate General Maduro’s observation in Turco that the “Best
can sometimes be the enemy of the good”504 should be kept in mind when
designing and implementing measures to increase transparency at EU level.
500. Rule 192 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament.
501. See for instance the websites of the ENVI and IMCO committees: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activi-
ties/committees/publicationsCom.do?language=EN&body=ENVI; http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/com-
mittees/publicationsCom.do?language=EN&body=IMCO
502. Rules 87-88 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament.
503. See for example: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201104/20110420ATT18246/
20110420ATT18246EN.pdf.
504. Opinion of Advocate General in Sweden and Turco/Council, para. 40.89
CONCLUSION – A PLEA FOR ‘OPTIMAL’ AS OPPOSED TO 
‘MAXIMAL’ TRANSPARENCY
While the answer as to what precisely is the ‘optimal level of transparency’ is all
but clear-cut, and the difficulty of the Court’s balancing act should thus by fully
recognized, it nonetheless seems that part of the recent case-law is driven by a
“principled approach” which risks to defeat its own purpose. Rather than
doubting the Court’s willingness to “strike the right balance”, it seems that too
little voices critical of the ‘maximal transparency’ objective could be heard out-
side of the institutions.505 Indeed, for a long time, legal-political academic
debate seems to have assumed increased openness to be unequivocally benefi-
cial.506 And quite likely, such a fervent pro-transparency attitude was legitimate
as long as the scales in the EU were tipped heavily towards secrecy. However,
over time the EU institutions’ attitude and openness have evolved significantly.
Hence, I argue that the EU adopt should a balanced approach and strive for an
optimal level of transparency rather than pursue a maximal transparency which
is likely to come at the expense of other valid interests such as effective decision-
making. Indeed, even the Parliament, which has played a crucial role in attaining
the current level of openness, should concede that its work benefits from closed
meetings such as those between the Group of Coordinators as well as the (unof-
ficial) pre-meetings between the rapporteur and shadow-rapporteurs for a par-
ticular dossier.
Hence, the Court should avoid imposing a de facto “prohibitive” standard of
proof on the parties who argue for the need for some degree of ‘space to think
and negotiate’ and who point out the risk of evasion practices. Indeed, if not, it
risks to harm the specific deliberation and negotiation process within the Coun-
cil, to deprive the Commission of ‘frank expert advice’, to rob the institutions
from a free exchange of ideas and opinions that are given the time to mature
without the constraints of self-censure, etc. More generally, it can be argued that
Regulation No 1049/2001 should be reoriented towards its core business of
increasing the accountability and democratic legitimacy of the EU. Indeed, given
that a non-negligible (and increasing) amount of requests for disclosure come
from lawyers seeking access to large quantities of documents to support their
clients’ case in e.g. infringement or competition law cases, it seems that a lot of
people and resources are being invested for reasons that do not correspond to
the ones which inspired the adoption of the Regulation. Hence, in a world of
limited resources it makes sense to rely on the specific rules on access designed
505. ARNULL, A., “Joined Cases C 39/05 P & C 52/05 P, Sweden and Turco v. Council, judgment of the Grand
Chamber of 1 July 2008, not yet reported” (2009) C.M.L.Rev. 46, 1219-1238.
506. For a critical examination of some of these assumptions, see CURTIN, D. and MEIJER, E.J., “Does transpar-
ency strengthen legitimacy?” (2006) Information Polity 11, 109-122.PUBLIC ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS: JURISPRUDENCE BETWEEN PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE
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for these situations and reorient the ‘general’ Regulation to its original purpose.
Moreover, some of these transparency efforts could probably even be usefully
redirected to address other concerns such as the remaining obscurity of phenom-
ena like lobbying and, to some extent, trialogues.91
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